It is increasingly becoming obvious that US President Donald Trump has to talk more to his friend Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, rather than to his other friend, President Xi Jinping of China, to stop helping Iran that enables not only the survival of the regime in Tehran but also the basic maintenance of its military prowess to withstand, first the American/Israeli attacks and then the military blockade.
Trump recently concluded his visit to China. Apparently, Xi agreed with him that the war in Iran must come to an end.
After all, China will want the war to end soon, given that it was hitherto Iran’s number one oil importer. But its military help, if one goes by various reports, might not have been much beyond satellite surveillance for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces in tracking and targeting the US military positions in the Gulf.
Of course, China did supply dual-use precursor chemicals, such as sodium perchlorate, crucial for producing solid rocket fuel for Iran’s missile arsenal, despite US sanctions on the involved logistical networks. But the American blockade has made this supply difficult, although there are reports that it is trying to do so through land in Central Asia.
However, it is Russia that seems to be Iran’s real friend in need.
It is Russia that is sending components for attack drones to Iran via the Caspian Sea, helping Tehran restock an arsenal that lost approximately 60% of its capabilities in recent conflicts. And it is Russia that is transporting grain and all essential commodities Iran needs through the Caspian Sea, which serves as an alternative to the Persian Gulf, thereby bypassing the American naval blockade.
It is said that many vessels operating between Russian ports like Astrakhan and Makhachkala and Iranian ports such as Bandar Anzali in the Caspian Sea function as a “dark” or shadow fleet. The merchant vessels of the two countries are said to be turning off their automatic identification system transponders in the Caspian Sea, allowing them to transport goods undetected by satellite surveillance.
According to a recent report in the New York Times, Iranian officials have said that efforts to open alternative trade routes are progressing rapidly, with four Iranian ports (Amirabad, Bandar Anzali, Nowshahr, and Caspian port) along the Caspian working around the clock to bring in wheat, corn, animal feed, sunflower oil, and other supplies.
Similarly, Russian trade officials have been quoted as saying there has been a swift increase in Caspian shipping in recent months. Two million tons of Russian wheat that used to be shipped annually to Iran through the Black Sea — now under threat of Ukrainian attacks — is now going via the Caspian.
Apparently, between July and February, Iran imported nearly 6 million tons of grain from Russia, double year-ago levels. Four Iranian Caspian ports now run 24/7 to process surges in wheat, corn, animal feed, and sunflower oil rerouted from blocked southern routes.
Russia is said to operate three grain-exporting ports on the Caspian: two in Astrakhan and one in Makhachkala, with a combined capacity of at least 3 million tons. A new 1.5-million-ton terminal in Makhachkala is expected to be completed by 2028.
In other words, the landlocked Caspian Sea, the largest lake in the world, larger than Japan, has been proven to be a safe passageway for overt and covert trade between Russia and Iran. Rebuilding Iran’s offensive capabilities in the process, this is helping Tehran persist as an adversary of the US despite overwhelming American military superiority.
The Caspian Trap
Unlike the Persian Gulf, the United States cannot interdict ships on the Caspian because only the five bordering nations have access. And that is because, under the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, only the five bordering nations—Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—have exclusive jurisdiction over it.
Third-party militaries are strictly prohibited. Only the five littoral states can maintain military forces there. The US Navy, or, for that matter, any NATO member, has no legal right or physical ability to enter, patrol, or intercept ships here.
Containing vast reserves of oil and gas, the Caspian Sea has, of late, assumed many strategic dimensions. First is its geography – Sitting at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, it acts as a buffer zone and transit corridor between competing spheres of influence.
There are multimodal (rail, road, maritime) arteries such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (connecting China through Central Asian states, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey to the European Union) and the North-South transport links involving Russia, Iran, and India. These bypass traditional oceanic chokepoints and are vital for regional integration.
Important pipeline systems linked to the Caspian region help transport energy to Europe and global markets while bypassing Russia or Iran in some cases. This makes the region central to European energy security, global oil supply diversification, and geopolitical influence over energy corridors.
Secondly, and this is particularly significant in the context of Iran, Moscow and Tehran signed a strategic partnership treaty in 2025 and have pledged to enhance military cooperation, including regular naval exercises in the Caspian.
In 2020, Iran and Russia started their first joint strategic naval exercises in the Caspian Sea. Since then, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla has been regularly hosting Iranian Navy and IRGC Navy vessels. Mutual port calls and what are called “PASSEX” drills, which focus on, among others, air defense and anti-ship missile launches, have become more frequent or routine.
Apparently, these exercises allow Iran to test Russian-provided air-defense radars and electronic warfare systems that are harder to deploy in the Persian Gulf due to US monitoring.
It may be noted that in March, Israel had targeted the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali, destroying several naval assets, including missile boats (likely Sina-class) and the Hamzeh corvette. This reportedly wiped out roughly half of Iran’s warships and patrol vessels in the Caspian, affecting the supply chains, particularly relating to Russian-supplied drone components, ammunition, and other military hardware.
Israel called it “one of the most significant” strikes conducted during combat operations, as this “shattered the illusion that the Caspian Sea was a secure and closed corridor for Moscow and Tehran to bypass blockades in the Persian Gulf”.
After Israeli strikes hit Iran’s Caspian naval command, Russia is reported to have increased joint drills with Iran to keep the country as a militarily viable partner against Western pressure, giving, in the process, the Caspian Flotilla a combat-relevant mission beyond coastal patrol.
Thus, it can be said that for Russia and Iran, the Caspian Sea is no longer an overlooked backwater; it is now a primary military artery. It enables drone and ammunition transfers, grain and energy flows, and sanctions evasion, while avoiding contested chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.
In the process, the Caspian Sea has emerged as a significant challenge for the United States.
Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, makes a lot of sense when he admits that, for America, the Caspian Sea is a blind spot. “For American policymakers, the Caspian is a geopolitical black hole; it’s almost like it doesn’t exist”.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
