During his first term in office, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal.
Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) had signed a joint plan of action to restrain Iran from achieving nuclear capability.
On May 8, 2018, the US announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA, arguing that it was a “bad deal” because it was not permanent and did not address Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
Further, Trump imposed sanctions on Iran, a decision heavily influenced by its regional ally, Israel.
Resentment In Europe
The withdrawal raised concerns in Iran due to its economic impact. Even America’s European allies, including the UK, felt belittled by the US’s unilateral action.
In a joint statement responding to the U.S. withdrawal, the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom stated that the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing the nuclear deal remained the “binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute.”
Various countries, international organizations, and U.S. scholars have expressed regret or criticised the withdrawal, while some U.S. conservatives, Israel, and Saudi Arabia supported it.
In response to the joint statement of three European countries that a resolution passed by the Security Council was binding for member countries to honour, Washington had argued that President Trump was authorised under the terms of the JCPOA to make a 90-day certification of the agreement’s implementation.
The US President was required to certify every 90 days that continued sanctions relief pursuant to the JCPOA was in the national security interests of the United States, that Iran was implementing the JCPOA and not in material breach of it, or that it was not pursuing covert nuclear activities. Therefore, his decision in 2018 to withdraw the US from the deal was legally perfect.
Notably, the European countries have traditionally advocated good relations with Iran. Even after the US withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal, EU countries held numerous meetings with Tehran to negotiate a new agreement. Of these, the Vienna talks were much trumpeted, although nothing concrete came out of them.
Breaking The Ice
On April 7, President Donald Trump made a surprise announcement that the US and Iran are poised to have direct talks on Tehran’s nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the discussion would remain indirect.
For some time before the news broke that the two countries would be engaged in indirect (or direct) talks, the Iranian supreme religious leader had outright rejected talks with Washington unless sanctions imposed by Washington were lifted.
President Trump is adopting a stick-and-carrot policy to impress upon Tehran the need to come forward for talks and resolve the issue. However, he has not ruled out the military option either.
Sum And Substance
The Biden administration has also tried to revive the deal. However, there is a noticeable change in perspectives. Washington, today, is in a more advantageous position, while Iran is significantly weaker. The war between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis has significantly weakened Iran’s Middle Eastern proxies. Iran’s economy is also in a much weaker position today.
Commenting on Iran’s current position, Gregory Brew, senior analyst on Iran and Energy at Political Risk Consultancy, Eurasia Group, told CNBC, “Iran’s regional position has been significantly weakened. They are concerned about how much more stress they can handle — their internal position, the situation of internal discontent, is likely only to get worse. So, they do have an interest in obtaining a deal sooner rather than later, and Trump is giving them-or potentially giving them-an opportunity to obtain such a deal.”
Besides, the theocratic Iranian regime was hit with the “hammer blow of losing its main ally in the Middle East last year” when the Assad regime collapsed in Syria.
Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly staunchly opposed to negotiations with the US. However, senior Iranian government officials launched a coordinated effort to change his mind, framing the decision as critical to the regime’s survival.
Parameters Of Talks
(a) President Trump will not accept a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran has been enriching and stockpiling uranium at its highest levels ever, prompting the IAEA to issue numerous warnings. Its current 60 % purity of nuclear enrichment is higher than the enrichment limit posited in the 2015 deal. In his interview in early February with the New York Post, Trump had said that he would prefer to make a deal with Iran rather than “bombing the hell out of it.”
(b) Washington will not accept Iran’s plea that it will adhere to civilian use of nuclear capability, particularly when the UN has also endorsed IAEA observations. It means that regular monitoring and inspection of Iran’s nuclear activity will not go away, much like the 2015 deal, which had recognized the US’s 90-day repeat certification as a clause.
(c) The time is ripe for Iran to abjure the culture of threats and intimidation against Israel, together with closing down its proxy networks in the Middle East and elsewhere. A few days before the talks in Oman, Trump said that Israel would be the leader of any potential military strike against Iran if its government does not give up its nuclear weapons program.
(d) Iran must accept the reality of Israel’s existence as a sovereign entity enjoying equal rights as other nations in the region.
Iran’s Constraints
(a) In a situation of direct armed conflict, Iran and the US have no inclination towards escalating it into World War III. Neither Russia nor China, considered allies by Iran, will risk a war for the sake of a nation where theocracy rules the roost.
(b) Most members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are from the Sunni faction with whom Iran hardly had smooth sailing. OIC is a house divided against itself, where Turkey, supported by Pakistan, has made no secret of aspiring for the leadership of the Sunni ummah.
(c) Pakistan, a hard-core Sunni-factored lone Muslim country in possession of a nuclear bomb, would rejoice to see another Islamic country – and that too a rabid Shia theocracy – denied entry into the world nuclear club. Iran’s acquiring nuclear capability may become a source of threat to its Sunni-majority regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, more than to Israel.
In conclusion, a nuclear agreement with the US is in the best interests of Iran, which can bring the nation back from the brink of disaster.
- Prof. KN Pandita (Padma Shri) is the former director of the Center of Central Asian Studies at Kashmir University.
- This article contains the author’s personal views and does not represent EurAsian Times’ policies/views/opinions in any way.
- The author can be reached at knp627 (at) gmail.com
