OPED By Imran Khurshid, PhD
China’s claim to have mediated the India–Pakistan ceasefire and Pakistan’s delayed endorsement reveal strategic opportunism and narrative manipulation, and reinforce India’s consistent account of Operation Sindoor.
China’s recent claim that it mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan during the May confrontation following Operation Sindoor is not only questionable but strategically incoherent.
Speaking at a foreign policy symposium, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that Beijing had helped ease tensions between the two countries, placing the episode among several global “hotspot issues” where China, according to him, had “maintained communication with relevant parties” and worked to “promote de-escalation and stability.”
Even more striking is Pakistan’s endorsement of this claim several months after the conflict had ended. These statements reveal less about diplomatic reality and more about geopolitical opportunism, narrative manipulation, and eroding credibility on the part of both Beijing and Islamabad.
India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, following the gruesome terror attack on Hindu tourists in the Baisaran Valley of Pahalgam, Kashmir, which claimed the lives of more than 26 people.
The ensuing military engagement was intense but brief, and India’s account of how the ceasefire was reached has remained very consistent from the beginning.
According to New Delhi, this ceasefire was reached only after Pakistan’s DGMO called his Indian counterpart, which resulted in the end of clashes between the two nuclear-armed nations.
India didn’t seek external mediation or third-party involvement during this conflict.
India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar clearly stated in Parliament, “No external power was involved in brokering the ceasefire with Pakistan during Operation Sindoor… there was no third-party intervention.” Reinforcing this, the Ministry of External Affairs clarified that “India’s position on mediation has always been clear. There was no mediation after Operation Sindoor,” stressing that the initiative came solely from Pakistan’s DGMO.
China Was a Party To The Conflict, Not A Mediator!
India has firmly rejected Beijing’s recent claims, accentuating that no third party played any role in ending the conflict.
The MEA highlighted that China’s version “does not reflect the reality of how the de-escalation occurred,” reiterating that the ceasefire was entirely the result of bilateral military communication and sovereign decision-making.
Against this backdrop, China’s claim of playing a third-party mediation role appears fundamentally illogical because, during this conflict, as also acknowledged by the Indian military officials, India was not fighting Pakistan alone; it was also fighting China, indirectly.
China was deeply involved in this conflict. Real-time intelligence support, satellite-based surveillance, and targeting assistance were largely provided by the Chinese PLA to the Pakistani military, enhancing its fighting prowess
As India’s Deputy Chief of Army Staff Lt Gen Rahul R. Singh stated, “Pakistan was in the front. China was providing all possible support… when DGMO-level talks were on, Pakistan had the live updates of our important vectors, from China… It’s like a live lab which is available to them.”
Further, Indian defence research groups and media reports have claimed that China assisted Pakistan in reorganising radar and air defence systems and adjusting satellite coverage to optimise monitoring of Indian movements. These accounts underscore that, from India’s perspective, China was far from a neutral mediator.
Pakistan’s heavy reliance on Chinese military hardware problematizes Beijing’s claim of neutrality. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), about 81 % of Pakistan’s defence imports between 2020 and 2024 came from China, making Beijing its principal weapons supplier.
A substantial majority of Pakistan’s inventory comprises advanced systems, including J-10C and JF-17 Block 3 fighter jets, PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles, and HQ 9 and HQ 16 air defence systems, all of which were actively deployed during the conflict.
During the engagement, Pakistan fought using Chinese platforms, sensors, and data links, while Chinese state-linked information channels amplified Pakistan’s propaganda and questioned the credibility of Indian military operations.
The 2025 Annual Report to Congress by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that China “opportunistically leveraged” the conflict to test and advertise its modern weapons systems, using the confrontation as a “real-world field experiment” to strengthen future defence exports. This highlights that Beijing’s involvement extended beyond hardware supply into strategic influence and narrative shaping.
In such circumstances, the idea that China could have acted as a mediator is not just implausible; it is strategically indefensible.
Pakistan’s Sudden Endorsement: A Case Study in Hypocrisy
Pakistan’s sudden decision to echo China’s claim raises further questions.
If China genuinely mediated the ceasefire, why did Pakistan remain silent for such a long period after the conflict? Why did this assertion surface only after China itself made the claim?
The timing suggests that Pakistan’s statement is driven less by historical accuracy and more by contemporary strategic compulsions.
Relations between China and Pakistan, while essentially structurally aligned against India, are no longer as smooth and frictionless as they once were. Recently, Pakistan’s military leadership has sought deeper ties with the United States, offering greater strategic and financial benefits, including access to mineral resources in Balochistan, areas where China has long held interests.
Moreover, Islamabad’s failure to adequately secure Chinese workers and infrastructure projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has undermined Beijing’s trust. Persistent attacks on CPEC projects, mismanagement of Chinese funds, and delays in implementation have all added to Beijing’s apprehension.
Pakistan’s worsening ties with Afghanistan are also hurting China’s strategic interests. Beijing has sought stability along its western periphery, and views improved Pakistan–Afghanistan ties as essential for extending CPEC connectivity.
Pakistan’s inability, or unwillingness, to stabilise this relationship has complicated China’s broader Belt and Road ambitions and undermined its grand geostrategic project.
Economically, Pakistan remains heavily dependent on the United States for support, surviving on IMF bailout packages, military aid, and ad hoc help from the US and its partners.
The United States and its close strategic partners provide various forms of assistance to it. Still, it is geostrategically packaged under categories such as climate financing, women’s education, infrastructure projects, and other developmental programs.
The basic objective behind this support from Washington is to achieve its geopolitical objectives in the region. Still, this recently deepening dependency between the Pentagon and Islamabad has now reinforced the perception in Beijing that Pakistan can’t be trusted, as its loyalties remain contingent on dollars.
This has created growing unease in China about Pakistan’s reliability as a long-term strategic partner. In the context of Pakistan’s recent claims to have played a role in mediating the crisis, the endorsement is an attempt to regain its lost goodwill, financial assistance, and strategic assurance amid mounting uncertainty.
Ironically, this step contradicts Pakistan’s previous claims.
For months, Islamabad allowed, and sometimes encouraged, US President Donald Trump’s frequent claims that he had brokered the India-Pakistan ceasefire. By supporting China’s assertion, Pakistan effectively contradicts its previous statements.
If China mediated, then the U.S. did not. If the U.S. mediated, China could not have. In attempting to please all sides, Pakistan has ended up eroding the credibility of every version except India’s.
A Strategic Win For India?
From India’s standpoint, these competing claims have had an unforeseen but positive effect. They support New Delhi’s persistent argument that no external power played a role in ending the conflict.
The conflicting reports from China, Pakistan, and the USA have only reinforced India’s position and heckled Pakistan’s narrative.
China’s claim of mediation, made long after the fact, and Pakistan’s endorsement of it do little to change the facts on the ground. Instead, they underscore narrative opportunism, strategic insecurity, and a willingness to sacrifice credibility for short-term advantage.
One should not be surprised if tomorrow Turkey claims to have mediated the India-Pakistan ceasefire; after all, if there is one country, along with China, that helped Pakistan in its war against India, amplified its propaganda, and would be keen to demonstrate its influence over Islamabad, it’s Turkey!
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
