Turkey is actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400 air defense system, including selling it off to potential buyers. However, analysts remain skeptical that it alone would be sufficient to secure Turkey’s full return to the F-35 program.
Turkish media claimed last week that Ankara’s Russian-origin S-400 air defense systems would be sold to a third country, with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerging as potential customers. The move is meant to convince the US to remove CAATSA sanctions imposed on Ankara for purchasing the S-400s.
Turkey seems to have finally confirmed that an effort to dispose of the Russian-origin system is gathering steam. The Ministry of National Defense said that “multilateral work” was underway and the public would be informed “once concrete steps are taken” while responding to queries about the S-400’s sale to a third country.
Optimism About Turkey’s Return To F-35 Imminent?
Despite being a founding member of the F-35 program with significant financial investment, Turkey was expelled from the consortium by the US and sanctioned under CAATSA for purchasing the S-400 despite repeated warnings. The rationale was simple: operating the Russian S-400 alongside the American F-35 could compromise sensitive stealth technology.
On its part, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan government risked buying the Russian S-400 because it urgently needed a long-range air defense system amid rising security threats, and the advanced NATO-origin systems sought by Ankara, including Patriot and SAMP/T, were either denied or delayed. Moreover, Ankara sought a policy realignment and pursued closer ties with Moscow amid mutual suspicions with Washington and other Western allies following the 2016 coup, as detailed in a EurAsian Times report.
Despite the perils associated with its purchase, the S-400 was never activated, let alone integrated into the Turkish air defense network, as Ankara continued to pursue the F-35.
While the S-400’s fate in Turkey remained undecided, Ankara has been eager to relinquish the Russian system to make way for the American F-35, especially since it is steadily losing its air-power edge in the region, with both Israel and Greece acquiring F-35s.
In fact, a host of options have been considered over the years to create conditions conducive to its return to the stealth fighter program: keeping the S-400 inactive, storing it at a US base, selling it to a third country, or returning it to Russia.
Speaking alongside Erdogan after arriving in Ankara for the NATO leaders’ summit on July 7, Trump said, “We’re going to lift the sanctions. We don’t want to sanction our friends. I don’t want to choke my friend with sanctions.” Furthermore, when asked whether F-35 will finally be sold to Turkey, Trump said, “That’s a decision we’re going to make… It’s a great plane, the best plane by far, and it’s certainly something we will consider.”
Following these comments, a Bloomberg report citing unidentified Turkish officials stated that the US could deliver a batch of 6 F-35s, depending on when sanctions on Ankara are lifted, whereas Turkish President Erdogan separately expressed confidence that Washington would support the sale of F-35s to his country.
That said, the prospect of selling the S-400 systems to a Gulf state such as Qatar or the UAE — in hopes of regaining access to the F-35 — is far from straightforward. While appealing in theory, the plan faces significant practical, diplomatic, and security challenges.
Notably, President Donald Trump must formally inform Congress that the S-400s are non-operational, that Turkey no longer owns them, and that Ankara promises not to forge similar ties with Russia in the future to eliminate CAATSA sanctions. If Congress is not persuaded that these legal conditions have been fulfilled, the matter may move to a vote.
Some analysts, including an Israeli expert whom the EurAsian Times spoke with, seem to think that even ridding itself of the S-400 won’t solve Ankara’s troubles and certainly won’t secure its entry into the F-35 program.
Turkey May Never Get The F-35?
Even if Turkey successfully sells its Russian S-400 systems to a third country, such as Qatar, several significant obstacles remain before it can realistically acquire F-35 fighter jets.
“Qatar is Ankara’s closest military ally in the Gulf. Yet even an S-400 transfer to Qatar would not restore Turkey to the F-35 program,” Shay Gal, Ex-Vice President of External Relations at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), told the EurAsian Times.
“Washington has already built safeguards against cosmetic divestment. I was directly involved in that effort. Relocation (to Qatar) does not erase the exposure, the record or Turkey’s strategic incompatibility with the West’s most sensitive combat aircraft,” Gal added.
