U.S. Stealth Drone Lands In Iran! Recalling 2011 Incident When Tehran Used GPF Spoofing To Checkmate USA

By
Sumit Ahlawat
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In the 12-day Iran-Israel war, Tel Aviv reportedly lost at least four Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) during its operations in Iran. Of the four UAVs, at least two were Hermes drones. One Israeli drone was lost in a friendly fire incident, according to reports.

Iran’s ability to down multiple Israeli drones once again highlights Tehran’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities. Incidentally, the world’s first recorded use of electronic warfare to down a UAV in a real-world combat situation also comes from Iran.

On Jun 23, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) confirmed that a remotely piloted aircraft was downed in Iranian territory.

“During operational activity, an Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle was downed in Iran. There is no fear of information leaking,” the military said.

The Iranian media reported that the drone was a Hermes model.

This would mark the fourth aircraft to be shot down since the start of the campaign in Iran, Israeli public broadcaster KAN reported. Additionally, the US forces shot down an Israeli drone after a misidentification error, KAN added.

Notably, this was the second Israeli Hermes UAV to be downed in Iran since the start of the hostilities. Another IAF Hermes 900 UAV was shot down over the Isfahan area in Iran.

The Iranian media has also released the alleged video footage of the drone being shot down, and the UAV falling from the sky.

The IDF assured that there was no fear of an information leak. However, the incident revived the memories of a 2011 incident when Iranian forces forced an American stealth drone to land in Iran fully intact.

The incident proved to be a nightmare for the US, as Iran gained access to the sensitive intelligence gathered by the drone. Additionally, there were fears that the fully intact drone would allow Iran to reverse-engineer the stealth drone technology.

However, even more shocking was the way Iran forced the stealth drone, the RQ-170 Sentinel, to land on an Iranian air base, using advanced electronic-warfare measures.

Iran allegedly utilized a GPF-spoofing technique to override the drone’s navigation system and trick it into landing in Iran, approximately 140 miles from Iran’s border with Afghanistan.

Incidentally, according to many defense experts, this was the first known instance of the GPF spoofing technique being used in a real-world combat situation.

In the coming years, electronic warfare and GPF spoofing were to become the central elements of modern warfare. From the Russia-Ukraine war to the recent India-Pakistan war in May, GPF spoofing is widely used in combat.

However, in 2011, this was a novelty that shocked many, as it was unclear how Iran had managed to master such sophisticated technology.

The 2011 RQ-170 Sentinel Incident

On December 5, 2011, a US Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel, a stealth reconnaissance drone, was captured by Iranian forces approximately 140 miles inside Iran’s border with Afghanistan.
The drone was operated by the US forces based in Afghanistan for surveillance over Iranian nuclear sites. It landed with minimal damage, a feat Iran claimed was achieved through a sophisticated cyberwarfare operation.
This photo, released by the IRGC, purportedly shows the RQ-170 Sentinel.
At that time, the incident stunned the global military community. A few days later, Iran showcased the intact drone on state television. The US initially said that the drone was lost due to a malfunction.
However, Iran insisted its electronic warfare unit had hijacked the drone using GPS spoofing, marking a pivotal moment in modern warfare.

The Arrival Of GPS Spoofing In Combat

GPS spoofing involves broadcasting fake GPS signals to mislead a receiver about its location or time. Unlike GPS jamming, which disrupts signals entirely, spoofing tricks devices into trusting false coordinates.

GPS spoofing has several advantages over jamming.

Operational trials have already established that the power requirements for spoofing are much lower than those for jamming. Also, spoofing can be performed simultaneously over a large area by radiating signals on desired frequencies.

The biggest advantage of spoofing over jamming is that the affected equipment/platform will never realize that external interference is being resorted to.

For instance, a platform following GPS guidance and commands to follow a particular track will never know that the GPS signal has been corrupted by an adversary by interfering with merely one of the satellite signals in the constellation. This enables the system to be deceived, causing it to believe it is still on the correct track when, in fact, it is deviating from the intended path.

US RQ-170 Sentinel
US RQ-170 Sentinel

The GPS spoofing process involves feeding fake maps and fake coordinates to a device, convincing it to follow incorrect directions.

According to an Iranian engineer interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor, Iran’s cyberwarfare team exploited weaknesses in the RQ-170’s GPS navigation.

“Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel,” he said, adding that these signals were then replaced by stronger counterfeit signals.

“The Iranian specialists then reconfigured the drone’s GPS coordinates to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.”

Effectively, the Iranian engineers made the advanced US drone to surrender itself.

The engineer described how Iran reverse-engineered US drones downed in prior incidents to identify GPS vulnerabilities. They then used advanced signal equipment to overpower the drone’s encrypted military GPS.

Furthermore, the Iranian engineers got their hands on a fully intact, advanced US drone.

At that time, many experts doubted that a military-grade GPS signal could be hacked.  However, experts like Todd Humphreys, a GPS security researcher at the University of Texas, later corroborated the plausibility of this technique, noting that even encrypted GPS signals can be spoofed with sufficient expertise and equipment.

Todd Humphreys demonstrated GPS spoofing in 2012. Credits: University of Texas.
The RQ-170 incident is widely regarded as the first documented instance of GPS spoofing in combat. Prior to 2011, spoofing was largely theoretical or experimental, confined to academic tests, such as Humphreys’ 2008 prototype.
Iran’s success demonstrated that spoofing could neutralize high-value military systems, such as drones, GPS-guided missiles, and artillery systems. The incident shifted global attention to electronic warfare, prompting militaries all over the world to recalibrate security for GPS-guided drones, missiles, and ships.

The Rise Of GPS Spoofing In Combat

GPS spoofing has since become a central element of modern warfare, particularly evident in the Russia-Ukraine war. Both sides have extensively used spoofing to disrupt GPS-guided munitions and drones.
For example, Russia has deployed spoofing to misdirect Ukrainian HIMARS rockets, while Ukraine has countered with spoofing to confuse Russian drones. These tactics echo Iran’s 2011 playbook, demonstrating how low-cost techniques, such as spoofing, can outmaneuver expensive military platforms.
The technique’s low cost and accessibility, using commercially available hardware, make it a game-changer, enabling even non-state actors to challenge technologically superior adversaries.
A truck-mounted Network Electronic Warfare System, or NEWS, used by Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force.
A truck-mounted Network Electronic Warfare System, or NEWS, used by Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force.
GPS spoofing has also become a persistent threat to civil aviation. During the first six months of the Israel-Hamas war, there were over 50 instances of horrifying cyberattacks that modified planes’ in-flight GPS, leading to “critical navigation failures.”
The RQ-170 incident highlighted the fragility of GPS-reliant systems, forcing militaries to invest in anti-spoofing technologies, such as signal authentication and inertial navigation backups.
However, spoofing remains a potent threat, as seen in conflicts from Syria to the Black Sea, where false GPS signals have disrupted civilian and military operations.

Iran’s 2011 coup not only humiliated the U.S. but also heralded a new era of warfare, where manipulating digital signals can be as decisive as traditional firepower. As militaries increasingly rely on autonomous systems, GPS spoofing will remain a critical tool in modern conflicts.

  • Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
  • He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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