Former CIA officer John Kiriakou exposed Pakistan’s double game and U.S. complicity, revealing decades of state-sponsored terrorism, elite corruption, and strategic deception. His revelations highlight how Islamabad’s reliance on external powers undermines regional stability and India’s security.
Recent revelations by former CIA officer John Kiriakou have once again exposed the duplicitous relationship between Pakistan and the United States — a relationship built on mutual manipulation, strategic convenience, and disregard for regional stability.
In a candid disclosure, Kiriakou admitted that the U.S. funnelled millions of dollars to Pakistan, deliberately ignored its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism against India, and even exercised control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in 2001.
His words are damning: “Musharraf had to keep the military and the clerics happy. He pretended to cooperate with the Americans on counterterrorism while committing terror against India.”
Kiriakou further revealed that during the 2001 Parliament attack crisis, the U.S. feared an India–Pakistan war so intensely that it evacuated its personnel from Islamabad.
Yet, Washington’s focus remained fixed on Afghanistan and al-Qaeda, not on Pakistan’s terror activities or its deception. “We were so busy with al-Qaeda and Afghanistan,” he said, “we never gave two thoughts to India.”
This has been a recurring pattern in U.S. policy toward South Asia. Moreover, whenever Pakistan’s actions endanger regional peace, Washington’s immediate response is not to confront Islamabad but to urge New Delhi to exercise “strategic restraint” and “strategic patience.”
Instead of holding Pakistan accountable and addressing India’s legitimate concerns, the U.S. has repeatedly expected India to absorb provocations quietly in the name of stability. This tendency continues even today, as seen when Washington once again counselled restraint following India’s retaliatory strikes under Operation Sindoor after the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack.
Dollars for Deception
Kiriakou’s testimony confirms what New Delhi had long maintained: Washington consistently turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism.
For years, Pakistan played a dangerous double game — accepting U.S. aid and intelligence cooperation on one hand, while providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives on the other. At the same time, it was sponsoring cross-border terrorism against India, further destabilizing the region.
As Kiriakou explained about Musharraf’s post-9/11 approach: “He had to keep the military happy. And the military didn’t care about Al-Qaeda. They cared about India. So, to satisfy both the military and extremists, he allowed a dual life — pretending to cooperate with the Americans on counterterrorism while committing terror against India.”
This statement reflects that the U.S. was fully aware of all three dimensions — Pakistan taking American aid, providing safe havens to extremist groups, and exporting terror against India — yet it largely remained silent.
This exposes the shocking reality of U.S. policy: despite knowing that Pakistan was undermining American objectives, Washington continued to provide aid, military assistance, and diplomatic cover, prioritizing short-term strategic convenience over long-term regional stability, security, and its relationship with India. The result has been a policy of deliberate blindness.
Even when Osama bin Laden was discovered living in Abbottabad — near Pakistan’s premier military academy — Washington avoided holding Islamabad fully accountable.
Externalizing Weakness
Moreover, unable to match India’s conventional military strength, Pakistan has historically adopted a strategy of externalizing its security by drawing other powers into its regional disputes.
The aim has been to make these powers stakeholders, particularly in any potential confrontation with India, thereby creating strategic leverage and an artificial form of deterrence. By raising the strategic stakes of these external actors, Pakistan seeks to ensure that in the event of an Indian attack, their assets and interests would also come under threat, compelling their involvement — effectively turning this approach into an insurance strategy for its own survival.
This practice began during the Cold War, first with China and later with the United States. In the 1960s, Islamabad ceded parts of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir to Beijing through the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, transferring approximately 5,180 square kilometers of territory, including Aksai Chin.
By doing so, Pakistan enabled China to secure a critical high-altitude corridor — the G219 highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet — giving Beijing direct strategic and logistical control over the region.
Today, through the $62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and extensive Chinese investments in dams, roads, and other infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and other areas, Pakistan has deliberately made China a direct stakeholder in the disputes with India, ensuring that any confrontation over the region involves Beijing as well.
Similarly, Pakistan has sought to ensure U.S. involvement by hosting American facilities, selectively sharing intelligence, and allowing Washington influence over its nuclear assets.
This was evident during Operation Sindoor, when India struck the Noor Khan Airbase in response to Pakistan’s provocations. The United States reportedly became alarmed, fearing for the security of both its strategic facilities and Pakistan’s nuclear assets, which remained under American oversight.
