Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung has blasted China’s schemes to pressure several African nations to withdraw overflight permits for the island’s leader, saying Taiwan will not “bow its head.”
Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te postponed an official trip to Eswatini — the island’s only diplomatic ally — last week after “Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar unexpectedly and without prior notice revoked the charter’s overflight permits”.
Lin attended the 40th anniversary of Eswatini King Mswati III’s accession, representing Lai after arriving in the African kingdom on Saturday.
“No matter how China uses political power to interfere with normal international civil aviation operations, politicizing and weaponizing flight information … it will not make Taiwan bow its head, nor will it stop our progress,” Lin posted on Facebook on Sunday.
“No unreasonable blockade or pressure can shake our resolve and will to safeguard our dignity and connect with the international community,” he added.
Washington has denounced China’s action, labeling it an “intimidation campaign against Taiwan and Taiwan’s supporters around the world”. Beijing shot back, calling American remarks a “baseless accusation” and maintaining that its actions were legitimate.
Taiwan – No Walkover?
China considers Taiwan a rogue province and has vowed to seize it by force if necessary.
Taiwan’s military posture is centered on the “porcupine strategy,” an asymmetric warfare concept aimed at deterring an invasion by making any attack very costly for the PLA, as EurAsian Times previously explained in a detailed article. This strategy includes anti-ship missiles, both locally manufactured and those purchased from the USA in recent years.
Taiwan’s media claims that it will complete mass production of more than 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III (including extended-range variants) anti-ship missiles by December 2026 under the Sea Air Combat Power Improvement Plan.
Combined with phased deliveries of the 400 US land-based Harpoon Coastal Defense System, Taiwan’s arsenal is projected to exceed 1,400 missiles in the coming years.
The main Taiwanese island has a coastline of about 1,566 kilometers, which means it would have about 0.9 missiles per kilometer. However, the actual density is likely to be higher when factoring in deployment along the western coast facing the Taiwan Strait and mobile systems capable of concentrating fires.
In contrast to Taiwan, China has a massive inventory of anti-ship missiles, including land-based coastal cruise missiles such as the YJ-12, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) such as the DF-21D and DF-26, and air-launched anti-ship missiles such as the YJ-18 and YJ-21. This means Taiwan trails China in both the sheer volume of anti-ship missiles and in their speed, range, and overall lethality.
However, China also has a massive coastline stretching about 14,500 kilometers, meaning the density of missile deployment will be lower than Taiwan’s. China’s missile arsenal is spread across a much longer, more dispersed coastline from the Bohai Sea in the north to the South China Sea, creating a formidable A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network.
This is also because China’s strategy focuses on power projection across the Western Pacific and saturation attacks against distant fleets rather than ultra-dense local coastal defense, like Taiwan’s, tailored to thwart a Chinese invasion attempt.
Taiwan’s Porcupine Strategy
Anti-ship missiles are the cornerstone of Taiwan’s porcupine strategy.
In the event of an amphibious invasion by Chinese troops, these missiles would be employed to target the PLA Navy’s amphibious and support vessels during the transit and landing phases, which are considered the most vulnerable steps of the invasion.
In a cross-strait situation, China would have to use civilian ferries, landing ships, and aircraft carriers to transport tens of thousands of troops, vehicles, and supplies across the strait, creating a logistical nightmare.
The three main anti-ship missiles that Taiwan is filling its inventory with are the Hsiung Feng II, Hsiung Feng III, and US-origin Harpoon Block II.
In 2023, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) published a video showing road-mobile launchers carrying the HF-II and HF-III missiles, whereas the Harpoon was shown being fired from a naval warship and a land launcher, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times. Footage of an overhead drone with a targeting reticule captures the Harpoon hitting the rear and the HF-II and HF-III striking the middle sections.
Subsequent photos showed three holes on the target ship, color-coded to mark the left, center, and right-most holes punctured on the vessel’s hull to be made by the HF-III, HF-II, and Harpoon missiles. Therefore, demonstrating the sheer importance the Taiwanese military places on these munitions.
Hsiung Feng II is a subsonic missile with a range of about 150 to 250 kilometers. It can be deployed from land-based truck launchers, ships, aircraft, or small boats, and is considered versatile for saturating PLA escorts.
It has been integrated into Taiwan’s Kuang Hua-class fast-attack craft and the new Tuo Chiang-class corvettes. In fact, in 2022, the missile was tested from a coast guard ship.
It uses a solid-propellant booster for launch and a turbojet engine for cruise, which gives it a sea-skimming flight profile to evade hostile air defenses. The missile typically uses an inertial navigation system (INS) and GPS for mid-course guidance and targeting.
Hsiung Feng III is Taiwan’s flagship supersonic “carrier killer” missile with a range of up to 400 kilometers in the extended-range variant. Developed to counter the growing number of China’s surface vessels and its advancing fleet defense systems, the Hsiung Feng III is propelled by a solid-fueled booster and liquid-fueled ramjet engine, and carries a single 120-kilogram high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing warhead.
INS uses terminal active radar homing to guide the missile. According to reports, it contains a smart fuse that maximizes damage by directing the majority of the explosive force downward after it detects that the missile is within the target ship’s hull.
Launched from coastal batteries and frigates, the missile is designed to overwhelm PLA defenses with speed and maneuverability. Additionally, the missile is available in an air-launched variant, which was reportedly deployed for the first time during a live-fire test in December 2025.
The Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS) is a land-based variant of the Boeing Harpoon Block II missile, designed to target a range of maritime and land-based threats, including coastal defenses, surface-to-air missile sites, ports, and moored ships.
The Harpoon missile system can strike stationary and moving targets from at least 124 kilometers away, placing much of the Taiwan Strait within its range.
The missile incorporates a GPS receiver and advanced flight-control systems, which allow it to navigate complex littoral environments with greater precision. Additionally, the missile features a two-way data link, enabling mid-flight retargeting. This is essential in dynamic combat scenarios where target priorities shift rapidly.
The Harpoon is radar-guided, allowing it to function in any weather conditions. This is a major advantage, particularly in maritime environments where visibility can be unpredictable. However, adversaries can detect radar emissions, rendering the missile susceptible to jamming.
In addition to these cutting-edge weapons, Taiwan is reportedly developing a next-generation anti-ship missile with a longer range. Taiwan’s defense ministry announced a new weapon described as a “long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile” in a list issued under the Defense Industry Development Act in August 2025.
“The new missile is believed to be a key weapon to make up for the range shortfall of Taiwan’s current anti-ship missiles, with performance expected to surpass that of the Hsiung Feng III and give the military a true ‘carrier killer’,” Lu De-yun, a former press secretary for Taiwan’s defence ministry was quoted as saying by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post at the time.
This setup creates an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble over the strait, deterring not only full invasions but also blockades by threatening the Chinese logistics. In previous war games, it has been estimated that dense anti-ship missile barrages could sink 20–50% of the invading PLA fleet in the first 24–48 hours.
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