A section of experts believes that the S-400 issue is not solely about the physical hardware in Turkey, but also about an irreversible exposure risk, especially since Russian specialists were reportedly involved in setting up the S-400 in Turkey. There is considerable skepticism that these personnel may have benefited by gathering information about the F-35, at least until 2019, when Ankara was still part of the consortium.
This is why many US officials believe the compromise risk is permanent. Even if Turkey sells every S-400 battery tomorrow, the data that may already have been transferred to Russia cannot be undone, and neither can the prevailing mistrust.
Moreover, Ankara maintains a fairly decent relationship with Moscow, unlike the rest of NATO. There is an impression that verified divestment would remove the technical risk. It would not restore strategic trust.
“Advanced Western weapons supplied to Ankara strengthen Turkey, not the Alliance. They will not deter Russia, whose gas reaches Europe through TurkStream and whose state company is building and will operate Turkey’s first nuclear plant. Nor will they deter Iran, whose survival serves Turkish interests,” Gal added.
Notably, Qatar, which has emerged as a prospective buyer of the S-400, is a close ally of Turkey in West Asia as well as that of the US. Moving the S-400 to another US-aligned Gulf state is seen by many as merely shifting the problem rather than eliminating it. In fact, the problem may be compounded as Qatar hosts the Al Udeid military base, one of the most important US military facilities in the world.
“A Qatari transfer would not neutralize the S-400. It would transplant a Russian system into Turkey’s closest Gulf defense network and the country hosting Al Udeid. That is strategic laundering, not disposal.” Gal said. This could dissuade the US Congress from approving the arrangement and a potential F-35 sale to Ankara.
Furthermore, the Israeli analyst said even though the US President has been rather enthusiastic about resolving the conundrum, he does not have the authority to approve the sale of the F-35 on his own.
“The United States is not its president. Whatever Trump promised Erdogan, and whatever he signed, neither promise nor signature delivers an aircraft. Trump can promise. The state must deliver. That state is Congress, the Pentagon, the intelligence community, export law, and the security review system. What some deride as the “deep state” is the state itself: institutions built to stop one man’s commitment from becoming a strategic fact. Trump may weaken them, but he cannot abolish law, procedure, or time,” Gal said.
“Any Turkish return will face scrutiny, conditions and delay. The F-35 pipeline spans years: congressional review, contracting, production allocation, configuration, testing, training, infrastructure, and certification. Trump’s term will expire before Turkey receives a single F-35,” he added.
It is pertinent to note here that several US lawmakers have publicly opposed transferring the F-35 to Turkey based on mere relocation.
One of the major challenges plaguing Turkey’s S-400 disposal strategy is that it depends on Russia’s approval, which is entirely contingent on what Moscow could derive from it.
According to Gal, “Moscow will consent only if the transfer preserves Russian leverage, access or compensation.”
Having said that, a potential sale of F-35 to Turkey has been opposed by both Israel and Greece (another NATO ally), Turkey’s two major regional rivals.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposed the deal shortly after Trump expressed optimism about lifting sanctions. Netanyahu told CNN that he urged Trump not to sell the F-35 to Turkey, adding that doing so would “destroy the power balance in the Middle East.”
Tel Aviv believes that the sale of F-35 to Turkey would upset the “Qualitative Military Edge” promised by the US to Israel.
Meanwhile, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias voiced concern over a potential deal, saying, “Greece will not be pleased if Turkey acquires the F-35s, or if Turkey acquires the engines for next-generation aircraft.”
When asked whether Ankara’s acquisition of F-35 would threaten its rivals, Gal said, “Turkey will not leapfrog Greece, whose first aircraft are scheduled for 2028 and whose pilots will train in the United States. Nor will it overtake Israel, whose third squadron of 25 additional F-35Is will begin arriving in 2028 at a rate of three to five aircraft annually.”
Israel’s opposition adds significant political weight against the deal in Washington, especially among a significant number of pro-Israel lawmakers in Congress. Combined with Greek concerns and US lawmakers’ skepticism about Turkey’s reliability in operating the F-35, it may create a difficult environment for the Trump administration to sell the stealth fighter to Turkey, even if it sells its S-400s.
“The S-400 may leave Turkey. The strategic problem will not,” Gal concluded.
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