If anything, the absence of any explicit mention of the QUAD (Quadilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) in the 24-page National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States that was released on January 23 could be yet another instance of the Trump Administration’s confusing signals on the importance of the Indo-Pacific grouping.
In contrast to the total absence of any mention of the QUAD in the latest NDS, the QUAD was explicitly mentioned in its previous edition in 2022.
It emphasized that the grouping was a vital part of building “a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships” to counter China and deliver on democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region.
The 2022 version highlighted the QUAD’s expanded role beyond security to include climate, cyber, and health initiatives. QUAD, it said, was framed as a key component of the U.S. strategy to create interconnected partnerships, demonstrating that democracies can effectively govern.
Incidentally, QUAD has never been projected as an anti-China grouping. QUAD meetings have generally avoided mentioning China; instead, they have emphasized principles that oppose any country that acts unilaterally and forcibly to change the territorial status quo and maritime boundaries, disregards international law, and threatens free and open navigation.
Originally initiated in 2007, the QUAD grouping has been reinvigorated since 2017. And here, none other than President Trump, during his first term, had initiated the reinvigoration process, leading to regular meetings among senior foreign ministry officials and intelligence chiefs of the four member countries.
But what added real strength to it is the annual summit meetings between the President of the United States and the three prime ministers of Australia, India, and Japan. There have been four such summits since U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration began in January 2021. The last summit was held in September 2024.
However, with the return of President Trump, who began his second term last year, relations between the U.S. and India have deteriorated, with an adverse impact on the QUAD.
The summit scheduled for last year in India did not materialize.
But this setback has not prevented the group from continuing some of its operational activities, such as the Malabar naval exercise and infrastructure partnerships. The 3rd Quad Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) meeting among the four members was held in New Delhi on 04-05 December 2025. It focused on UAV threats and emerging tech, showing continued operational cooperation.
Significantly, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, who is considered very close to President Trump, has been consistent in his support for the QUAD. He has emphasized U.S. commitment to the group and efforts to schedule a leader-level summit, potentially in “ early 2026”, with Trump’s visit to India.
In fact, as one writes this, news comes that President Trump has congratulated the Indian government and the people of India on India’s 77th Republic Day.
Cracks “Wide Open” in NATO? Is Trump Planning To Exit Trans-Atlantic Alliance or Scaring Europeans?
“The United States and India share a historic bond as the world’s oldest and largest democracies,” he added.
Equally important from the QUAD’s point of view is that earlier on the day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also wished New Delhi on Republic Day and appreciated the “QUAD cooperation” between the two countries on defence and other fronts.
“On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend my heartfelt congratulations to the people of India on your Republic Day,” Rubio said, adding, “The United States and India share a historic bond. From our close cooperation on defense, energy, critical minerals, and emerging technologies to our multi-layered engagement through the QUAD, the US-India relationship delivers real results for our two countries and for the Indo-Pacific region.”
Against this background, the latest edition of the NDS, which does not mention the QUAD, appears somewhat surprising, unless one buys the logic that it is only a limited instrument for implementing the broad National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025.
The NSS is produced by the White House and signed by the President. It outlines the administration’s overall foreign policy vision and how all elements of American power (economic, diplomatic, and military) will be wielded.
On the other hand, the NDS is prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (currently Pete Hegseth). It translates the President’s broad NSS goals into specific military requirements, force structures, and budgetary priorities.
The NDS “nests” within the NSS framework, which, under Trump, focuses on “Flexible Realism” and an “America First” approach. The NSS identifies China as a long-term challenger to the U.S. and treats non-military issues such as economic security and border control as national priorities.
The NDS is more specific, focusing on the Pentagon’s role by prioritizing homeland defense and “sealing the borders” as its primary military mission, followed by deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. The NDS dictates how the military will maintain a “favorable balance of power” to ensure China cannot “veto” American access to economic centers.
Let us now see what the NSS talks about the Indo-Pacific region and the role QUAD can play here. And then we will see what specific steps the NDS says it will take for “nesting” within the NSS.
After elevating” the Western Hemisphere” above all others, given its importance to homeland protection, as well as access to key geographies, the NSS, 2025, talks of the Indo-Pacific as America’s second region in priority, ahead of Europe.
It designates the Indo-Pacific as the central “decisive theatre” for global competition, primarily against China, focusing on economic security, supply chains, and technology, shifting towards a more transactional, “America First” realist approach.
The NSS’s Indo-Pacific military strategy centers on deterring any Chinese aggression against U.S. partners and interests, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the broader First Island Chain. To that end, it calls for maintaining a “favorable conventional military balance” in the region as “an essential component of strategic competition.”
However, the NSS is said to be introducing a more transactional flavor to alliance management. It insists that allies must contribute more – economically and militarily – to uphold the regional order, aligning with Washington’s oft-repeated complaints about “free-riding.”
“Fairness” is listed as a guiding principle, meaning the U.S. will no longer tolerate…free-riding” and expects allies to spend far more of their GDP on defense.
In the Indo-Pacific context, it says: “the United States must work with our treaty allies and partners—who together add another $35 trillion in economic power to our own $30 trillion national economy (together constituting more than half the world economy)—to counteract predatory economic practices and use our combined economic power to help safeguard our prime position in the world economy and ensure that allied economies do not become subordinate to any competing power.”
Obviously, the U.S. wants this to translate to explicit pressure on allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia to boost defense outlays and capabilities. But this is not all. Here, India also needs to contribute more.
“We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (“the Quad”). Moreover, we will also work to align the actions of our allies and partners with our joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation”, it says.
In other words, the NSS, 2025, wants India to be a rising security provider, urging deeper commercial/technological/ strategic ties and stronger QUAD cooperation.
Decapitation Strike On Taiwan! Why China Can’t Pull Off A U.S.-Style Military Attack On Taipei? OPED
However, some experts seem to have a point when they say that the QUAD and India received only a brief mention, compared to the space they occupied in the 2022 version.
The 2022 NSS portrayed the QUAD as a dynamic, multifaceted grouping essential to fostering a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific through cooperation on shared democratic values and pressing global issues.
Emphasizing that the QUAD was “a premier partnership”, a significant evolution from a purely security-focused group to one delivering practical benefits, it had talked of how the grouping was “a way to demonstrate that democracies can effectively address global challenges, offering a strong alternative to autocratic models”.
In that sense, the latest version of the NSS is more transactional than ideological. That, it seems, affects the text of the NDS, which is not specific to any country or arrangement as such, except China and the First Island Chain (FIC).
Even in the case of China, it talks of “peace through strength”, not confrontation, and “ Deterrence by Denial” along the FIC (stretching from Japan to the Philippines) to prevent regional domination by any single power.
The NDS does not even mention Taiwan.
So it should not be a surprise that neither India nor the QUAD appears in the NDS. It explicitly demands that Indo-Pacific allies and partners, including treaty allies such as Japan and South Korea, assume “primary responsibility” for their own conventional defense. The U.S. will only provide “critical but more limited” support.
“Consistent with the President’s approach as detailed in the NSS, this Strategy prioritizes dealing with the greatest threats to Americans’ interests… this Strategy relies on sensibly and prudently pressing and enabling U.S. allies and partners to take primary responsibility for defending against those other threats, with critical but more limited U.S. support…… . we will seek to make it as easy as possible for allies updated its operational parameters and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions”, the NDS, 2026, says.
The moral of the story is this: American allies and partners must work and spend for their own security; American support is now conditional and limited.
In other words, it may be time to update QUAD’s operational parameters.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
