Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and Israel’s shocking strikes on Hamas outfit in Qatar, two mutual defense pacts have seized global attention: the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea, signed in June 2024, and the very recent mutual defense treaty between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
On the surface, both treaties pledge mutual support in the face of aggression—echoing the spirit of NATO’s Article 5. Yet, beneath the rhetoric of solidarity lies a striking asymmetry: in each case, the junior partner (North Korea and Pakistan) appears poised to provide military support, boots on the ground, while the senior partners (Russia and Saudi Arabia) may not reciprocate.
Russia-North Korea Pact
The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea marked a bold step in ties between the two nations, formalized during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s landmark visit to Pyongyang.
At its core, Article 4 commits both nations to immediate military and other assistance if either faces an armed attack, a clause that Putin ratified into law in November 2024.
The pact extends beyond defense to encompass economic cooperation, technology transfers, and joint military exercises, reflecting Russia’s need for allies amid its protracted war in Ukraine.
For North Korea, the treaty has translated into tangible—and costly—support for its Russian patron. Since late 2024, Pyongyang has sent thousands of troops to bolster Russian forces, alongside shipments of ballistic missiles and artillery shells to Moscow.
These contributions have proven invaluable to Russia, helping to counter Ukrainian advances following Kyiv’s 2024 incursion into western Russian territory. In return, North Korea has reportedly received advanced military technology, such as air defense systems and possibly even assistance with satellite launches.
However, a recent analysis paints a sobering picture: Pyongyang’s gains may be limited, suggesting a lopsided exchange where North Korea’s sacrifices far outstrip its rewards.
Analysts argue this imbalance stems from Russia’s own vulnerabilities. Stretched thin by sanctions and battlefield demands, Moscow prioritizes extracting immediate utility from allies like North Korea over long-term reciprocity.
If North Korea were hypothetically attacked—say, by South Korea or the U.S.—Russia’s capacity to intervene meaningfully could be hampered by its commitments in Ukraine and other geopolitical situations.
The big question is: will Russia really attack American military facilities if the U.S. bombs North Korea?
The pact serves more as a deterrent signal than an ironclad guarantee, something the USSR once offered to India during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. The USSR was in a position to counter the U.S. and China at that time, but now, Russia, trapped in the brutal Ukraine war, has nothing much to offer to Pyongyang except for some military tech and financial bounties.
The Pakistan-Saudi Pact
Fast-forward to September 2025. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formalized their mutual defense agreement in Riyadh, declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”
This pact builds on decades of close ties, including Pakistan’s historical role in training Saudi forces and providing security advisors.
Reportedly, the deal had been in the works for years, and Saudi Arabia expected Pakistan’s arch-rival India to understand the kingdom’s security needs.
When asked if the deal meant Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be used to defend Saudi Arabia, Ali Shihabi, an analyst close to the royal court, told AFP: “Yes, it does.”
“Nuclear is integral to this deal and Pakistan remembers that the kingdom effectively financed their nuclear program and supported them when they were sanctioned,” he added.
“India will understand the security needs of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia maintains excellent ties with India.”
Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif reportedly also told a local broadcaster that the country’s nuclear programme would be made available to Saudi Arabia if needed, following the signing of the agreement.
The mutual defence agreement was signed in Riyadh just days after an Israeli strike that struck the Hamas outfit in Qatar, which sent shockwaves through the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi-Pak pact also comes mere months after Pakistan and India engaged in an intense four-day clash in May after India launched Operation Sindoor and targeted Pakistan’s terror outfit harboured in the country.
With the pact, Pakistan stands to gain economically—Saudi investments could alleviate Islamabad’s chronic balance-of-payments woes—and politically, as the pact signals Riyadh’s enduring commitment amid Pakistan’s balancing act between the U.S., China, and the Muslim world.
Yet, the expectations appear tilted toward Pakistani contributions. Pakistan has deployed troops to Saudi Arabia during past crises, such as the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure and Yemen conflicts, and could do so again to safeguard the kingdom’s oil fields or holy sites.
In a worst-case scenario involving an Iranian or Israeli attack, Islamabad might even extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, besides conventional forces.
Conversely, Saudi reciprocity may fall short.
The kingdom’s military, while modernized with U.S. hardware, lacks the expeditionary depth to project power into South Asia against threats like India, Pakistan’s arch-rival.
Riyadh’s foreign policy has long emphasized defense over offense, constrained by domestic stability concerns and reliance on American security guarantees.
As one expert noted, the pact is “more symbolism than substance,” a political gesture to counter the U.S. waning influence in the Middle East rather than a blueprint for mutual sacrifice.
If Pakistan faced an existential threat—such as escalation along the Line of Control with India—Saudi intervention would likely be limited to diplomatic support or financial aid, not boots on the ground.
The parallels between Russia-North Korea and Saudi-Pakistan pacts are uncanny, revealing a pattern in asymmetric alliances where junior partners bear the heavier load. Both North Korea and Pakistan, with troubled economies but powerful militaries, leverage their might to secure patronage from resource-rich allies.
Russia extracts military and munitions from Pyongyang to sustain its war machine; Saudi Arabia gains a nuclear backstop from Islamabad to deter Iran and Israel, while mainly offering economic lifelines in return.
This dynamic echoes Cold War-era pacts, like the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but inverted: here, the “senior” partner (Russia/Saudi) dictates terms from a position of relative strength, leaving the junior one exposed.
The Russia-North Korea alliance has alarmed Washington and Seoul, prompting calls for tighter sanctions and enhanced deterrence. Similarly, the Pakistan-Saudi pact could have rattled military experts in India, Iran, and Israel.
India responded with measured caution, emphasizing its strong strategic ties with Saudi Arabia while signaling vigilance over potential security risks.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated on September 19 that New Delhi “expects” Riyadh to factor in its “wide-ranging strategic ties” with India when implementing the pact, and that India will “study the implications” for its national security and regional stability.
Iran expressed unease, viewing the pact as a direct challenge to its regional influence, particularly amid a fragile Saudi-Iranian détente brokered by China in 2023.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan briefed his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, on the agreement during a September 18 call, framing it as part of broader bilateral discussions on de-escalation.
However, Tehran interprets it as a Saudi move to restore deterrence against Iran. Iranian media and officials have highlighted “concern” in Tehran, with state outlets like Press TV suggesting the alliance could prompt Iran to seek new partners to counter the Saudi-Pakistan pact.
Israel has remained tight-lipped on the pact, consistent with its policy of nuclear ambiguity and restrained public commentary on distant alliances. No statements from the Israeli government or military have surfaced as of September 22, 2025.
Analysts speculate this stems from the deal’s primary focus on Iran rather than Israel—Jerusalem Post op-eds describe it as a “signal to Iran, domestic audiences, and Washington” rather than a direct threat to Tel Aviv.
However, the agreement raises indirect concerns for Israel, given Pakistan’s historical anti-Israel stance (e.g., no diplomatic ties) and vocal criticism of Gaza operations. Some Israeli security experts worry it could embolden anti-Israel rhetoric in the Muslim world and complicate Saudi-Israeli normalization efforts under the Abraham Accords.
One thing appears to be pretty straightforward: Saudi Arabia is set to greatly benefit from the defense pact, where Pakistan’s military is now officially duty-bound to defend Riyadh and not the other way around.
North Korea is believed to have lost between 600 and 1000 soldiers in the Ukraine war, with nearly 2000-3000 injured. Only time will tell what lies ahead for the Pakistan Army.
- This is an Opinion Article. Views personal of the Author
