Uzbekistan has publicly displayed J-10CE multirole fighter jets. This appears to confirm that the Central Asian country is the second confirmed customer for Chinese aircraft after Pakistan.
Uzbekistan released footage of its newly acquired J-10CE fighter jets on August 28, 2026, as part of the country’s Independence Day celebrations.
At least six J-10CE fighters were shown flying in formation, approaching the runway, and being greeted with a water-cannon salute in a two-hour broadcast on the state television channel O’zbekiston 24 Telekanali.
Subsequently, the Uzbek Defense Ministry described the aircraft as “modern fighter aircraft guarding our air borders” in an official video aired on state television on August 30, 2026.
The official confirmation follows days of photo updates and open-source reporting on the aircraft’s purported delivery to the Central Asian country.
Uzbekistan has officially inducted the Chinese-made J-10CE fighter jet into its Air Force
On August 30, 2026, the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan announced that Chinese-made J-10CE fighter jets have officially entered service with the Uzbek Air Force.#J10CE #AVIC #Chengdu… pic.twitter.com/Zy6U5gG32F
— China Military Bugle (@ChinaMilBugle) August 31, 2026
Currently, two other Asian countries—Indonesia and Bangladesh—remain interested in the aircraft, as the EurAsian Times has reported on multiple occasions.
So far best image of 5 Uzbekistan AF J-10CEs. pic.twitter.com/fFZvesV7Xu
— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) August 30, 2026
As for Uzbekistan, previous reports suggested an order for up to 24 aircraft, but the government has not confirmed the total number.
Nonetheless, the purchase marks a major modernization for the Uzbek Air Force, which currently comprises aging Soviet-origin MiG-29s, Su-25 Frogfoots, and Su-27 combat jets.
Speaking about the confirmation of the purchase, Chinese military analyst Zhang Junshe told the state-owned media outlet Global Times that Uzbekistan’s choice of the J-10CE is based on four factors: 1) The pressing need to replace aging MiG-29 and Su-27 fleets plagued by high failure rates and maintenance difficulties; 2) J-10C’s cost-effectiveness compared with Western fighters of similar capability; 3) Proven combat performance in India-Pakistan engagements; and 4) seamless integration with existing Chinese systems in Uzbek military such as the HQ-9B.
Furthermore, Zhang emphasized that the J-10CE is relatively easier to maintain, and China’s well-established defense industry support infrastructure could help lower long-term operational and maintenance costs.
Uzbekistan’s confirmation of its purchase is a clear and powerful indicator of a broader trend: China is rapidly eroding Russian influence in Central Asia amid the latter’s engagement in the Ukraine War, and could eventually replace Moscow as the region’s largest arms exporter.
China Replacing Russia As Dominant Player in Central Asia
Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—all formerly Soviet republics—was long a near-monopoly of Russian and Soviet-legacy arms.
Following the fall of the USSR, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan acquired Soviet aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, air defense systems, maintenance infrastructure, and military training standards.
This made Russian weapons a natural choice, and Moscow supplied most major conventional weapons for decades, supported by CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) membership, military bases in the region, military training, and widespread subsidized deals.
That near-monopoly has loosened.
Russia’s overall global arms exports fell 64% between 2016–20 and 2021–25, including to Central Asia. This was largely due to the war in Ukraine, which strained production, forced Moscow to prioritize domestic needs, and created delivery problems for buyers.
This, in turn, drove away customers that had traditionally bought Russian weapons, forcing them to diversify their purchases to prevent putting all their eggs in the same basket.
China, on the other hand, had a major economic relationship with Central Asia. It formed economic ties with the region soon after the Soviet Union’s collapse and has expanded them significantly over the past two decades through massive infrastructure investments driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), increased bilateral trade, regional frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and energy cooperation.
In fact, China has now replaced Russia as the biggest direct foreign investor in Central Asia.