Washington grew increasingly anxious and soon became deeply involved in diffusing the tensions. However, the ceasefire agreement between the two countries was reached only after Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) reached out to his Indian counterpart, requesting a ceasefire, which eventually led to a cessation of hostilities.
Such incidents reveal how Pakistan exploits its strategic dependence on external powers to trigger international intervention, thereby shielding itself from India’s justified military responses.
Limits of Islamabad’s Autonomy
This deep-rooted external dependence extends beyond security and diplomacy, revealing the myth behind Pakistan’s claims of sovereignty. Many leaders and analysts in Pakistan often boast about pursuing an independent foreign policy comparable to India’s.
However, this notion remains largely rhetorical, as Pakistan continues to rely strategically, economically, and geopolitically on external actors — particularly the United States, China, and Western financial institutions.
Former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf himself acknowledged this dependency in his memoir In the Line of Fire. Reflecting on the post-9/11 period, he admitted that Pakistan was unable to resist U.S. pressure when Washington sought its support, exposing the limits of Islamabad’s autonomy.
Musharraf wrote that he had “war-gamed the United States as an adversary” and concluded that Pakistan could not withstand an American assault: “We could not, on three counts — military, economy, and national unity,” he confessed.
“Pakistan’s military would have been wiped out, its economy could not be sustained, and the nation lacked the unity needed for such a confrontation.” This candid admission underscores how Pakistan’s sovereignty has often been conditional — traded for financial aid, military protection, and political survival.
Today, Pakistan’s economy remains sustained by IMF loans, U.S. and Gulf aid, and Chinese infrastructure investments. Yet, these resources rarely translate into public welfare; instead, they enrich the political and military elite. Many among them live in luxury — their families educated abroad, their assets secured in Western capitals — while ordinary citizens struggle with food shortages, unemployment, and inflation.
Kiriakou also highlighted the extravagance and corruption of Pakistan’s political elite, using Benazir Bhutto as a striking example. He described visiting her in exile in Dubai, where she lived in a $5 million palace surrounded by a collection of luxury cars.
Kiriakou remarked, “She lives in a $5 million house with a collection of Bentleys. Aren’t they ashamed of themselves? Their people don’t even have shoes or enough food to eat.” This stark contrast between elite opulence and public deprivation highlights how foreign aid and political privilege have consistently benefited Pakistan’s ruling class rather than its citizens.
Reflecting on Pakistan’s chronic instability, Kiriakou further expressed concern over the country’s internal divisions. “I’m worried about continued disagreement in Pakistani politics that has the potential to spill into the streets,” he warned.
“The Pakistanis have a tendency to get themselves spun up, and people die during demonstrations, and there are attacks against political figures and assassinations. The country is not known for its transformative leaders making positive decisions.” His remarks capture the grim reality of a state caught between elite corruption, populist volatility, and institutional decay — a reality that continues to undermine both its sovereignty and stability.
A Comfortable Arrangement
Perhaps the most revealing part of Kiriakou’s account is his admission about Washington’s preference for autocrats: “The United States loves working with dictators. Because then you don’t have to worry about public opinion or the media. We essentially just purchased Musharraf.”
This blunt statement encapsulates the essence of U.S.–Pakistan relations. Washington finds Pakistan’s military rulers more reliable than its fragile civilian governments, while the generals prefer U.S. backing to maintain their power and wealth. Democracy, therefore, has never been in the strategic interest of either side.
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship has always been transactional — a marriage of convenience between a superpower seeking regional leverage and a military regime desperate for survival. For Washington, Pakistan offers access and intelligence; for Islamabad, it offers dollars and diplomatic cover. Both sides know the deceit, but neither has the incentive to change.
As history repeats itself, Pakistan continues to act as the West’s “bad boy” in South Asia — destabilizing its neighbours, manipulating its patrons, and blaming its failures on others. The Kiriakou revelations only confirm what has long been visible: Pakistan’s sovereignty has been sold, its democracy subverted, and its policies shaped not in Islamabad, but in Washington and Beijing.
Until this dependency ends, Pakistan will remain trapped — not as a victim of foreign powers, but as an architect of its own subservience.
OPED by a Kashmiri Author who wishes to remain anonymous
