The prolonged closure of the Hormuz Strait due to an impasse in the US-Iran war and negotiations calls for a considered analysis.
The question of whether the US–Iran peace talks in Islamabad were designed to fail arises naturally from how they were conceived, conducted, and publicly presented. The heightened hope surrounding the peace talks, along with the absence of overt background diplomacy, suggests that the talks were perhaps critically misaligned from the start. Instead of generating basic diplomatic engagement to lay the groundwork, the process seemed to be undercooked. It lacked the invisible, ongoing backroom processes that drive successful negotiations.
Among the notable elements of the negotiations were the delegates chosen, particularly by the US. The absence of seasoned diplomats was conspicuous. While the decision to send a high-level political delegation led by Vice President J.D. Vance was an indicator of serious intent, it turned troublesome for the complex talks. Crisis negotiations, particularly among rivals such as Iran and the United States, depend heavily on calm, quiet diplomacy handled by competent diplomats away from the public gaze.
Figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who were part of the American team, had already lost credibility with Tehran following earlier failed engagements, and their presence did little to inspire confidence. More importantly, there appeared to be no one tasked with conducting the essential “backroom” diplomacy that allows contentious issues to be explored, reframed, and gradually narrowed.
Analyzing past negotiations emphasizes this aspect. The US and Iran in 1980 held talks in Algiers to secure the emancipation of US Embassy hostages. These talks were between experienced diplomats, such as Christopher Warren, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Algerian FM, who undertook patient mediation. The Iranian team was close to the Iranian President. The negotiations unfolded over several days from November 1980 to January 1981, of indirect, proximity talks, during which issues were patiently worked through before a resolution was reached.
When Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization held talks in Oslo, success emerged due to quiet diplomacy outside media scrutiny. Norwegian mediators found avenues to build trust using informal channels, which then aided formal discussions. In both cases, the presence of skilled diplomats and the insulation of the process from public pressure were critical to success, conditions that were largely absent in Islamabad.
A second issue relates to the decision to begin the process at such a high political level. Dispatching the Vice President for what was effectively a first round of talks created the impression that a deal had already been substantially negotiated and merely awaited formalization. This led to high expectations on the Ianina side and may have framed their positions at the talks.
Tehran responded by sending its Speaker of Parliament, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and a diverse delegation, ready to discuss all issues. However, it quickly became apparent that there was no underlying convergence. The imbalance between the political weight of the delegations and the lack of substantive preparatory work left both sides constrained rather than empowered.
For Vance, his perception of political risk within his own constituency lurked behind his positions. Entering an agreement through compromise that did not fully meet US ambitions would have drawn domestic criticism of giving in to Iran, thereby curtailing his negotiating stance. Internal political perceptions in the US seemed to guide the US negotiating positions.
Another issue was the lack of a layered diplomatic engagement.
To create an ambiance for tackling background work on identifying issues, unaccompanied by them, and prioritizing where to begin to make the talks meaningful. In the Islamabad talks, there were signs that such efforts were lacking, either on Pakistan’s part or by the US and Iran jointly, to establish a framework to work within.
Instead, highly complex and contentious issues were placed on the table simultaneously. American demands relating to Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities, for instance, were unlikely to be resolved in a single round of talks, particularly given the history of mistrust and the collapse of earlier agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
In the Iranian view, their hope of lifting sanctions and the release of frozen financial assets was perhaps overambitious, particularly as they lacked an offer of reciprocity. Both Iran and the US came to the talks with fulsome demands, without a plan to create areas of convergence.
The Strait of Hormuz restrictions demonstrate the mismanaged priorities. The Strait is pivotal to international energy supply chains. Seeking continuous functioning without restrictions by either party may have been an important initial step and a CBM. Instead, the issue became entangled in broader strategic disagreements.
Iran appeared to view its control over the strait as a source of leverage, while underestimating the extent to which other stakeholders in Asia and Africa would criticize any attempt to restrict access to what is regarded as an international waterway. Similarly, the US’s control over access to the Strait and its check on shipping led to a ladder of escalation that made the outlook more Dangerous than when the crisis erupted. This outcome suggests a failure to prioritize achievable objectives and to build trust incrementally.
The compressed timeframe of the talks also points to a lack of seriousness in their design. Although discussions reportedly lasted around 21 hours and included both proximity and direct exchanges, this was insufficient to address issues of such complexity. The fact that the talks moved from indirect to direct engagement was, in itself, a positive development, as was the exchange of written proposals. Yet these primary successes were not followed up.
Factors seem to have been introduced behind the scenes, either due to an altered political matrix or a sharpening of views, which thwarted progress. For Iran, the result perhaps strengthened anxieties about US objectives, cleaving the circle of mistrust that has long marked their relationship.
Lastly, the public glare and constant media coverage may have impinged on their effectiveness. Pakistan, as the host, predictably sought media attention for its perceived diplomatic coup. The complex diplomacy required on this occasion could not benefit from publicity.
To succeed, such diplomacy needs discretion, often deniability, and the option to seek adjustments without parallel public scrutiny. Top-level engagement can be effective when it helps finalize the remaining parts of agreements that have been extensively worked on by the sherpas. Without such layered diplomacy, summit engagement is theatrical rather than result-oriented.
The Islamabad mediation demonstrates the perils of trying shortcuts in public image-building, which cannot help difficult talks succeed. The lack of capable diplomats given the confidence to proceed, the premature elevation of the talks to high political levels, the absence of a negotiated and prioritized framework, and the impact of relative internal political perceptions all contributed to a suboptimal result.
While it cannot be said that these talks were clearly designed to fail, they do seem to have been initiated in a way that made success very improbable.
- Gurjit Singh is a former Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, and Ethiopia; ASEAN; and the African Union Chair; a member of the CII Task Force on Trilateral Cooperation in Africa; and a Professor at IIT Indore.
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