Its cumulative direct investment in Central Asia exceeded $35 billion in 2025, according to data from the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) published earlier this year. In comparison, Russia’s cumulative direct investment in Central Asia was about $20 billion, as Russian President Vladimir Putin noted in October 2025.
Over the past five years, Chinese investment in Uzbekistan—the buyer of Chinese J-10CE jets—has surged from $2.1 billion to $10.7 billion.
As trade flourished, China began expanding defense ties with the Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan purchased the FD-2000, the export variant of the HQ-9 long-range air defense system, the FM-90 short-range air defense system, and the KS-1C medium-range air defense system. Additionally, it also purchased the cutting-edge Wing Loong II drones, showcasing a clear expansion in arms imports from Beijing.
The Uzbek Air Force has historically relied heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made platforms such as the MiG-29, Su-25, and some Su-27 Aircraft. In fact, reporting from 2019 suggests the country informed Russia of its interest in buying Su-30SM multirole fighters as a modern replacement for its aging Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, and in modernizing the Fulcrums. However, interest in the Russian Su-30 may have stalled later, and the purchase of the J-10 marks the clearest shift for Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan purchased the Chinese Wing Loong-1 armed drones in 2016, and later expanded the purchase in 2024. Additionally, it acquired eight Y-8F-200W transport aircraft under a 2018 agreement.
Turkmenistan has acquired and integrated the HQ-9, HQ-12, the FM-90, and the KS-1C into its armed forces. Additionally, it has purchased CH-3A and WJ-600A attack drones, Wing Loong-type drones, the YLC-18 active phased-array surveillance radar, and tropospheric communications and electronic reconnaissance stations.
Tajikistan—despite relying heavily on Russia—has acquired Chinese Norinco VP11 armored vehicles, CS/VN3 light armored vehicles, China Tiger armored cars, self-propelled mortar systems, and small arms.
Although Kyrgyzstan is not yet a major buyer of sophisticated Chinese weapons, China has been providing regular military and security assistance. According to reports, China has supplied vehicles, communications equipment, and other hardware, while Chinese institutions have trained Kyrgyz personnel.
Many of these purchases were made before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, when Central Asian countries decided to diversify arms purchases amid Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine War, China saw an opportunity to further strengthen those ties, which has likely culminated in the sale of its J-10CE fighter jets.
“China is filling the vacuum left behind by Russia in fulfilling the arms requirements of Central Asian states. China attaches much significance to the Central Asian region as a bridge linking East and West, and supplying arms to these countries allows Beijing to expand its influence in this strategic region,” K.N. Pandita, the former director of the Center of Central Asian Studies at Kashmir University, earlier wrote for the EurAsian Times.
As of now, China’s role is expanding steadily, driven primarily by Russia’s constrained export capacity, competitive Chinese pricing, a willingness to supply advanced systems, and energy and trade ties.
Russia retains geographic proximity, CSTO mechanisms, training networks, and large legacy inventories that still dominate most Central Asian forces. However, its involvement in the Ukraine War and the crippling Western sanctions on Moscow, which are affecting its ability to produce weapons platforms, are expected to further reduce its share in the global export market. Therefore, China appears best placed to capitalize on Russia’s declining share of the global arms export market.
Earlier, Brian Hart, deputy director and fellow of the China Power Project at the US-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said China’s increase in arms sales could make Russia the biggest loser in the arms sales competition. “The United States sells to its military allies and other close security partners, while Russia has historically captured much of the rest of the global market share. If China begins selling military equipment, it will likely make the most inroads with countries that have historically bought from Russia – especially since much of China’s own equipment has evolved from systems designed by Russia,” he had argued.
The public appearance of Uzbek J-10s is a concrete marker of Chinese fighter-export progress and illustrates a real, ongoing diversification in Central Asian defense procurement driven by practical needs, economic ties, and shifting supplier reliability.
However, China’s gain would inevitably mean a Russian loss in the long-term.
- Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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