The U.S. and Israeli militaries have been hammering Iran for over two weeks. There are two reported aims of the campaign: one to replace the hardliners and install a moderate regime, and the second to completely neutralise the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
While a large part of the Khomeini regime and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders have been neutralised, the next-tier leaders have taken over, and Iranian forces and proxies are striking back across the Middle East.
The IRGC has threatened to set the region’s oil and gas infrastructure “on fire” if Iranian energy sites are attacked.
Global financial and energy markets are highly volatile. Questions abound about the future trajectory of this conflict and its wider consequences. Has Iran’s nuclear stockpile reasonably been neutralised and the program pushed beyond easy recovery?
Since Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow in June 2025, it has been difficult for experts to assess how much of Iran’s nuclear stockpile remains accessible and potentially dangerous.
Prior to those attacks, Iran’s stockpile had been estimated at 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium.
On 9-10 March, the United States dropped its largest non-nuclear bomb on Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons facility. The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 30,000-pound bomb designed to penetrate up to 200 feet of hardened concrete, was delivered by B-2 Spirit stealth bombers.
Satellite imagery shows significant damage at the Taleghan-2 facility inside Iran’s Parchin military complex following strikes.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) November 2011 report had identified the site as the location of hydrodynamic experiments consistent with nuclear weapon development, specifically high-explosive testing for implosion-type nuclear initiators, the component that compresses fissile material to achieve critical mass.
Israel released 55,000 pages from Iran’s Amad Plan archive in 2018 documenting Parchin’s role. The IAEA detected chemically man-made uranium particles during its sole inspection of the specific site in September 2015.
After Parchin, the current war is about whether Iran still possesses the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. According to the IAEA, the existing stockpile is “mainly” in Isfahan, while other parts may have been destroyed last year.
Some experts believe that the stockpile is largely inaccessible and buried underground. Most middle powers feel that not having nuclear weapons in today’s geopolitics is a liability and could be subjected to bullying. In fact, some countries like Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia have long shown interest in having their own nuclear deterrence.
If Iran devolves into political chaos and civil war, then the stockpile could fall into the hands of rogue elements with nefarious purposes. It is time to reassess Iran’s current nuclear capability and better means to neutralise it.
June 2025 Attacks
On June 26 last year, the United States bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities, using, among others, the GBU-57A/B to attack the deeply buried Iranian Fordow uranium enrichment plant.
Tomahawk cruise missiles were deployed against the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Esfahan complex, where Iran conducted uranium conversion activities and stored at least some of its highly enriched uranium. All three sites were part of Iran’s declared nuclear program and under IAEA safeguards.
U.S. strikes followed Israel’s initial targets, which included Natanz and the assassination of more than a dozen top Iranian nuclear scientists. Israel also targeted key Iranian military leaders and ballistic missile launch sites. In the following days, Israel damaged several buildings at Esfahan and an unfinished reactor at the Arak site.
U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that Israeli and U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities obliterated the program, but early intelligence assessments and the head of the IAEA suggested that the program may only have been set back a matter of months.
The IAEA’s director-general, Rafael Grossi, said that the IAEA “did not have proof of a systemic effort by Iran to move into a nuclear weapon.” Grossi condemned the strikes and told the UN Security Council (UNSC) that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place.” The strikes once again prompted debate in Iran about the value of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and negotiations with the United States.
Following the June attacks, Iran launched ballistic missiles at the US Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Iran’s then Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claimed victory, saying that Iran struck a “large number of Israeli military” targets and critical infrastructure during the 12-day conflict, and the American strikes could not achieve “anything significant.”
Trump continued to insist then that the strikes “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, declared a ceasefire, and called for peace.
Yet the United States was unsure if the strikes destroyed Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told senators in a June classified briefing that the United States does not have the military capability to destroy the deeply buried facilities at Esfahan, where Iran may have been storing that material.
Iran needs to convert uranium from gas to the metal form necessary to build a bomb. Iran “can’t do a nuclear weapon without a conversion facility,” which reportedly was hit.
Grossi assessed that although Iran’s facilities were “severely damaged,” the country had the “industrial and technological capabilities” to rebuild. According to a May 2025 IAEA report, Iran had produced more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235. That stockpile, if enriched to the 90 percent U-235 (weapons-grade), would be enough for about 10 bombs.
