President Donald Trump may have a point when he periodically asserts that the United States is the world’s foremost military power, given the precision, stealth, networking, and cutting-edge technology of the American weapons. But are these enough to fight a long war, unless stored in plenty or replenished easily?
This is the question many leading strategic analysts are asking, with the war in Iran remaining locked in a fragile and tense limbo.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that if Trump is not inclined to disturb the fragile ceasefire in the Middle East, it could be due to Americans’ discomfort over fighting a long war. The US has decisive advantages, which it has displayed in recent years, but only when the military operations are swift and short.
But when the war gets prolonged, as it has happened in Iran (America fought for 39 days), the ruling establishment in Washington does discover, which the Trump Administration has seemingly done, that the high-end capability without industrial depth is a fragile foundation for fighting an actual war.
The world’s most sophisticated weapons that America possesses cost billions of dollars and require long lead times to produce and replenish, something that cannot be guaranteed for fighting a long war. And, the war with Iran is seemingly reflecting the age-old phenomenon that, along with the quality, quantity, and attrition of weapons, still matters.
It may be noted that Democratic Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ), a retired Navy Captain and former astronaut, who has been involved in several high-profile clashes with the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over military discipline, whistleblower protections, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) contracts, has raised concerns over US weapons stockpiles that have been depleted in the Iran war.
In a recent television interview, Kelly said that it could take “years” to replenish stockpiles of Tomahawks, Patriots, and other long-range munitions. Apparently, those remarks disturbed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth so much that he has launched an investigation into Sen. Kelly’s remarks, accusing him of leaking classified information.
Not long ago, the EurAsian Times analyzed why one possible reason for President Donald Trump’s war pause was the depletion of America’s munitions for a prolonged war against Tehran, without risking the safety and security of America and its allies in other regions like the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
But a major report from the leading American think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, released last week and authored by Mark F. Cancian and D.C. Chris H. Park, highlights that the 39-day war with Iran has severely depleted America’s front-line interceptor inventories.
The most drastic setback to US inventories involved the use of Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAMs) and THAAD and Patriot interceptors, according to CSIS.
Though the exact number of Tomahawks on hand is classified, the CSIS study estimated that before the Feb. 28 launch of Epic Fury, the U.S. had about 3,100 TLAMs. Of these, US forces lobbed more than 1,000 TLAMs at Iran during the conflict, or about a third of the entire inventory as assessed by the think tank.
Making up that supply will take some time. Tomahawk procurement “averaged 86 missiles in the past 10 fiscal years (FY 15–FY 26), with most orders coming from the Navy,” CSIS noted.
While Raytheon, which makes the missiles, has a goal of increasing capacity to produce more than 1,000 Tomahawks per year, “the recent annual production rate is less than 200 because of small past orders,” according to the think tank. “Existing orders will begin replacing the 1,000+ Tomahawks expended during the Iran War, but will not be enough to fully restore inventories to pre-war levels.”
Similarly, CSIS estimated that before the war began, the U.S. had about 400 THAAD interceptors and used between 190 and 290 during the war to protect American and allied interests. The US Army “has requested 857 THAAD interceptors in FY 2027,” CSIS explained. “Their deliveries, projected to start in mid-2029, will complete the replacement of Iran War usage by the end of calendar year 2029.”
The delivery timelines in the budget documents “imply that THAAD production is at the current surge rate of 96 interceptors a year,” the report states. “With additional facilities and tooling, Lockheed Martin plans to expand production capacity to 400 a year, a needed increase to fulfill large U.S. procurement orders and those of allies.”
The same problem of paucity is with the Patriots, too. At the start of the war, there were about 2,500 Patriot interceptors in the U.S. inventory, according to CSIS. During the conflict, between 1,060 and 1,430 Patriots were fired.
CSIS says that the current production PAC-3 MSE “is around the baseline rate of 650 interceptors per year, with half the deliveries going to the United States and the rest to allies and partners”.
