Iran has maintained a strong, multi-front response to joint US-Israeli military actions, focusing on asymmetric warfare, targeting American military assets in over eight countries, the regional energy infrastructure of those who allowed housing US military, and the near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran has launched hundreds of ballistic missiles, with estimates varying between 500 and 900, targeting Israel and various regional locations since the conflict began. Nearly 350 missiles were directed specifically at Israel. Iran also reportedly hit Diego Garcia, a US-UK military base, in the northern Indian Ocean, nearly 4,000 kilometres away. Iran’s reported missile capabilities were previously thought to be limited to a 2,000 km range.
With limited combat jets and a greatly diminished naval fleet, Iran has effectively used relatively cheap drones, including the very successful Shaheed-136, against some very high-value ground-based Air Defence systems.
Iran has effectively de facto controlled the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting maritime traffic in response to US-Israeli attacks, forcing oil prices to soar.
Iran has also targeted energy and desalination infrastructure in the Gulf. Iran has extended its retaliatory strikes to neighbouring Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar), attacking infrastructure and threatening to draw them into the conflict. Despite reports of degraded conventional capabilities, Iran has used specialized drone and missile barrages, demonstrating a capacity to keep the region on edge and sustain a war of attrition.
The Iranian military, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has signalled a “no limited war” approach, suggesting any attack on its soil is treated as the start of a wider war. The conflict has caused considerable damage to energy infrastructure in the region and led to a sharp increase in global energy prices.
Iran War Military Asymmetry
Iran is greatly outmatched in conventional technology, air power, and defense spending by both the USA (ranked 1st globally) and Israel (ranked ~15th). While Iran (ranked 16th) relies on drones, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies to bridge the gap, Israel holds air superiority and advanced, US-backed technology.
Iran has considerable military strength, estimated at around 600,000–800,000, plus roughly 190,000–200,000 with the IRGC. They are known to have around 3,000 ballistic missiles (Ranges up to 2,500 km). Iran possesses a massive, battle-tested drone arsenal, with over 2,000 low-cost Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, and its total inventory includes nearly 3,000 reconnaissance-attack drones and 670 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) units.
More than 2,100 Shaheds have been fired so far. Iran also has a network of very active proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis, though some have been greatly weakened.
Israel dominates in the air, utilizing advanced aircraft like F-35s against Iran’s outdated fleet. Israel’s multi-layered defence system (Iron Dome, Arrow) is highly effective, though vulnerable to large-scale saturation attacks. Israel also possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal estimated at 90 warheads.
The US military, with massive defence spending and technological dominance, vastly exceeds Iran’s military capabilities. While Iran has the capacity to target US regional bases, the US retains superior defensive capabilities and reach. Iran’s strategy thus relies on harassing its adversaries with missile/drone swarms and proxies. However, in direct, conventional warfare, Iran lacks the capabilities to compete with Israel’s technological edge and the immense resources of the United States.
Iran’s Asymmetric Warfare
While Washington and Tel Aviv have been using expensive missiles and drones to attack Iran, and to intercept missiles that Iran has fired back.
The Patriot and THAAD defence systems, for example, which launch interceptors to take out incoming drones and missiles, can cost millions of dollars per missile fired. This compares with the $20,000-$35,000 cost of each Iranian Shahed drone.
The US has reportedly spent $2bn a day in its war on Iran, and there are fears it could run out of interceptor missiles altogether if the war goes on for more than a few weeks. It is therefore in Iran’s interests to focus on holding out against strikes and protecting its own weapons systems and supplies.
Undoubtedly, sanctions and domestic capabilities have limited its capacity to sustain a very high‑tempo confrontation. Iran cannot match high‑end aircraft, precision munitions, or blue‑water fleets. It cannot achieve a conventional military victory. Its approach is ‘survival and leverage’ and a costly ‘shadow war’ through grey zone operations between war and peace.
It mass‑produces drones, carries out cyber-operations, and a posture of underground, dispersed and hardened facilities that make pre-emptive action difficult and preserve some retaliatory capability. Drone swarms help deplete Israeli and US interceptor stockpiles. It has unleashed economic warfare by selectively closing the Strait of Hormuz through which about 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies are shipped. Iran has also targeted civilian infrastructure like airports and desalination plants, which are crucial for water supply in the region, and it has launched drones targeting oil depots.
IRGC has threatened to attack “economic centres and banks” with links to the United States and Israeli entities in the Gulf region after what it claimed was an attack on an Iranian bank. It will also hit top technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle, as well as cloud-based service infrastructure located in Israel or some Gulf countries.
Iran has aimed to keep the much more powerful US military and its allies off balance through proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen receive weapons, training, funding, and ideological guidance from Iran.
The now-famous “Mosaic” defence system is a defensive structure spread across multiple regional and semi-independent layers, rather than concentrating power in a single command chain that a decapitation strike could paralyse. It makes Iran’s command system difficult to dismantle by force.
All this has made war more expensive for the US. The war is reportedly costing the United States an estimated $2bn a day. Iranian counterattacks are designed to generate pressure on Gulf States, create regional disruption on land, sea, and air, while simultaneously attempting to exhaust US and allied defensive resources.
