It would have been understandable if it was Pakistan, but Turkey preparing its foreign ministry’s annual budget for the next year by keeping Kashmir in mind, among others, may appear a little unusual.
But then that is understandable, given the facts that promotion of Islam and re-emergence as the leader of the “Islamic World” are now Ankara’s dominant global goals.
On November 18, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan referred to the Kashmir issue in the same tone and tenor as Pakistan’s while presenting the 2026 budget for Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the Planning and Budget Committee of the Parliament.
Fidan, in a way, was only repeating what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been doing every year in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly since 2019. While in the U.N., he urges India to solve “the Kashmir issue” by negotiating with Pakistan and “in accordance with international law”, outside the world body, he has not hesitated to say that “India right now has become a country where massacres are widespread. What massacres? Massacres of Muslims. By who? Hindus.”
It may be noted that ever since President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominated Turkey’s politics in 2002, Ankara has been projecting the country not only as “a middle power” by extending its international reach outside its traditional proximity to the West as NATO member (with 252 diplomatic missions round the world, Turkey now has the third-highest number of diplomatic missions in the world, trailing only to the United States’ 271 and China’s 274) but also as the leader in “the Islamic world”.
Erdogan is said to be employing Ottoman symbolism and rhetoric by rejecting purely secular interpretations of Turkish history and seeking to revive Turkey’s historical influence as the seat of the former Islamic Caliphate.
In the process, he has attempted to challenge Saudi Arabia’s perceived leadership role in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) by creating alternative Islamic alliances, such as a summit with Pakistan and Malaysia.
Apparently, Erdogan is a votary of “ittihad-i-Islam” (unity among Islamic believers), arguing that Muslims are one nation, superficially fragmented into ethno-national and sectarian identities in a West-dominated world.
For him, “Turkey is the only country that can lead the Muslim world as part of its civilisational duty”.
The Turkish President has been addressing the broader “Ummah” (Muslim community) issues by taking strong public stances on Kashmir, Palestine, and Islamophobia in Europe. And it seems this has resulted in him gaining popularity and support among conservative Muslim populations worldwide, often in contrast to the more reserved diplomacy of other Muslim-majority nations.
This explains his travelling, of late, widely in Muslim-majority countries in the Balkans, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. His latest visit in the series was to Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia this year.
It may be noted that “Diyanet”, as a Turkish religious institution, is now officially playing an active role in pursuing the country’s foreign policy. It claims to be a diplomatic counterweight to Western institutions in reshaping global governance narratives.
Its activities include the export of Turkish religious narratives, infrastructure development, and clerical training in line with Ankara’s interpretation of Sunni Islam—specifically the Hanafi-Maturidi tradition. It is collaborating with the authorities of the countries in which it works to limit the appeal of Saudi-style Salafism.
Diyanet’s official name is “The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs”. It has significantly expanded its influence abroad, with its budget increasing from $1.3 billion to $3.18 billion in 2023, according to the latest official release.
Operating as a state structure directly under the President of Turkey and receiving funds in accordance with the country’s budgetary provisions, it manages thousands of mosques domestically and internationally and engages in educational, charitable, and informational activities.
Incidentally, because of Diyanet’s overseas operations, Turkey has faced criticism from many Western capitals. There is now growing international scrutiny of Diyanet’s activities, leading to tighter regulations and oversight. Many Turkish Imams have been refused visas in Europe.
However, it is also a fact that there are countries elsewhere in Asia where Diayanat has been most welcome, particularly in Bangladesh after the coup against Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.
The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has significantly expanded ties with Turkey. It is well known that the AKP has had very friendly relations with Bangladesh’s radical Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party. Under Hasina, JeI was put under many restrictions, but now it is openly being supported by the AKP/Diyanet
Incidentally, both have been traditionally close to the global radical organization called the Muslim Brotherhood.
Reportedly, Erdogan is now liberally providing financial and logistical support to JeI and associated radical groups, including Islamic charities and madrasa networks. A close aide to President Erdogan is said to have visited the JeL’s Dhaka headquarters in July 2025.
Similarly, many Islamist leaders of Bangladesh have been invited to visit Turkey, and some of them have been reportedly given arms training.