Under a contract with the Pentagon inked in January, Lockheed is committed to boosting Patriot annual production to 2,000. However, “because U.S. procurement in the last decade has averaged 225 missiles per year, deliveries from prior years will not be enough to fully replace expenditures,” CSIS cautioned. “For that, the United States will need to wait for the 3,203 Patriot missiles requested in the Army’s FY 2027 budget. These are projected to start delivery in May 2029.”
Besides, before Epic Fury, the US Navy had about 400 SM-3s, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in space, and used upwards of about 250, according to CSIS. There were about 1,250 Standard Missile-6s (SM-6), which can intercept air-breathing and ballistic missile targets, as well as attack targets on land and at sea, in the arsenal, and between 190 and 370 were launched.
But these munitions will take about two years to replenish to pre-war levels, CSIS estimated. “Both missiles have lengthy production lead times,” the think tank explained. “The Missile Defense Agency and the Navy requested large quantities in the FY 2027 budget: 78 SM-3 Block IBs, 136 SM-3 Block IIAs, and 540 SM-6s. These orders will take between 36 and 39 months to begin deliveries once Congress provides appropriations.”
Because of the small size of past orders, inventories will not return to pre-war levels until early 2029, despite the relatively low usage in the campaign, CSIS pointed out.
However, the CSIS study said that although there were more than an estimated 4,000 stealthy air-launched Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) in the U.S. arsenal before the war, U.S. aircraft fired more than 1,100 of them. Here, there is not a serious problem, as there will be “large deliveries from recent procurements.”
The study says that “US forces began this campaign with a sizable JASSM inventory…The Air Force has procured large quantities of these long-range cruise missiles since the 2000s—an average of nearly 500 a year over the past decade. To deliver these orders, current production appears to be already at the surge rate, unlike the other munitions discussed in this article. Further, the missile was not used in operations until 2018. Thus, while over 1,100 JASSMs were expended, U.S. inventories will recover fairly quickly as past orders are delivered.”
However, this is not the case with the ground-launched Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), the longer-range tactical ballistic missile successor to the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It was apparently used for the first time during Epic Fury.
The inventory of these missiles “is limited as it is a relatively new system with deliveries beginning in 2023,” CSIS highlighted, estimating that there were fewer than 100 prior to the war. During the conflict, between 40 and 70 were used, the think tank posited.
“Lockheed Martin has been scaling up PrSM production, setting an annual target of 400 units last year and announcing further increases under the framework agreement with the Trump administration”, it said.
If anything, the CSIS study shows that the core issue with the US military in fighting long wars is generating high-intensity fires at a rate vastly outpacing the manufacturing base’s capacity to regenerate them.
Of course, the American military had incurred losses long before the Epic Fury. SM-3 and THAAD interceptors were degraded by more than a year of combat in the Red Sea region with the Iranian-backed Houthis and several efforts to defend Israel.
The US had also depleted its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors by giving them to Ukraine. If it later stopped giving these interceptors to Ukraine, it was principally due to the smaller number it had in its arsenal.
In a way, the shrinking arsenal capacity has adversely affected America’s reputation as a reliable arms provider to Poland, Taiwan, and the Middle East.
In the aforesaid article in EurAsian Times, we explained how America’s defense industrial base is afflicted by many bottlenecks, such as supply chain issues due to shortages of specialized components like primers, propulsion systems, and critical minerals, on the one hand, and “labor unrest” on the other. Experts say that without urgent action to scale production, streamline contracting, and prioritize munitions over less critical programs, the United States will remain vulnerable.
Viewed thus, America’s missile and air defense shortfall is a strategic challenge. It weakens deterrence, limits warfighting options, and endangers allies. It even exposes the American homeland as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and Patriot batteries constitute the primary shield against ballistic and cruise missile attack.
All of these could be factors in President Trump’s $1.5 trillion FY 2027 defense budget. His administration has also signed a series of framework agreements with industry to expand munitions production capacity, which could expedite future deliveries over the next five to seven years.
But then, as the CSIS study cautions, “ Capacity, however, does not equate to actual production”.
And that, perhaps, is the reason why President Trump, or for that matter any US President, will think about a prolonged all-out war against any adversary until American inventories are restored.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
