The ruling establishment in Pakistan seems thrilled that, after more than 50 years, Islamabad’s diplomatic credentials have received international endorsement, showing that it has the strategic vision and diplomatic acumen to serve as a neutral mediator in global politics and emerge as a “peace broker”.
If, in 1971, a Pakistani government plane carrying the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, flew overnight from Islamabad to Beijing and thus facilitated the subsequent US-China rapprochement the following year, over the last few days, Pakistan is said to be acting as a “go-between” for Washington and Tehran.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed on March 25 that Islamabad had relayed a US 15-point ceasefire proposal to Tehran.
And as one writes this, Pakistan is hosting meaningful talks (March 29-30) with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to build consensus on ending the hostilities that threaten global energy security and regional stability.
Dar has revealed that “Pakistan will be honored to host and facilitate meaningful talks between the two sides (Iran and the US) in the coming days, for a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the ongoing conflict”.
Have the US and Iran agreed to attend such a meeting hosted by Pakistan?
Though one cannot find a clear answer to this question, the success of Pakistani diplomacy is linked to the answer. Such reasoning seems highly relevant, given Pakistan’s diplomatic history.
After all, one remembers Husain Haqqani, former Pakistani ambassador to the US and author of “Magnificent Delusions: US, Pakistan, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding”, who had characterized Pakistan’s deal with the then Nixon administration (specifically in 1970-1971) as a classic example of Pakistan’s “delusion” of being a crucial international player while acting as a conduit for U.S.-China relations.
The point is whether Pakistan’s role in international diplomacy is one of facilitation or true mediation. This distinction rests on whether Pakistan acts as a neutral broker with the power to influence outcomes or merely serves as a “postman” or conduit for communication.
If one goes by the strategic literature on the role of mediation in resolving international conflicts, there seems to be a consensus among pundits that credible mediators between two warring countries must possess “a combination of structural, personal, and procedural attributes” to gain trust and manage high-stakes conflict.
Essential Criteria for a Credible Mediator are said to be the following:
First is the factor of “Impartiality and Neutrality”. The mediator must be seen as unbiased and fair-minded in their approach, with no material stake in the outcome of the dispute. This does not necessarily mean they have no personal opinions, but they must be able to put them aside to facilitate an honest, balanced process.
Secondly, there has to be “Trustworthiness and Credibility”. The mediator must possess a strong reputation for discretion, tact, and trustworthiness to ensure that parties feel comfortable sharing sensitive information. Mediation should not facilitate betrayal and must obtain permission before disclosing confidential information, particularly about a warring party’s weaknesses.
Mediators should also commit to transparency in information gathering and in presenting settlement proposals, as well as to respecting parties’ deadlines and the need for breaks, to improve the chances of a peaceful resolution.
Thirdly, there is the need for what are called “High-Level Leverage and Resources”. Successful mediators in international relations often possess rank and prestige (such as heads of state or trusted diplomats serving as special envoys, or elder statesmen with pre-existing relationships with the warring parties) and command resources (leverage) that both parties value.
The other major aspect of mediation is that the mediators may use one of the following three strategies in the course of helping to deal with an intractable conflict:
(a) Communication-facilitation strategies describe mediator behavior at the low end of the intervention spectrum. Here, a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating cooperation, but exhibiting little control over the more formal process or substance of mediation.
The mediator’s role in this case is limited to facilitating dialogue and communication and to simply conveying information from one party to the other. This is the role Norway had played in bringing about the Oslo Accords in 1993, which were signed on September 13 in Washington, D.C., where Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization formally recognized each other, initiating a five-year transitional period to create the Palestinian Authority to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
(b) Procedural strategies enable a mediator to bring both parties together in some neutral environment. Here, a mediator may exercise control over timing, issues on the agenda, meeting place and arrangements, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the formality or flexibility of the meetings.
Such was the case with then US President Jimmy Carter’s control over all aspects of the physical setting at Camp David in 1978, leading to the the Peace Treaty next year between Egypt and Israel ( Israel agreed to withdraw all its armed forces and 4,500 civilian inhabitants from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt became the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations, and Egypt guaranteed free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran).
(c) Directive strategies are the most powerful form of mediation, where a mediator works hard to shape the content and nature of an outcome. This is done by offering each party in conflict incentives, promises of support, or threats of diplomatic sanctions.
For instance, in the Camp David process, President Carter decided to further alleviate his role to break through both Israeli and Egyptian intransigence by promising each $2 billion if they would sign a ceasefire agreement.