That they are all collaborating or cooperating with each other is not exactly surprising, particularly for India. Apparently, investigations into the recent blast near Red Fort in Delhi have revealed that the two main accused, Dr Umar Mohammed and Dr Muzammil, were being guided by a handler based in Ankara, under the alias ‘Ukasa’.
Investigations have also discovered 68 suspicious mobile numbers active near the parking and the blast site, with calls traced to Pakistan and Turkey.
Incidentally, an alleged Turkish-backed group in Dhaka, “Saltanat-e-Bangla,” has circulated maps promoting a “Greater Bangladesh” that includes Myanmar’s Arakan State, Indian states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and the entire Northeast region of India.
In other words, one could argue that an “Islamic Axis of Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh” is attempting to reshape South Asia’s strategic order, in which Pakistan provides the operational core, Bangladesh’s JeI the ideological base, and Turkey the diplomatic and financial cover.
Their shared goal is to challenge India’s influence and revive the narrative of “Islamic resurgence” across the Bay of Bengal. The consequent “Bangladesh front” may soon become the epicenter of another proxy war in Asia.
A noteworthy aspect that deserves mention in this regard is the helping role that the Turkish Defense industry provides to Erdogan’s Islamic push in countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Pakistan now has Turkish-made drones and a Turkish Ada-class anti-submarine corvette. In fact, Turkey has emerged as Pakistan’s second-largest arms provider after China.
The two sides regularly conduct joint military drills. Pakistan’s National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP) is also said to have entered into an agreement with Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar for research and development.
Similarly, Bangladesh has purchased numerous Turkish military hardware, including Otokar Kobra II infantry mobility vehicles, TRG-300 MLRS rocket systems, and Bayraktar TB2 drones.
In fact, Bangladesh is now Turkey’s fourth-largest defense customer, and the military-to-military relationship has deepened significantly over the past year. Besides, thousands of Bangladeshi military and security personnel have received specialized training in Turkey.
In January 2025, Dhaka finalized negotiations to procure 26 Turkish-made Tulpar light tanks. Suited for marshy and riverine terrain, they are especially useful in the borderlands adjoining India. Turkish firm CANiK signed a MoU to supply Bangladesh with heavy machine guns, 30 × 113 mm cannons for counter-UAV warfare, and precision rifles.
Besides, Ankara has pledged support for building two defense complexes in Chittagong and Narayanganj, offering co-production, credit lines, and technology transfer.
It is against this background that strategic analysts point out that, apart from China, India’s security challenges in the subcontinent must now include a hostile Bangladesh, armed with Turkish weaponry and ideologically aligned with Pakistan.
But all this does not necessarily confer the status of the supreme leader of “the Muslim world “ on President Erdogan or, for that matter, Turkey. The Muslim world is not monolithic; its member states have diverse foreign policy agendas and shifting alliances with global powers like the U.S., China, Russia, and India, which often conflict with a unified leadership structure.
Turkey has fraught relations with key Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, largely due to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and divergent regional interests.
Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood is considered an existential threat to the state model and stability of most of the Arab regimes, Turkey, under President Erdogan, happens to be its safe haven.
Then there is Iran, which has its own ideological and political sphere of influence. In fact, many Arab states have historical grievances and political tensions stemming from the Ottoman era, which complicates universal acceptance of Turkish leadership.
Secondly, though Erdogan has managed to maintain his dominance in Turkish politics for a long time, the country also has a strong opposition and secular elites who view his Islamist rhetoric as a threat to national unity and a departure from the vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey.
Thirdly, Turkey also faces economic challenges, including high inflation, a depreciated currency, and a high cost of living. These are impacting its citizens and businesses.
This challenging situation is driven by factors such as a large current account deficit, excessive foreign-currency debt, and a recent history of inconsistent monetary policy. As a result, the country is said to be experiencing rising poverty, skilled worker brain drain, and a decline in its tourism industry.
All these do limit Erdogan’s Islamic policy adventurism. Therefore, his claim to be the undisputed leader of the Islamic world will remain ambitious and contested, in all likelihood.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
