Field Marshall General Asim Munir, arguably the most powerful man in Pakistan, is in a quandary.
Munir is under tremendous US pressure to contribute to the Gaza stabilisation force by sending thousands of Pakistani soldiers to the war-torn country as part of Trump’s Gaza peace plan.
Not doing so would annoy Trump and affect the US-Pakistan relationship, which is showing signs of improvement after years of mistrust following Osama Bin Laden’s killing in Pakistan.
Islamabad also needs Washington for investments in the country and to secure fresh loans from the IMF.
“Not contributing (to the Gaza stabilisation force) could annoy Trump, which is no small matter for a Pakistani state that appears quite keen to remain in his good graces — in great part to secure US investment and security aid,” said Michael Kugelman, Senior Fellow, South Asia, at the Washington-based Atlantic Council.
Notably, Pakistan has a long history of deploying its soldiers on active military duty in West Asia, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, in what has been variously described as an ‘Army for Hire’ in return for economic aid and foreign loans.
However, notwithstanding Islamabad’s long history of sending troops on foreign military deployment, agreeing to send Pakistan troops to Gaza can be Munir’s undoing at home.
Notably, despite his recent promotion, Munir is already under pressure over the continued imprisonment of Imran Khan, Pakistan’s most popular leader at the moment.
Such a decision can also harm Munir’s carefully built image of a ‘defender of faith,’ as he would be seen as doing Israel’s bidding.
Why Sending Troops To Gaza Could Be Munir’s Undoing?
Pakistan has not recognized Israel, and the two countries do not have official diplomatic relations.
In fact, Pakistani passports explicitly say that they are “not valid for travel to Israel.”
Pakistan also did not join the Abraham Accords, a Trump-led initiative under which certain Muslim countries, such as the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, recognized Israel and normalised relations with Tel Aviv.
However, if Pakistan agrees to send its troops to Gaza as part of Trump’s peace plan, it will mean a tacit recognition of the state of Israel, which is a party to the peace plan.
Further, it will mean Islamabad’s recognition of the two states on Palestinian land, Israel and Palestine.
Abdul Basit, Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said if things escalated once the Gaza force was on the ground, it would cause problems quickly. “People will say ‘Asim Munir is doing Israel’s bidding’ — it will be foolhardy of anyone not to see it coming.”
Furthermore, according to the 20-point Trump peace plan, the international peacekeeping force in Gaza would be required to help in ‘disarming Hamas.’
“The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza,” says the Trump peace plan.
Regarding disarming Hamas, it says, “Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.”
“There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy-back and reintegration programme, all verified by the independent monitors.”
It adds: “A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.”
Again, the peace plan adds: “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens.”
Clearly, disarming Hamas, destroying its tunnels and weapons-producing capabilities, as well as destroying its military and terror infrastructure, is a key part of the overall peace plan.
Such a scenario could put the Pakistan Army against Hamas.
Additionally, this could strain Pakistan’s relationship with Iran on one side, as Tehran is one of the key backers of Hamas, and Turkey, on the other side, as Ankara also offers diplomatic and financial support to Hamas.
It’s worth recounting that in 2015, Pakistan briefly entertained the idea of joining the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces in Yemen, and even debated sending its troops to the war-torn country.
However, the prospect of damaging relations with its neighbor Iran, the primary supporter of the Houthis forces, and the apprehension of getting sucked into the Shia-Sunni rivalry in West Asia, forced Islamabad to reconsider its decision.
In the end, Pakistan decided not to send troops to Yemen.
Even in this case, Islamabad is worried about the optics and the message it will send in the wider Islamic world.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said last month that Islamabad could consider contributing troops for peacekeeping, but disarming Hamas “is not our job.”
Incidentally, if Munir does decide to send Pakistani troops, this would be the second time that Islamabad would be betraying the Palestinian cause.
Nearly fifty years ago, another Pakistani Islamist General, Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq at that time, had led the Jordanian Army’s counter-offensive against the Palestinian uprising, known in history as ‘Black September.’ According to various reports, over 25,000 Palestinians were killed in that operation.
Ironically, just like Gen Asim Munir, Gen Zia-ul-Haq has also positioned himself as an Islamist Army Chief and a ‘defender of faith’.
As Munir weighs sending Pakistani troops to Gaza, a move that can make or break his legacy, it’s worth recounting an important part of the Pakistani Army’s history, now largely forgotten, when it helped in the massacre of Palestinians in Jordan.
Black September: When Zia-ul-Haq Led The Massacre Of Palestinians
In his book ‘The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power,’ British-Pakistani writer Tariq Ali refers to a quote by Moshe Dayan, the legendary Israeli military commander and former Defense Minister, who said that in Black September, King Hussein (of Jordan), “killed more Palestinians in 11 days than Israel could kill in 20 years”.
Incidentally, according to many reports, it was former Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, Brigadier Zia at that time, who led the counter-attack of the Jordanian Army on Palestinian refugees and militants, which resulted in the death of 25,000 to 30,000 Palestinians in 1970.
However, to understand what led to Black September, one has to go back to the Six-Day War in 1967.
During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and occupied the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights (Syria).
This led to millions of Palestinians fleeing to Jordan.
In 1970, under the “Rogers Plan,” Israel and Egypt agreed to establish peace and exchange territory. This led to further disappointment in Palestinian refugees, who feared that Arab states were incapable of fighting Israel and reached a settlement with Israel, ignoring the rights and interests of the Palestinian refugees.
