In modern civilian aviation, every crew is trained to treat an in-flight fire as a countdown. Once smoke is detected, they must land the aircraft and get everyone off as soon as possible. However, that wasn’t the case with a Saudi Lockheed flight.
For instance, a Turkish Airlines Airbus A330 was evacuated when smoke was seen coming from its landing gear as it was taxiing after landing in Kathmandu, Nepal, in May 2026. The incident led to the airport’s closure, even as firefighters stood ready to douse the fire. After the incident, the airline announced that all 277 passengers and 11 crew members on board were evacuated through the emergency exits, and no one was hurt.
In September 2024, an Air New Zealand ATR72 had an engine fire while approaching Wellington. The crew landed the aircraft, stopped the aircraft on the runway, and immediately told everyone to evacuate. An investigation report released this month detailed how clear commands and practiced procedures prevented a much worse outcome.
A United Airlines Boeing 787 returned to Los Angeles in March 2026 after an engine-fire warning and evacuated on the ground. Months later, a Swiss A330 aborted takeoff in Delhi after an engine failure and flames; the crew stopped and ordered an evacuation.
Furthermore, multiple cargo-hold smoke events in 2025 and 2026 were contained because modern detection and suppression systems worked as designed—and because crews treated those warnings as an immediate emergency, the lesson the Lockheed L-1011 on Saudia Flight 163 taught the industry at terrible cost.
The Flight Landed, But Nobody Deboarded
Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK was a scheduled passenger service operated by Saudi Arabian Airlines on 19 August 1980.
The aircraft, a Lockheed L-1011-200 TriStar delivered the previous year and with roughly 3,000 flight hours, flew from Quaid-e-Azam International Airport (now Jinnah International) in Karachi, Pakistan, to Jeddah International Airport, Saudi Arabia, with a scheduled refueling stop in Riyadh.
According to reports, the flight-deck crew consisted of Captain Mohammed Ali Khowyter (approximately 7,674 total flying hours, only 388 on the TriStar), First Officer Sami Abdullah M. Hasanain (roughly 1,615 total hours and just 125 on the TriStar after a recent type rating), and Flight Engineer Bradley Curtis (limited TriStar experience).
Saudia Flight 163 took off from Karachi for Jeddah International Airport, Saudi Arabia, at 18:32 Pakistan time, and landed at Riyadh Airport at 19:06 Saudi Time.
About 82 passengers boarded in Karachi and the remaining 205 in Riyadh. Many on the flight—Saudis, Pakistanis, and Iranians among them—were pilgrims traveling to Mecca (Makkah).
For the final leg, the aircraft took off from Riyadh at about 21:08 local time (18:08 UTC), bound for Jeddah.
Just seven minutes into the flight, the crew received warnings of smoke in the aircraft’s cargo compartment. While climbing through about 15,000 feet toward its planned cruising altitude, visual and aural smoke warnings activated for the aft C-3 cargo compartment. Following the first sign of trouble, the crew spent several minutes confirming the warnings.
Subsequently, the engineer entered the passenger cabin and reported smoke and fire coming from the extreme aft area, right above the cargo compartment. It was only a matter of time before smoke entered the cabin, triggering panic among the passengers.
Captain Khowyter decided to return the aircraft to Riyadh. At around 21:20 (18:20 UTC), the first officer radioed the intention to return because of the cabin fire and requested emergency services. Meanwhile, flight attendants attempted to fight the fire—which had already burned through the cabin floor—with handheld extinguishers.
During the return, the situation worsened.
The thrust lever for the number 2 engine jammed as the fire burned through control cables, forcing a shutdown on final approach. Meanwhile, chaos prevailed as the smoke detectors continued to sound the alarm and passengers started to fight in the aisles, prompting the cabin crew to reassure the panicked passengers and urge them to remain seated and calm.
Despite the chaos, the aircraft landed safely back at Riyadh on runway 01 at approximately 21:36 local time, about 28 minutes after takeoff.
However, instead of making a maximum-effort stop and evacuating immediately, the captain taxied the aircraft off the runway onto a taxiway, using much of the long runway. Meanwhile, emergency workers and fire engines were positioned at the end of the runway expecting an emergency stop and evacuation and had to chase the airplane, delaying the emergency response at a crucial point.
As the aircraft stopped, the captain radioed that they were shutting down the engines and were about to evacuate.
However, the engines kept running for several minutes, delaying ground crews from approaching the aircraft and opening the doors.
After the engines finally shut down, ground personnel still struggled to open a door, consuming more precious time as the aircraft burned.
As it turned out, all 301 people on board died, primarily from inhaling smoke and toxic gases. The autopsies later confirmed that deaths occurred well before the doors were opened and noted that the burns were secondary.
This accident remains the deadliest accident involving a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar and the second deadliest in the history of Saudi Arabia’s aviation record to this day — the biggest being the 1996 Charkhi Dadri mid-air collision just outside New Delhi, India.
An investigation later determined that the C-3 cargo compartment was a Class D compartment designed to contain fires by limiting oxygen until they self-extinguish. It also had a fire-prevention layer (liner) installed in the same class.
However, the design had a major flaw: this section was too large and had too much oxygen. As a result, the fire-prevention layer (the liner) also burned quickly, and the fire spread outside the cargo section.
“Testing demonstrated that the Nomex cargo liner material was inadequate to contain the fire within the cargo compartment. As the fire burned through the cargo liner and created a breach into the cabin, additional oxygen fed the fire in the cargo compartment. The fire quickly spread to the passenger cabin, and the burning material produced toxic fumes, including carbon monoxide,” the FAA noted.
Furthermore, investigators found the captain underused his crew in the emergency: he kept flying instead of handing control to the copilot, freeing himself to assess the return to Riyadh. The operator’s emergency checklists were poorly indexed for quick use. He also failed to brief the cabin crew for an immediate post-landing evacuation and did not perform a maximum-performance stop, instead taxiing off the runway. Moreover, the engines were not shut down promptly after stopping, which may have blocked the attendants from starting an evacuation while the engines were still running.
By the time they were shut down, toxic fumes had likely incapacitated those on board.
The accident report concluded that no evidence showed any attempt to open the doors from inside.
Investigators described the accident as fully survivable, and a question has since haunted aviation: Why would a fully loaded airliner land safely, stop on a taxiway, and still kill every person on board?
- Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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