Ukraine is setting up production facilities for some of its most potent weapon systems outside its borders to protect them from strikes by Russian missiles and drones.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the Ukrainian company Fire Point has announced the relocation of its solid rocket fuel production facility to Denmark.
The new facility, located near the Skrydstrup Airbase in Vojens—where key NATO infrastructure is also based—is expected to begin production in December. Copenhagen is reportedly funding the project with $78 million.
Fire Point has recently drawn attention as the developer of the Ukrainian Flamingo FP-4 cruise missile, which is claimed to have a range exceeding 2,900 kilometers and a warhead weighing up to 1,100 kilograms.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced around August 21 that production of the missile would begin by the start of next year. Reuters reported that “Zelensky… expects mass production [of Flamingo missiles] by the beginning of next year.”
There has also been speculation that the missile has already been used to strike targets in Crimea.
The Flamingo Threat
The Flamingo lacks the technical sophistication of British and French missiles such as the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, which are capable of evading detection by flying nap-of-the-earth profiles and avoiding known adversary air defense installations.
However, imported missiles are expensive, not available in sufficient numbers, and require advanced airborne and space-based ISR assets for routing and targeting. US President Donald Trump’s determination to end the war is further complicating the acquisition and use of their resources.
By contrast, the Flamingo is a simpler missile with greater range and a heavy warhead, making it highly destructive. It is affordable enough to be produced in large numbers and at a rapid pace. Ukraine will likely employ the missile in coordination with long-range drones to overwhelm Russian air defences.
Western sources claim that the Flamingo has already been used against Russian targets in Crimea, though the assertion remains speculative and unsupported by evidence.
In addition to the FP-4 Flamingo cruise missile, Fire Point has also announced plans to develop the FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles, with ranges of 200 and 855 kilometers, respectively.
Avoiding The Fate Of The Sapsan Missile
It is likely that Ukraine has opted to relocate key segments of its military-industrial complex to avoid a repeat of the fate that befell its Sapsan battlefield ballistic missile program.
The Sapsan (also known as Grom-2) is a Ukrainian short-range ballistic missile system developed by KB Pivdenne and PA Pivdenmash.
It is a single-stage, solid-fuel missile with a 500 kg warhead and an operational range estimated between 50 km and 400–500 km. Some reports suggest its maximum range could reach up to 700 km.
Sapsan combines characteristics of both a tactical missile and a multiple rocket launcher, resembling the U.S. ATACMS, which it was likely intended to replace.
Beginning in June, Russia mounted a sustained campaign to destroy the production facilities supporting the Sapsan program.
As part of this campaign, the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PMZ), the Pavlograd Chemical Plant (PCP), the Shostka State Plant “Zvezda,” the Shostka State Research Institute of Chemical Products, and a chemical plant in the Zhytomyr region were struck.
These enterprises formed part of the technological chain involved in the Sapsan’s development, design, and quality control.
Follow-up strikes continued through July and August. After crippling production capacity, Russian forces also targeted stored missiles and spare parts.
Other Outsourcing
In the past, there have been several reports of Ukraine relocating its weapons manufacturing facilities outside its borders to ensure both safety and expanded production.
In June, The Guardian reported that Ukraine and the UK plan to jointly produce long-range drones for use against Russian targets, though the exact location was not specified.
In May, The Guardian also reported that Ukraine and Germany had agreed to jointly produce long-range missiles, with manufacturing facilities possibly located in Germany.
In December 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that Ukrainian defence firms were considering relocating production facilities to Poland. A joint venture between Ukroboronprom and Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa was launched to produce 125-mm tank shells.
More recently, there have been reports that Ukraine is negotiating with New Zealand and the Philippines to manufacture marine unmanned surface vessels (USVs).
It is conceivable that the Philippines sees value in the Ukrainian proposal, as kamikaze USVs would provide it with an affordable asymmetric capability to keep the PLA Navy in check in disputed waters.
Ukrainian Gains
Ukraine’s move to relocate its military-industrial complex (MIC) to NATO countries entails minimal risk but substantial benefits for both Ukraine and the host nations.
The relocation will help ensure stable supply chains and reliable power, enabling a ramp-up in production.
Host countries such as Denmark and Poland will gain access to Ukrainian military hardware design and manufacturing intellectual property, while the new production facilities will also generate local employment.
In a recent statement, President Trump announced that the United States would be prepared to pay Ukraine billions to acquire its weapons manufacturing intellectual property.
Russian Response Options
As Ukraine’s relocation of its military-industrial complex progresses, Russia’s sustained campaign against Ukrainian military and power-generation infrastructure will gradually lose effectiveness.
Russia will no longer be able to leverage its overwhelming aerial strike capability to steadily erode Ukraine’s warfighting potential.
It may take a year or more before Russian superiority is seriously diminished, giving Moscow a limited window of opportunity to press its advantage.
It is unlikely, however, that Russia will exercise its claimed right to self-defence by attacking Ukrainian production facilities located in NATO countries. Russia is currently winning the war, and such escalation would be highly risky.
The most viable option for Russian forces would be to shift focus from targeting Ukraine’s manufacturing infrastructure to striking its logistics network. However, much of the logistics infrastructure that facilitates the flow of Western weapons into Ukraine lies in the western regions of the country, far from the front lines. Russia lacks sufficient long-range, accurate, and air-defence-evading weaponry to sustain such a campaign.
A more practical strategy would be for Russia to mount a sustained aerial campaign targeting cargo ships transporting weapons and ammunition, while simultaneously rendering bridges across the Dnieper inoperative.
Dnieper Bridges
Since the start of the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO), Russian military bloggers have often expressed dismay at Moscow’s reluctance or inability to destroy all of Ukraine’s bridges across the Dnieper River.
Many believe Ukraine would be unable to sustain its military campaign against Russian forces if those bridges were destroyed, as most Western-supplied weapons and ammunition are routed across the Dnieper on their way to the front lines.
Although Russia has occasionally targeted the bridges, it has never mounted a concerted effort to demolish them.
One likely reason is that Russian military leadership may anticipate the need for its own forces to cross the Dnieper in the future. Destroying the bridges would implicitly signal that Russia has no intention of crossing the river, which in turn could prompt Ukraine’s leadership to harden its stance and resist entering peace negotiations.
There are also doubts about Russia’s ability to destroy the bridges. Ukraine’s failure to render the Kerch Bridge inoperative, despite repeated attempts, illustrates the difficulty of such an undertaking.
Russian forces may be able to destroy bridges on the Dnieper close to the front line, such as those near Kherson, through relentless strikes with heavy glide bombs. However, they would face significant challenges in destroying bridges deeper inside Ukraine, which lie beyond the effective reach of glide bombs.
- Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
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