This convinced Palestinian refugees in Jordan that they would have to take matters into their own hands. Simultaneously, radicalised militant groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Yasser Arafat’s Fatah were gaining popularity among the Palestinian refugees.
King Hussein (of Jordan) was one of the primary targets of the protests by the Palestinian refugees as he started cracking down on these militant groups active in Jordan, seeing them as a challenge to his authority.
Clashes started between the Jordanian Army and Palestinian groups in September 1970.
Next, the Palestinian groups hijacked three flights – TWA Flight 741, Swiss Air 100, and Pan-American Flight 93. Two flights were flown into Dawson’s Field, a desert airstrip in Jordan. The third plane was flown into Cairo and was blown up “under the noses of the Egyptian army”.
On September 9, the fourth flight was hijacked. By September 15, the rebel Palestinian groups had captured the city of Irbid and declared it a “liberated zone”.
The Syrian Army and a small unit of the Iraqi Army in Jordan also joined the Palestinian rebels.
On September 17, 1970, King Hussein ordered the Jordanian Army to target militants operating from the refugee camps around Amman.
On September 18, Syrian tanks entered Jordan in support of the Palestinian militants near the town of Irbid, which Palestinian militants had captured.
At this point, King Hussein asked Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq to travel to Irbid and assess the situation. Zia-ul-Haq was in Jordan following Jordan’s defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967. The Pakistan Army was assisting in the rebuilding and training of the Jordanian Army.
Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, wrote an article in 2020 on 50 years of Black September for the CIA website.
Riedel wrote, “Hussein sent Zia-ul-Haq to the scene to make an on-the-ground assessment of the situation. Zia reported that the situation was serious but not dire. Jordan could handle the Syrian tanks with its own forces and prevail. Zia effectively took charge of part of the Jordanian counterattack…”
It was in this counter-attack, planned and led by Zia, that thousands of Palestinians were killed. Arafat claimed the Jordanian Army’s operation in Black September killed up to 25,000 people.
The Palestinian rebel groups received no support from either Syria or the Iraqi military. They had no armored vehicles, no air support, and were facing a professional army with overwhelming assault power.
Political scientist William B Quandt, in his book The Politics of the Palestinian Nationalism (1973), writes that “the lack of both heavy armour and air power contributed to the defeat of the fedayeen at the hands of the Jordanian army”.
For his role in Operation “Black September,” Zia was even called the ‘butcher’ of Palestinians. However, over the years, many Pakistanis have tried to minimise the role played by Zia in the massacre of Palestinians.
Writing in The News International in August 2010, Tayyab Siddiqui emphasized that the Pakistani military’s mandate was to train the Jordanian defense forces and did not involve combat.
Siddiqui, who was chargé d’affaires of the Pakistani embassy in Jordan at the time, wrote, “… I received a call from Brig Zia, informing me that the king had asked him to take over the command of the 3rd Armoured Division stationed in Irbid, a town close to the Syrian border. Syria had moved with an armoured brigade into Jordan.”
He added that Zia took command in Irbid, but the Syrians withdrew under pressure from the US and Israel before any combat operation. “This was the sum total of Pakistan’s involvement or Zia’s role in the alleged massacre of the Palestinians,” Siddiqui wrote.
However, even Siddiqui acknowledged that Zia took command of the 3rd Armoured Division in Irbid, and it remains a fact that thousands of Palestinians were killed in the final assault.
Zia-ul-Haq would go on to become the army chief of Pakistan and, after ousting the civilian government in a military coup in 1977, introduce Islamic Shariat laws.
Writing in the Pakistani newspaper The Express Tribune, Pakistani social scientist and author Raza Naeem said, “Even a then-obscure Pakistani Brigadier bearing the uplifting name of Zia-ul-Haq performed yeoman’s service for King Hussein by blatantly violating the terms of his secondment to the Jordanian army by taking part in the massacre – undoubtedly valuable match practice for what he was to wreak in his native country just seven years later as its worst military dictator.”
“Zia-ul-Haq was sent to Jordan in 1967, where he stayed for three years. He trained Jordanian soldiers and led the operation known as Black September, a very regrettable action against Palestinians in Jordan,” veteran Pakistani journalist and writer Shaikh Aziz wrote in 2013 in Pakistani newspaper ‘The Dawn’.
“The estimated number of Palestinians killed in this action is believed to be anywhere from 2,000 to 25,000, depending on the source. It is, however, certain that their (Palestinian) forces were thoroughly routed. Thanks to his role in this action, Zia-Ul-Haq, a Brigadier at that time, came to be remembered as the Palestinian killer in his own country,” Aziz added.
“The king emerged from the greatest challenge to his throne almost entirely because of his own smart decisions, his excellent intelligence service, and the loyalty of the army. A helping hand can be attributed to Zia. Luck played its part as well,” wrote Riedel.
Munir & Zia: The Islamist Generals
Ironically, the two most Islamist Generals in the Pakistan Army might be remembered for the greatest betrayal of the Palestinian cause.
Incidentally, it was none other than Gen. Zia who opened the doors of the Pakistan Army for Munir.
Initially, the Pakistan Army did not recruit students from madrassas. However, Zia allowed government departments and the Armed Forces to recruit madrasa graduates.
This opened the doors of the Pakistan military for Munir, who got his primary education in an Islamic seminary.
Munir is also known to have adored Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and to have modeled himself after him.
Indeed, Munir is the first Pakistani general to be an Hafiz, having memorized the entire Quran.
However, if he chooses to send Pakistani troops to Gaza, history might remember him, just like Gen Zia, as the Islamist General who betrayed the Palestinian cause.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
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- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
