It is likely that Russian forces were tracking the B-2 bombers that struck three Iranian nuclear facilities—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—between 2:10 AM and 2:35 AM local time in Iran on June 22, 2025.
The B-2 bombers, departing from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, reportedly took a transatlantic route across the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, entering Iranian airspace from the west or southwest, according to Pentagon details of Operation Midnight Hammer.
The aircraft flew through airspace monitored by Russia using two types of radar systems—Container over-the-horizon (OTH) radars and Voronezh early warning radars, both of which are theoretically capable of detecting stealth aircraft under certain conditions.
Container Radar
The 29B6 Container is a Russian bi-static HF over-the-horizon (OTH) radar capable of detecting aircraft, cruise missiles, and potentially stealth platforms at ranges of up to ~3,000 km or more.
The radar uses skywave propagation, bouncing signals off the ionosphere to enable detection of low-RCS targets that conventional radars might miss.
Container radars operate in the HF band, where stealth shaping is less effective because the wavelengths are comparable to or larger than the B-2’s dimensions.
Container radars capable of detecting B-2 bombers are currently operational at Kovylkino (Mordovia) and Zeya (Amur region).
The Kovylkino radar covers Europe, North Africa, and parts of the Middle East, while the Zeya radar can cover northern and western Iranian airspace, depending on its orientation and operational mode (airspace monitoring or ballistic missile detection) at the time.
While a Container radar could detect a B-2 as an anomalous reflection at long range, it cannot track it with weapon-grade precision. Skywave OTH radars are also affected by ionospheric conditions, so reliability varies.
To warn Iran, the radars just needed to detect the B-2s, not accurately track them.
Voronezh Radars
The Voronezh radars come in several variants, including Voronezh-M, Voronezh-DM, and Voronezh-SM, each tailored for specific detection roles and performance enhancements.
Voronezh-M (VHF band) is optimized for long-range detection with relatively lower resolution, providing early warning of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles.
Voronezh-DM (UHF band) offers better resolution and tracking accuracy for smaller targets.
Voronezh-SM (L-band) and the planned Voronezh-VP variant provide enhanced precision tracking and improved clutter rejection. The Voronezh-VP, which integrates both VHF and UHF bands, can track incoming ballistic missiles and even low-flying targets like cruise missiles at great distances, giving Russian forces ample reaction time.
Voronezh-M, Voronezh-VP (VHF), and Voronezh-DM (UHF) radars have ranges of 6,000–8,000 km, can track objects at altitudes up to 8,000 km, and are capable of monitoring over 500 targets simultaneously.
Unlike Container OTH radars, which achieve long range via ionospheric reflection, Voronezh radars rely on high-power emissions and large phased-array antennas. Their phased-array design, featuring digital beamforming, enables rapid scanning across 120–240° azimuth sectors.
The VHF and UHF frequencies enhance detection of stealth targets because:
1. Their wavelengths are less affected by radar-absorbing materials optimized for higher-frequency bands (like X or S band).
2. The longer wavelengths (1–10 meters) of VHF radars are more likely to reflect back to the emitter, whereas shorter wavelengths are more easily deflected.
These radars’ digital beamforming and phased-array technology enable them to scan and track large numbers of targets with high efficiency.
Data Fusion
The different Voronezh radars work in unison as part of Russia’s integrated Missile Attack Early Warning System, generating a comprehensive radar picture of potential missile threats and space activity.
Each Voronezh radar operates independently within its assigned sector, monitoring for ballistic missile launches, space objects, and other high-altitude targets. The data collected—such as trajectories, speeds, and classifications—is transmitted to a central processing hub.
The central system fuses this information with data from other radars, satellites, and sensors to create a unified, real-time picture of the entire monitored region.
Voronezh radars are strategically positioned to ensure overlapping fields of view, providing redundancy and improving detection reliability. For example, if one radar detects a missile launch, nearby radars can validate the event and contribute additional trajectory data for more accurate tracking.
Voronezh Deployment
Voronezh radars are currently operational at
1. Lekhtusi, Leningrad Oblast: Voronezh-M (VHF) operational since 2009. The radar covers northern and western directions.
2. Armavir, Krasnodar Krai: Two Voronezh-DM (UHF) radars, operational since 2009. One monitors southwest (Balkans, Mediterranean), the other southeast (Persian Gulf).
3. Pionersky, Kaliningrad Oblast: Voronezh-DM (UHF), operational by 2014. Covers the Northern Atlantic to Italy.
4. Mishelevka, Irkutsk Oblast: Voronezh-VP (VHF), operational by 2014. Two arrays provide 240° coverage, monitoring southern directions.
5. Yeniseysk, Krasnoyarsk Krai: Voronezh-DM, operational by 2017. Enhances eastern coverage.
6. Barnaul, Altai Krai: Voronezh-DM, operational by 2017. Covers southern and central Asia.
7. Orsk, Orenburg Oblast: Voronezh-M, operational by 2017. Monitors Middle East and western China, attacked by drones in May 2024, damage unclear.
8. Vorkuta, Komi Republic: Voronezh-VP, operational by 2024. Covers Arctic and northern directions.
These eight stations provide near-complete strategic coverage, with ranges up to 6,000–8,000 km.
The following Voronezh installations were most likely to have had visibility of US B-2 activity over Iran:
1. Armavir Voronezh-DM, designed specifically to monitor Middle East airspace and missile launches.
2. Orsk Voronezh-M, which might have provided fringe detection if the B-2s entered northern Iranian airspace.
Barnaul, Kaliningrad, and possibly other stations could also have had some visibility, depending on the B-2s’ route and altitude.
Unless the B-2s were flying a terrain-hugging profile, Russian Voronezh radars could have detected and tracked their movement.
Nebo Radars
Besides Russian Container and Voronezh radars, the Nebo-M and Nebo-UM counter-stealth radars are also capable of detecting low-RCS aircraft like the B-2 using their VHF sensors.
However, these mobile Nebo radars have a much shorter range—typically around 300 to 600 km, depending on the model—and are primarily deployed to protect Russian territory and strategic zones, such as Kaliningrad, Crimea, the Far East, and the Arctic.
Conclusion
The U.S. employed a feint as part of Operation Midnight Hammer, the B-2 bomber strike on Iran on June 22, 2025.
According to Pentagon details, six B-2s were deployed to Guam as a deliberate deception tactic to mislead Iranian and potentially Russian defenses about the bombers’ true approach.
The feint was likely intended to prompt Russian forces to switch the operating modes of their Voronezh and Container radar networks to ballistic missile tracking, reducing their ability to detect and track the actual B-2 strike formation headed toward Iran.
Whether the feint succeeded in misleading Russian forces is not known. However, satellite imagery showing Iranian evacuation of the nuclear facilities before the strike suggests that Iran may have received advance warning of the impending attack.
- Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
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