Historic Background & Neutralisation Attempts
Development of nuclear technology began in the Pahlavi era and continued after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. By the early 1990s, Iran’s nuclear program accelerated on two parallel tracks: one overtly civilian and one covert.
Thousands of centrifuge components, tools, and technical drawings obtained from Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network were used to set up secret pilot enrichment workshops. In 2000, Iran completed a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, based on a Chinese design, to produce uranium hexafluoride feedstock for enrichment.
Openly, Iran continued working with Russia and China to build a peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Bushehr’s reactor project, led by Russian engineers, came online in 2011.
China helped Iran with nuclear research and uranium mining expertise. Less transparently, Iran was building a secret enrichment capability and exploring technologies relevant to nuclear weapons, away from the eyes of inspectors.
The United States Intelligence assessed in 2007 that Iran pursued nuclear weapons under the AMAD Project until 2003, then ceased its effort. Undeclared nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak were exposed in 2002, and Fordow in 2009.
The program is widely believed to support deterrence from foreign aggression or domination or leverage in its negotiations with the United States, while some have argued it could increase Iran’s support for terrorism or its threats against Israel.
In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, and in 2006, the UNSC demanded Iran cease uranium enrichment and imposed sanctions.
The U.S. and Israel sought to covertly degrade the Iranian nuclear program, with the 1990s U.S. Operation Merlin, and the 2009 use of the jointly-developed Stuxnet computer worm. Between 2010 and 2012, four Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in Tehran.
By mid-2013, Tehran had installed over 18,000 centrifuges (mostly IR-1 models) at Natanz and Fordow, including some 1,000+ more advanced IR-2m machines. Its stockpile had grown to nearly 10,000 kg of 3.5% low-enriched uranium and about 370 kg of 20% medium-enriched uranium.
In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran with the P5+1 to restrict Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Iran agreed to reduce its centrifuges to 6,104, limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%, and cap its stockpile of enriched uranium for 15 years. Unhappy with Iranian secret efforts, in 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the agreement, re-imposing sanctions, which led Iran to start violating its restrictions.
On 27 November 2020, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in Tehran. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran’s covert nuclear program for many decades.
Throughout 2021 and 2022, Iran installed cascades of advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6) at Natanz and Fordow, significantly increasing its enrichment output. In April 2021, a sabotage attack struck the Natanz enrichment plant, causing an electrical blackout and damaging centrifuges.
Iran responded by further upping enrichment: days later, it began producing 60% enriched uranium, an unprecedented level for Iran, just short of weapons-grade (90% and above). If Iran chose to enrich this material to 90%, it would be sufficient for several nuclear warheads.
In late 2024, intelligence persuaded U.S. officials that Iran was exploring a cruder gun-type fission weapon, undeliverable by missile, which could be manufactured in a few weeks. In late October 2024, during a series of Israeli airstrikes in Iran carried out in response to a ballistic missile attack earlier that month, Israel reportedly destroyed a top-secret nuclear weapons research facility known as the Taleghan 2 building, located within the Parchin military complex.
In November 2024, Iran announced that it would make new advanced centrifuges after the IAEA condemned Iran’s non-compliance and secrecy.
Iran and the U.S. have engaged in bilateral negotiations since April 2025, aiming to curb Iran’s program for sanctions relief, though Iran’s leaders have refused to stop enriching uranium. On 12 June 2025, the IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its NPT safeguards agreement for the first time since 2005.
On 13 June, Israel launched airstrikes targeting Iranian military leaders, nuclear scientists, and nuclear facilities, beginning the twelve-day Iran–Israel war. On 22 June, the United States bombed three Iranian nuclear sites with larger bunker-buster bombs. Iran subsequently suspended its cooperation with the IAEA.
In August, France, Germany, and the UK triggered the snapback mechanism, which reinstated UN sanctions in September. In October, Iran, Russia, and China declared they viewed the JCPOA as terminated and the UN sanctions as legally void.
In February 2026, following the largest U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Israel and the United States launched large-scale strikes against Iran, with Iranian nuclear and missile programs as one justification.
Major Nuclear Facilities & Attacks
Natanz is Iran’s main uranium enrichment site. The facility includes an underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) housing large cascades of gas centrifuges, as well as a smaller Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) above the ground.
As of 2025, Natanz was enriching uranium to up to 60%. The site has seen multiple attacks. After the March 2026 attacks, its entrance buildings suffered significant damage. The underground facility remains intact, but is no longer accessible.
Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La (Pickaxe Mountain) is another site excavated by Iran as a future centrifuge assembly facility deep beneath mountains near the Natanz nuclear complex. At 260–330 feet, the depth may exceed that of the Natanz Site, significantly reducing the effect of non-nuclear bunker-buster bombs, such as those dropped on Fordow.
The mountain above the site is nearly 650 metres taller than the one over Fordow, providing greater protection and larger chambers for nuclear operations. It is potentially intended for the secure storage of Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium or for covert uranium enrichment. The site features two pairs of entrance tunnels, one to the east and one to the west. Tunnel entrances are being reinforced.
Fordow is an underground enrichment site built inside a mountain engineered to withstand airstrikes. In 2025, Iran was using Fordow to enrich uranium up to 60% U-235 as well, deploying advanced IR-6 centrifuges. Fordow’s smaller size and heavy fortification make it difficult to target. Following the June 2025 airstrikes, satellite images and IAEA sources indicated that Fordow was now “likely destroyed.”
Bushehr is Iran’s only commercial nuclear power station (1000 Mwe), situated on the Persian Gulf coast in southern Iran. Bushehr is under full IAEA safeguards. The Arak IR-40 complex is a heavy-water reactor and production plant. Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center is another major hub of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and research activities.
The site hosts the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). The facility sustained significant damage in two separate bombings in June 2025.
Iran’s Current Nuclear Program Status
Following the U.S. 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA deal, Iran has accumulated significant stockpiles of 60% enriched uranium, placing it on the threshold of nuclear weapons capability.
As of mid-2025, Iran had accumulated over 440 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, which is close to the 90% required for weapons-grade and sufficient for multiple bombs, including the use of uranium metal to produce neutron initiators. Iran announced in 2020 that it would no longer abide by any restrictions.
In January 2025, the exiled opposition group NCRI alleged that Iran is developing long-range missile technology under the IRGC, with some designs based on North Korean models. They said that these missiles, such as the Ghaem-100 and Simorgh, could carry nuclear warheads and reach targets as far as 3,000 kilometres away, including parts of Europe.
In March 2025, President Trump wrote to Ali Khamenei seeking to reopen negotiations. Ayatollah Khamenei later said, “Some bullying governments insist on negotiations not to resolve issues but to impose their own expectations.”
In late March 2025, Khamenei’s top advisor, Ali Larijani, said Iran would have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States, Israel, or its allies. As of early 2026, diplomatic efforts remain stalled, with Iran continuing to advance its technical capabilities while restricting IAEA monitoring.
In September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four nuclear reactors in Sirik in Iran. The Generation III reactors were expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. On 28 September 2025, UN sanctions were officially re-imposed on Iran.
In October 2025, Ali Khamenei had reportedly authorised the development of miniaturised nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles. Circulated accounts indicate the existence of an ultra-secret enrichment program at one of Iran’s covert nuclear sites, to which the IAEA has not been given access.
Iranian Law Prohibiting Cooperation with the IAEA
After the June 2025 attacks, the Iranian parliament had drafted legislation calling for the country to withdraw from the NPT, but finally chose instead to pass a law prohibiting cooperation with the IAEA. Iran, as an NPT state-party, is legally required to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
The new law, however, requires that before resuming cooperation with the agency, Iran must receive assurances that its nuclear facilities and scientists will be secured and that its NPT rights, including the right to enrichment, will be respected.
The NPT guarantees that non-nuclear-weapon states can access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards, but does not explicitly mention a right to uranium enrichment.
Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program
Iran possesses the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, serving as a key deterrent and strategic tool for the IRGC. The program has shifted from reliance on foreign designs (North Korean/Russian) to domestic, solid-fuel technology for better mobility and faster launch times.
The program is focused on short- and medium-range missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs) with ranges of 2,000–3,000 km, and includes underground “missile cities” and advanced hypersonic, manoeuvring, and precision-guided technology.
MRBMs are the backbone of the force, including the Khorramshahr-4 (Khaibar) (2,000 km), Sejjil (2,000 km), and Emad. SRBMs include the Shahab-1/2 (Scud-based) and the Qiam-1 (700-800 km), often used by regional proxies. Iran has developed the highly manoeuvrable Fattah hypersonic missile (announced in 2023) with precision guidance. The arsenal is intended to counter superior air forces in the region, particularly those of the U.S. and Israel.
