During a humanitarian relief mission to Myanmar following the recent earthquake, Indian Air Force (IAF) transport aircraft encountered GPS spoofing within Myanmar’s airspace.
The first incident occurred on March 29, 2025, when a C-130J Super Hercules aircraft carrying 15 tonnes of relief material from Hindon Airbase to Yangon experienced GPS interference.
Subsequently, additional IAF aircraft, including C-17 Globemaster III transports, reported similar spoofing incidents during their missions.
Six military transport flights delivered aid, field hospitals, and rescue teams to Myanmar.
To counteract the spoofing attacks, IAF pilots promptly switched to the aircraft’s inertial navigation systems (INS), which rely on internal sensors rather than external signals, ensuring the successful completion of their missions.
While the exact source of the GPS spoofing remains unidentified, such incidents are often associated with regions experiencing geopolitical tensions and are sometimes attributed to state or non-state actors.
This incident underscores the growing challenges of threats in modern military operations, even during humanitarian missions, and highlights the importance of robust navigation systems and security measures for aircraft operating in contested environments.
GPS Spoofing
GPS spoofing involves broadcasting counterfeit signals to deceive receivers, causing them to miscalculate position, altitude, or time. Unlike jamming, which disrupts signals entirely, spoofing manipulates them to mislead systems into believing an aircraft is elsewhere.
Attackers use software-defined radios or GPS simulators to overpower legitimate satellite signals with false ones. Sophisticated attacks gradually alter coordinates to evade detection, requiring precise timing and target tracking.
Spoofing disrupts navigation systems, autopilots, and even backups for aircraft that rely on GPS inputs. The result can be catastrophic—veering into restricted airspace or colliding with obstacles. The accessibility of spoofing technology, now available for as little as a few hundred dollars, amplifies its threat to military and civilian aviation.
Recent Spoofing Incidents: A Growing Concern
GPS spoofing is not unique to Myanmar. Recent incidents highlight its global spread:-
- Middle East (2023-2024). Reportedly, More than 20 civilian aircraft in Iraq-Iran airspace faced spoofing, with one jet nearly violating Iranian airspace. Israel’s electronic warfare against Hezbollah inadvertently affected commercial aviation.
- Eastern Europe (2024). Over 1,000 flights in the Baltic and Black Sea regions reported interference related to Russian tests of electronic warfare systems.
- Azerbaijan Crash (December 2024). A tragic Embraer jet crash, killing 38, was tied to GPS disruption, allegedly from Russian defenses countering drones.
- India- Pakistan Border (2023-2025). Several civilian flights have reported spoofing cases near the Amritsar and Jammu areas.
These incidents reveal severe implications: safety risks from navigational errors, geopolitical tensions from airspace violations, economic losses from flight disruptions, and exposed military vulnerabilities in GPS-dependent systems.
Potential Perpetrators, Possible Reasons & Investigating Challenges
Attribution in these incidents is particularly tricky. Likely suspects include state actors, insurgent groups, or proxy forces. Given Myanmar’s strategic location, speculation could even involve state actors like China and Bangladesh, Non-state groups, or Myanmar’s junta with access to affordable spoofing technology. The blame cannot be attributed to anyone due to the lack of evidence.
Possible Reasons for resorting to GPS jamming could include geopolitical messaging. Disrupting a high-profile humanitarian mission could demonstrate technological prowess or warn against foreign presence in Myanmar, a region with contested influence among powers like China, India, and the U.S. These flights offer an opportunity to test spoofing technology without the fear of escalation of conflict. Given Myanmar’s prevailing situation, the spoofing may not have specifically targeted relief aircraft but affected them as part of broader electronic warfare in the region.
Investigating such incidents is fraught with several challenges. Spoofing signals, often from ground-based or airborne, static, or mobile platforms, are hard to trace. Distinguishing deliberate attacks from accidental interference demands advanced signal analysis. India’s limited access to Myanmar’s territory would restrict the ground-based evidence collection. Accusing a state without proof could escalate tensions.
Countering GPS Spoofing
A multi-pronged approach, including technological, operational, regulatory, and collaborative measures, is vital to safeguard against GPS spoofing. These are listed below:-
Technological Solutions
- Alternative Navigation. Integrate India’s NAVIC, Galileo, or ground-based aids like DME and ILS.
- Indigenous Innovation. Develop affordable anti-spoofing tech through India’s NAVIC and defense R&D. Retrofit aircraft with resilient systems.
- Sensor Fusion. Combine INS, radar, and visual systems to navigate without GPS.
- Encrypted Signals. Use systems like Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) to verify GPS authenticity.
- Multi-Antenna Systems. Cross-check signals to detect discrepancies.
- Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA). Filter out false signals for enhanced resilience.
Operational Strategies
- Pilot Training. Equip crews to spot spoofing signs, such as sudden coordinate shifts, and switch to backups, as done in this case.
- Pre-Flight Briefings. Issue warnings for high-risk zones, as done for subsequent aircraft post-initial incidents.
- Real-Time Detection. Install systems to alert pilots of interference instantly.
Regulatory & Collaborative Efforts
- Global Standards. Adhere to ICAO and EASA guidelines for GNSS resilience.
- Data Sharing. Collaborate via groups like OPSGROUP to map spoofing trends.
- Cyber security Audits. Regularly test navigation systems for vulnerabilities.
- Diplomatic Advocacy. Push for international bans on spoofing to deter state-sponsored attacks.
Conclusion
The GPS spoofing of IAF aircraft in Myanmar exposes the fragility of modern aviation in an era of electronic warfare. While India’s pilots averted disaster, the incident underscores the need for vigilance and innovation.
By blending advanced technology, rigorous training, and global cooperation, the aviation community can neutralize this stealthy threat, ensuring safe skies for humanitarian and operational missions.
- Air Marshal Anil Khosla is a former Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS) of the Indian Air Force and AOC in C of Eastern Air Command.
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