Similarly, directive strategies can take the form of threats to withdraw if certain agreements are not reached or actions are not taken. It is in this context that President Donald Trump’s threat of economic sanctions or curtailing military aid in his mediatory role between Russia and Ukraine may be seen.
However, what is noteworthy in the ultimate analysis is that a mediator is evaluated by the long-term implementation/impact/ durability of its peace-making or conflict-resolution.
It has been seen that many times, agreements reached through mediation have not lasted long, such as in the case of Angola’s civil war in 1991 (the agreement was mediated by the United States, Russia, and the United Nations) and various ceasefire agreements in the Middle East and Afghanistan in recent years. Durable peace eluded such mediations.
It is against these criteria that one may evaluate Pakistan’s goal of becoming a successful mediator.
First, Pakistan’s neutrality in the Middle East is under challenge. Its role is delicate indeed, given the fact of its strong ties to Saudi Arabia, which creates suspicions in Iran. Even so, the country has too many stakes in the region as a whole to be truly impartial and neutral.
For instance, it could never broker a stable peace agreement in Afghanistan despite trying it for over 40 years, ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
On the other hand, it played the role of the primary conduit for US, Saudi Arabia, and Chinese military and financial assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, with its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In fact, it was allegedly organizing and directing the resistance.
It is widely recognized by experts that Pakistan occupied a dual role: a stakeholder on the one hand and a mediator on the other. So much so that even after hosting, in July 2015, the first officially acknowledged direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government of then-President Ashraf Ghani in Murree, near Islamabad, with US and Chinese officials attending as observers, its neutrality was never taken seriously by the combatant parties.
If anything, the fact that it was sheltering Osama bin Laden all the time further exposed its duplicity.
Despite bringing the Taliban interlocutors to the table, today the situation is such that Pakistan and the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan are locked in a war, both firing at each other. And what was hitherto unimaginable for Islamabad for years, the Taliban has grown close to India, its “ eternal rival”.
Similarly, analysts point out that Pakistan’s efforts to reconcile with Saudi Arabia did not yield the intended results.
After protesters ransacked Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran in January 2016, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Tehran and Riyadh in a single trip alongside then-Army chief General Raheel Sharif. But Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir publicly denied that any formal mediation had been agreed upon!
Similarly, after drone and missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais temporarily halved the kingdom’s oil output in 2019, then Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan undertook shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh. But this time, Iranian officials said that they were unaware of any formal mediation process!
And it so happened that China finally succeeded in brokering the restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic ties in Beijing in March 2023. Though Pakistan tried to take some credit for the fact that it was Islamabad that had made the first direct contacts between the two sides, no one took note of it.
Even the Pakistani role in bringing about the rapprochement between the US and China, which many Pakistani analysts term “the most consequential” for restructuring the Cold War, did not yield any long-term diplomatic benefits for Pakistan.
For Muhammad Faisal, a Sydney-based foreign policy analyst, though it was “Pakistan’s defining diplomatic moment”, the fact remains that “Pakistan couldn’t turn that support from both powers to its advantage in the 1971 civil conflict and the subsequent war with India”.
Despite being on good terms with both China and the US, Pakistan couldn’t deter India from carving out Bangladesh.
Likewise, Haqqani argues in his book that the whole episode was one of “mismatched expectations”. If Pakistan deluded itself into thinking American support would make it India’s equal, the US deluded itself into thinking aid would make Pakistan a reliable regional proxy, so ran his argument.
In fact, Haqqani considers US-Pakistan relations to be part of a recurring but dysfunctional pattern where Pakistan provides strategic services in exchange for temporary aid, ultimately failing to build a sustainable, mutually beneficial alliance.
All told, compared to other rising powers, Pakistan is often viewed as having limited geopolitical weight, lacking the economic or political leverage necessary to compel parties toward a final settlement, relegating its role to providing backchannel channels.
Viewed thus, Pakistan lacks the leverage to address deep-seated gaps between Washington and Tehran, limiting its role to relaying messages rather than reshaping the conflict.
However, it may be wrong to say that Pakistan cannot play a meaningful role at all.
One, here, can agree with Masood Khan, who served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States and later to the United Nations, that “Pakistan’s forte is opening channels, building confidence, and hosting indirect, proximity talks. This kind of facilitation is foundational in any kind of mediation and subsequent conciliation, arbitration, and agreements.”
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