Iran received multiple large shipments of sodium perchlorate from China, totalling approximately 3,000 tons. It is a precursor in the production of ammonium perchlorate, the primary oxidiser in solid-fuelled rocket motors used in Iran’s MRBMs.
During the 2026 Iran War, ballistic missiles were used to target U.S. bases as well as targets in neighbouring Arab states and Israel. All of Europe, and in particular Britain, France, and Germany, are in range of Iranian MRBMs, while major US cities such as Washington and New York, beyond range at approximately 10,000 km away, may be targeted by missiles launched from the sea.
Iran was assumed to possess more than 3,000 missiles in total (across all ranges). Iran-backed Iraqi militias have received “a couple of dozen” short-range ballistic missiles. Iran employs mobile multi-axle trucks to transport most missiles, enabling dispersion.
Several of Iran’s ballistic missiles have the range and payload capacity to carry a nuclear warhead, should Iran choose to develop one. This has drawn international concern and sanctions. The Shahab-3, based on North Korean technology, is one of Iran’s most sophisticated ballistic missiles. With a range of about 1,300 kilometres, it could carry a nuclear warhead.
Possible Special Operations
The Deep Layer facility was an underground Iranian-funded missile manufacturing site located near Masyaf in western Syria, a stronghold of Syrian air defences, destroyed by Israeli Special Forces on September 8, 2024, during “Operation Many Ways”.
The site was a flagship project of Iran’s missile production program, and intended to supply precision missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the Assad regime in Syria.
The underground facility had been built because an earlier Israeli airstrike on an aboveground rocket engine manufacturing site in Jamraya, southern Syria, had destroyed it. By 2021, the underground facility, buried 70 to 130 metres into a mountain, had become operational, with missile production capabilities nearing full scale.
The horseshoe-shaped structure featured three primary entrances: one for raw materials, another for completed missiles, and a third for logistics and office access. Israel estimated the facility’s annual output could range from 100 to 300 missiles, with a range of over 300 kilometres.
The site was intentionally located 200 km north of the Israeli border and 45 km from Syria’s western coastline to keep away from Israeli strikes. Israel had been monitoring the facility closely and refining airstrike plans.
In October 2023, the elite Israeli Shaldag unit, known for long-range penetration operations, and Unit 669, specialising in combat search-and-rescue, were selected for the mission.
The operation began with 100 commandos and 20 medics boarding four CH-53 “Yasur” heavy helicopters, escorted by AH-64 attack helicopters, 21 fighter jets. Other platforms were five drones and 14 reconnaissance planes. The formations flew over the Mediterranean to avoid detection by Syrian radar.
After entering Syria, the helicopters flew exceptionally low, nap-of-the-earth (NOE) operations, to evade the country’s densest air defence zones. Fighter aircraft launched diversionary strikes on other Syrian targets, taking attention away from the Masyaf region. The helicopters landed near the facility’s entrances, deploying troops. A surveillance drone launched by the commandos monitored the area.
Commandos secured the perimeter and then breached the heavily guarded facility. Once inside, the team planted nearly 660 pounds of explosives along the production line and its support facilities.
The team then exited and detonated the explosives, remotely destroying the production site. The mission was completed in less than 3 hours, and returned using the same helicopters. Could such a mission be flown against some deep nuclear facilities?
To Summarise
Despite its vast natural gas reserves and abundant solar and other renewable energy potential, Iran continues to invest in extremely high-cost nuclear projects.
Former Foreign Minister Zarif admitted that expenditures on nuclear projects could have upgraded the entire energy sector by over 20 times.
Iran’s current aims are to create panic in the UAE and Gulf countries through attacks and threats, so that they pressure the U.S. to stop the war.
Threatening to choke the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of global oil flows, could push oil prices sharply higher. Trigger global inflation and economic pain, so major economies pressure Washington politically. Turn the conflict from a regional military fight into a global economic crisis that forces negotiations.
The U.S. claims to have reasonable control over Pakistani nuclear weapons. An Iranian nuclear bomb will change the geopolitical dynamics of West Asia.
Not only Israel, but also the West Asian neighbours and Europe could all be threatened. Undoubtedly, it is important to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program, if it actually exists.
Mere bombing of deeply embedded facilities is not the solution. Even regime change will not stop the program. The U.S. could plan some kind of special operations to seize Iran’s enriched uranium, which could ultimately end the war.
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran, fighter test pilot, and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals during his 40-year tenure in the IAF.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- He tweets @Chopsyturvey
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