A new report by RAND Corporation is raising questions about China’s ability to effectively wage a conventional war against the U.S. military despite its rapid modernization efforts.
The report, titled ‘The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness,’ challenges the notion that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is adequately prepared for a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, even as defense officials in the US have long identified the PLA as an urgent threat.
The study, released on January 27 by senior defense researcher Timothy R. Heath, argues that the PLA’s primary function is not warfighting but maintaining the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Heath contends that this mission has shaped a military that is more focused on political loyalty than combat effectiveness.
“The core of the PLA’s system of political controls includes political commissars, party committees, and the political organization system,” Heath writes in the paper. “These controls are designed to ensure the military’s subordination to CCP authority, and all come at the cost of reduced potential combat effectiveness.”
Despite major investments in military modernization, which include a growing number of warships and combat aircraft, the PLA’s lack of real-world combat experience raises concerns about its readiness for a conflict with the US.
The author points out that the PLA has not fought a war since 1979, and recent exercises have been criticized for their lack of integration and effectiveness.
“Chinese media is replete with withering criticisms of the military’s inability to execute integrated joint operations and its lack of combat readiness,” Heath noted, citing widespread discontent within the ranks.
Central to the military’s lack of operational readiness, according to Heath, is its political structure. Political commissars—military officers tasked with enforcing loyalty to the CCP—hold equal authority to military commanders, impeding timely decision-making.
Heath notes that these commissars are often criticized for lacking military knowledge and physical fitness, further diminishing the PLA’s combat capabilities.
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The decision-making process is further complicated by the presence of party committees, which must approve most military actions. The need for approval from higher levels of government for even basic operational decisions has raised concerns about the military’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis.
The requirement for party committee approval on most decisions raises questions about the speed and efficiency of decision-making in combat. This system of approvals and centralized control also offers minimal motivation for commanders to take independent action.
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Beyond structural issues, Heath argues that the PLA’s focus on political loyalty—reflected in recruitment practices, promotions, and the presence of corruption—has hindered the development of a military capable of confronting a powerful adversary like the US military.
The researcher notes that the incomplete nature of military reforms designed to improve combat readiness suggests that these goals are secondary to maintaining CCP rule.
While the PLA’s modern capabilities are impressive, Chinese leaders have apparently little desire to engage in a conventional war with the US, particularly over Taiwan.

Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party’s focus has largely been on domestic issues like corruption, unemployment, and social unrest rather than military conflict.
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Xi Jinping’s rhetoric about Taiwan unification, according to Heath, remains largely formulaic, consistent with previous administrations, and lacking the urgency typically seen before a major military engagement.
“No study on how China’s military could defeat U.S. forces has surfaced in any academy affiliated with the Chinese military,” Heath said, further noting that the PLA has not published any comprehensive plans on how to occupy and control Taiwan.
The absence of such research, Heath argues, raises doubts about the strength and seriousness of China’s military plans despite ongoing modernization efforts. While Beijing’s military preparations continue, Heath contends that the CCP is far more interested in using economic, political, and military means to deter Taiwanese independence rather than engage in a full-scale conflict.
Nevertheless, the possibility of conflict remains, especially if China’s economic decline persists. In such a scenario, Heath warns, the PLA could increasingly prioritize regime survival over military engagement, prompting the US to reassess its threat framework.
The report suggests that the US should consider a broader range of potential threats while still recognizing the remote possibility of a conventional war with China.
Although the new report highlights flaws in the PLA’s centralized command structure, Chinese military doctrine emphasizes political oversight and ideological cohesion as essential safeguards against military disobedience—an aspect the CCP regards as a strategic advantage rather than a drawback.
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In a November 2023 article for The Strategist, analyst Payton Rawson examined the PLA’s dual command system, which integrates both military and political leadership to ensure unwavering CCP control.
This structure is designed to prevent independent military actions that could challenge party authority, reinforcing the PLA’s primary role as a tool of the state rather than an autonomous fighting force.
Rawson explained that the PLA’s command framework consists of a party committee, a political commissar, and various political bodies, all of which work together to uphold party leadership, combat corruption, and maintain ideological alignment.
These mechanisms ensure that military operations align with CCP objectives, preventing any deviation from the party’s directives.
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