Iran has survived intense sanctions, clandestine campaigns, and periodic strikes while maintaining a credible ability to hit Israeli territory and now US bases. It is a fight of endurance. Oil price hikes put global pressure on Trump. Americans are also worried that Trump is “plunging America into another endless ‘forever war’.
Iran is waiting for Washington to “blink first” in this so-called regime-change war.
North Korea
North Korea possesses one of the world’s largest and most highly militarized forces, with over 1.3 million active personnel (7.6 million reservists), and a vast, yet largely aging, conventional arsenal.
Its primary strength lies in its nuclear weapons program (50 assembled warheads), expanding arsenal, and long-range missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland.
North Korea is a recognized, albeit un-sanctioned, nuclear power. They possess ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) designed to strike the United States and have demonstrated advanced, road-mobile technology.
The army has around 4,300 tanks and 8,800 artillery, though much of it is outdated (Soviet-era). They have highly developed cyber warfare capabilities, with thousands of hackers.
It also possesses substantial chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. Despite reliance on old air force and naval assets, recent parades showed new tanks (M2020), “colossal” rocket launchers, and modern combat gear, signalling efforts to modernize.
North Korea operates massive submarine fleets, numbering around 70-80 vessels, primarily focused on coastal defence and asymmetric threats.
North Korea spends around 34% of its GDP on the military. This exceptionally high figure reflects its “Songun” (military-first) policy. This has crippled its economy. North Korea sent troops to aid Russia in Ukraine, gaining valuable combat experience. The regime continues to accelerate its nuclear build-up and classifies South Korea as its “main enemy”.
North Korea’s Military Strategy
North Korea’s military strategy prioritizes the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in state affairs to ensure regime survival and deter aggression. It combines rapid, asymmetric conventional forces with a growing nuclear doctrine focused on limited nuclear use and escalation management. Key capabilities include tactical nuclear weapons, solid-fuel ICBMs, and massive underground facilities.
Nuclear deterrence and coercion aim to win quickly or to compel an adversary to stop fighting, rather than to engage in a long, conventional war.
The KPA Strategic Force manages liquid and solid-fuel ICBMs and IRBMs capable of targeting Japan and the US mainland. They have developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) designed for battlefield use, capable of striking South Korea and US bases.
North Korea operates one of the world’s largest special operations forces and a large submarine fleet to counter superior technology with superior numbers and unconventional tactics. Massive underground bases are integrated into their defence strategy to protect personnel and weapons from air strikes.
North Korea also has the backing of its immediate neighbours, and superpowers, Russia and China, who will use them to keep the USA, Japan, and South Korea on their toes.
North Korea: Lessons from the Iran War
North Korea understands that nuclear weapons provide real protection and will deter potential attacks from the United States.
The Iran case reinforces Kim Jong Un’s oft-stated position over the past few years that he will not negotiate away his nuclear arsenal. Moreover, North Korea has gone beyond merely possessing nuclear weapons to being able to use them against US bases and allies in South Korea and Japan, with an increasing ability to directly threaten all of the US homeland with nuclear-armed ICBMs. These are augmented by an assessed large chemical weapons capability that Iran did not have.
It is clear that US military build-ups may presage an attack. Similar build-ups preceded the US June 2025 Iran and January 2026 Venezuela operations. It may heighten Pyongyang’s incentive to conduct any desired offensive actions before the US can finish building up by “pre-empting pre-emption.”
North Korea probably already started updating and refining its leadership protection protocols and its contingency plans for conducting military operations when higher headquarters are lost or disconnected, in the wake of successful Israeli leadership strikes and the US incursion to capture Venezuelan President Maduro.
North Korea is preparing to expect loss of airspace control, and the need to try to conduct military operations without adequate air defense. It is working on improving its air defense capabilities with Russian assistance.
It will attack allied airbases to suppress air operations, employ electronic warfare to degrade the accuracy of air-delivered munitions, and protect assets using hardened facilities. They will do more to protect road-mobile missiles: Israel and the US claim to have destroyed hundreds of Iranian road-mobile ballistic and cruise missile launchers.
The US-made theatre missile defense systems, such as Patriot and THAAD (as well as Israel’s Arrow and David’s Sling), are highly effective in real-world intercept engagements.
North Korean solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) already have substantial capabilities to complicate theatre missile defense because they can fly lower (depressed) trajectories and operate mostly within the atmosphere, permitting extensive manoeuvring to throw off intercept calculations. It is also working on developing hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).
The increasing stockpiling of missiles and weapons is an important lesson. Benefits and ways to operate low-end, one-way theatre-range attack drones like the Iranian Shahed-136 are well understood.
They offer more dispersed and survivable deployment and launch options. North Korea is already working to expand production of both types of drones, probably in part with assistance from Russia.
Taiwan vs China
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) possesses a vast, modernizing superiority over Taiwan’s military, with over 10 times more active personnel, aircraft, and armour.
China’s $230bn defense budget dwarfs Taiwan’s $16.8bn.
