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China’s ‘Civilian Bases’ In India’s Backyard New Security Threat As Beijing Could Keep The Border Boiling

OPED By Gp Cpt TP Srivastava

Scar of the 1962 debacle is still fresh in Indian minds, both civil and military. It was a war that ought not to have ended as it did. The primary and sole reason for this unqualified and unwarranted humiliation was entirely due to despicable decision-making by the political outfit.

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In October 1962, the IAF was one of Asia’s most formidable air powers. But for fear of escalation, our political leadership willfully surrendered to a weak adversary who had no Air Power elements to support the Chinese Army on the ground.

The report on the 1962 debacle, famously known as the Henderson-Bhagat report, continues to languish in some cupboards of the government of India. It was taken out for referral only when the Subrahmanyam committee examined the 1999 Kargil War fiasco.

Terrain

In the Chinese context, any offensive, both ground and air, must be viewed in the context of terrain for ground troops’ operations and the location of suitable airfields. Air Power will invariably spearhead any future conventional warfare anywhere. It must be candidly stated at this stage: “No future conflict can be won without Air Power. However, Air Power by itself cannot win any conventional war”.

Chinese Air Force is called the People’s Liberation Army – Air Force (PLAAF). A look at the map will indicate that no PLAAF element operating from mainland China can reach Indian targets in the Ladakh region and Arunachal Pradesh entirely due to the limited radius of action. Even with mid-air refueling, it would be operationally unviable, though theoretically feasible.

Chinese leadership decided to build nearly 18 airfields in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Most airfields, barring a couple, are at an elevation of 3 km or more. Sustained operations from high-altitude airfields impose massive restrictions on operations in terms of weapon load, extended take-off, and landing run.

Weather

If PLAAF elements have to support ground operations, they must operate from airfields in TAR, which experience some of the most hostile weather for more than six months a year.

For eight months in a year (September to April), operations will be severely affected due to extremely low temperatures, icy, strong surface winds, and extensive ice accumulation over the runway from November to February.

Few airfields, particularly in the Chengdu Military Region, are affected by extensive fog. Sustained day/night operations are virtually impossible. Maintenance activity in sub-zero temperatures is a nightmare.

Operational Airfields Of PLAAF

Chinese Military is governed by seven military regions (MRs) subdivided into Military Districts (MDs). Two MRs facing India are Lanzhou MR opposite Ladakh sector and Chengdu MR opposite Arunachal Pradesh (North Eastern region of India).

Lanzhou MR. Two MDs of Lanzhou MR face India. South Xinjiang MD is opposite UP, HP, and Ladakh. East Xinjiang MD faces Ladakh.

Chengdu MR. Two MDs of this MR are in Indian proximity. Yunan MD is opposite Myanmar, and Xizang MD is opposite Arunachal, Assam, and Sikkim.

PLAAF can operate from about 15 bases in TAR. However, because of the distance from TBA, only five PLAAF airfields can support air operations in the Tactical BATTLE Area (TBA). These airfields are:

  • Lanzhou MR. Khotan and Hoping
  • Chengdu MR. Kongka Dzong, Donshoon and Pangta

Of these five airfields, only Khotan is at a lower elevation of 1,400 meters (nearly the same as Srinagar). The remaining four airfields are above 3,500 meters. Other airfields are Chengdu, Jekundo, Kantse,  Kashgar, Kunming, Mangshi, Nagchuka I&II, Paoshan and Petun.

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