While China dominates, Taiwan focuses on asymmetrical, defensive strategies supported by a large, active reserve force (1.65M+). China has approx. 2 million vs. approx. 215,000 (Taiwan). The two air forces are at nearly 1,200 fighter aircraft (China) vs. 280 (Taiwan). Navies 777 total vessels (China) vs. 117 (Taiwan). Submarines, 79 (China) vs. 4 (Taiwan).
China has a powerful airborne troop capability (35,000–40,000 personnel). China has developed the world’s second-most-capable amphibious force, designed for rapid, multidimensional ship-to-shore assaults. Key assets include Type 075 Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs), Type 071 Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), specialized high-speed armoured vehicles, and large-scale use of commercial roll-on/roll-off ferries.
The PLA holds overwhelming air and naval supremacy, conducting regular, intensive drills around the island, often crossing the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan focuses on an asymmetric “porcupine strategy,” investing in mobile, precise weaponry—such as anti-ship missiles and air defense systems to exploit the challenges of a potential amphibious invasion. A Chinese invasion faces substantial challenges, including a dangerous sea crossing and a rugged coastline well-suited to defense.
The U.S. provides military aid and security assurances to Taiwan, complicating Beijing’s military calculations. Japan, which China also threatens, is likely to enter a war in support of Taiwan.
Taiwan Lessons from Iran
Could Taiwan’s military continue to fight after an Iran-like decapitation? The survival of Iran’s political and military apparatus following a massive US-Israeli decapitation strike has ignited a strategic debate in Taiwan, with experts weighing the island’s ability to withstand a similar “surgical” opening to an attack from the mainland.
Iran has two parallel command structures, including the IRGC. Does Taiwan require “distributed command” against the PLA? Precision strikes on Taipei’s “nerve centre” could force rapid capitulation, something Beijing has long considered.
China has a training base in Inner Mongolia that includes mock-ups of Taiwanese government facilities, providing evidence that the PLA was preparing for such scenarios.
Taiwan’s evolving doctrine over the last few years has been decentralised command-and-control, described as a “headless but still fighting” force. Taiwan’s annual war games had begun testing scenarios of strikes on command systems, communications breakdowns, and degraded coordination. Taiwan has launched ‘urban resilience’ drills to test war readiness amid PLA pressure.
PLA has been closely studying the recent US operations that showed rapid, coordinated decapitation capabilities integrating air power, Special Forces, and intelligence.
Taiwan lacks the advantage of Iran’s combat experience and strategic depth. Taiwan is a highly urbanised island lying just across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. There is limited hiding place. Relatively smaller, Taiwan was vulnerable to saturation attacks by PLA missiles, rockets, and drones, which could overwhelm defenses.
That creates issues about decentralisation. A blockade by China will bring supply chain issues, which Iran did not face because of its own drone and missile industry and support from Russia and China.
Lessons from the wars in Iran and Ukraine have pushed Taipei to rethink its air-defense strategy, and that expensive missiles alone cannot stop large waves of rockets and drones. Low-cost interceptor weapons were urgently needed to counter the mainland Chinese military’s growing arsenal of long-range rockets and uncrewed aircraft.
Planned “Taiwan Shield”, or T-Dome, a layered air-defence architecture designed to protect critical infrastructure and ensure the island could sustain defensive operations during an armed conflict. Low-cost interceptor munitions were being developed in two versions, one designed to counter drones and another for missile interception.
Beijing has a major advantage in drone supply chains and production capacity. Taiwan needs to evaluate countermeasures such as microwave jamming and laser weapons.
Since 1949, Taiwan has relied on the United States as a security guarantor against a potential Chinese invasion. The United States’ global credibility is a concern. An unreliable ally reduces Taiwanese willingness to resist military threats from China.
To Summarise
Nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate defense.
Economic coercion hurts all. The USA remains the global policeman, but it has failed in many operations in the last seven decades. Regime change has not been for the good most of the time and has brought instability.
Munitions stocking, low-cost options, secured defenses, and hardened shelters are important. War-fighting endurance counts. An extended war is a deterrence.
Hard power matters, but an asymmetric approach is a reality. Doctrines require a revisit. Decentralisation of power and leadership is a big lesson. Will to fight and public endurance matter. Hegemony doesn’t always work.
Maritime chokepoints remain areas of action and need to be dominated. Uninhabited autonomous high-speed boats may be an answer. For Taiwan, a blockade could be a serious concern. Air power remains the leading means of prosecuting war, but ultimately, boots on the ground or special operations may also be required. With the rise of China, the Indo-Pacific will be a future area of action. Taiwan and North Korea have to prepare.
Further, the US domestic tolerance for open-ended enforcement has narrowed. The result is a widening gap between those who pay the marginal costs and those who authorise escalatory decisions.
The economics of war need to be reworked. Energy security and alternative energy have gained greater importance. It is not always possible to buy security. Each country must secure itself. Coalitions (NATO) are being tested both in Ukraine and in West Asia.
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran, fighter test pilot, and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals during his 40-year tenure in the IAF.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- He tweets @Chopsyturvey
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