By: Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan
On March 27, Iran’s military, in a missile‑and‑drone strike, attacked Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia, a facility defended by cutting-edge THAAD and Patriot Air Defense Systems.
The attack wounded nearly a dozen U.S. troops and severely damaged aerial refueling tankers and at least one E‑3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
It is widely seen as one of the most serious breaches of American air defenses so far in the current U.S.–Iran war.
Why is the Prince Sultan Air Base Important?
Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) is around 110 km southeast of the capital Riyadh and is operated by the Royal Saudi Air Force. It hosts several U.S. personnel and vital U.S. Air Force assets.
Since the base has a concentration of enablers like air-to-air refuellers and airborne command‑and‑control platforms, PSAB is considered an extremely critical node in the current U.S. air campaign against Iran.
What Happened
The Iranian attack was a combination of ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones. Open-source imagery suggests that the strike was precision‑focused on USAF aircraft parked in the open.
In the attack, several U.S. aerial refueling tankers were hit, with at least one reportedly destroyed and others badly damaged.
What was most damaging was the strike on an E‑3 Sentry AWACS aircraft on the base, which was apparently heavily damaged.
The destruction of E‑3 Sentry AWACS was one of the most consequential losses of the war so far. U.S. media describe this particular strike as one of the most serious penetrations of U.S. air defenses in the conflict so far.
Operational significance
The loss or severe damage to KC‑135 refueling tankers and an E‑3 Sentry AWACS has a direct bearing on the coalition’s ability and the immediate capacity to sustain long‑range air operations from Gulf bases against Iran. Reduction in the number of available tankers will temporarily constrain sortie rates and time on station.
Worst Affected and Strategic Significance
The E‑3 is an AWACS that combines a long‑range radar with battle‑management and command‑and‑control systems. Its radar and sensors can detect, identify, and track aircraft, cruise missiles, and other airborne threats hundreds of kilometers away, over land and sea, at all altitudes, and in all weather.
On board, the real-time air picture is built, fighter and interceptor aircraft are directed to targets, airspace is deconflicted, and strikes, air defense, reconnaissance, and other operations are coordinated.
The E‑3 links this picture to other aircraft, ships, and command centers via data links (e.g., Link‑16), feeding the Joint Air Operations Center and higher‑level decision‑makers with a common, up‑to‑date view of the battlespace.
In short, it is both the “eyes” (wide‑area radar and sensors) and the “brain” (battle management and C2) for large‑scale air operations.
Since AWACS are limited in number and their availability is a prized asset, even a single unavailability leads to coverage gaps. The AWACS’s unavailability has direct strategic ramifications, especially given the air defense breach that led to its supposed damage.
Resemblances
In Operation Spiderweb on June 1 2025, Ukraine carried out drone attacks aimed at Russian aircraft on the ground. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU)-linked drones concealed inside trucks were launched against five Russian air bases deep inside Russia.
The attack involved 117 drones and targeted aircraft such as Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, A-50, and An-12, with some reports also indicating that a possible Il-78M tanker and a possible Tu-160 were affected. It was reported that about 20 military aircraft were hit and 10 destroyed.
SBU confirmed that its special forces unit “Alpha” conducted successful long-range drone strikes against five Russian military airbases in 2025, targeting and destroying 15 aircraft. The details of these 15 aircraft are 11 fixed-wing combat aircraft: Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-27, Su-24, and MiG-31 fighter and bomber platforms; 3 helicopters: Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 models; and 1 transport aircraft: An-26.
Ukraine has targeted Russia’s high-value airborne early warning fleet — mainly the Beriev A-50/A-50U — in multiple operations. A drone attack at the Machulishchy air base damaged a Russian A-50 on the ground. March 17, 2026, a strike on the Staraya Russa repair plant damaged an A-50 aircraft at the facility.
Did Russia Help Iran?
Western media claims that there is a plausible probability of Russian intelligence support for Iran.
The strongest public basis is President Zelenskyy’s claim that Ukrainian intelligence tracked Russian satellites imaging Prince Sultan Air Base on March 20, 23, and 25, just before Iran’s strike on March 26.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his interview with NBC News, claimed that Russia took satellite images of a U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia three times in the days before Iran attacked the site.
During the interview, he said he was “100%” confident that Russia was sharing “such” intelligence with Iran to help target U.S. forces across the Middle East.
During the interview, Zelenskyy shared a summary of the daily presidential briefing he receives from Ukraine’s spy agencies.
However, claims by a country’s head who is at war with the country he is blaming should be taken with a pinch of salt.
Resemblance notwithstanding, what is more important is that it is war, and targets as prized as the highly valued aircraft (out in the open) are being presented to the opponent. The opponent will use all available resources to capitalize on the presented opportunity, and did so.
Western media were ecstatic about the planning and execution of Op Spiderweb. Nobody asked or questioned how Ukraine could manage such an elaborate operation.
It was painted as a David-versus-Goliath story.
Iran and Russia’s teamwork in the PSAB attack is the only harangue one encounters in the Western media. One should give credit where it is due.
Possible American Mistakes
PSAB is known to host Patriot, likely THAAD batteries, and U.S./Saudi air-defense networks. Did the planners treat this layered shield as sufficient and did not fully plan for saturated, mixed‑threat salvos combining ballistic missiles and large drone swarms: on the face of it may be.
KC‑135 tankers and the E‑3 Sentry were reportedly parked in relatively dense clusters, rather than being widely dispersed. Questions should be asked about why they were not parked across multiple sites, or whether the base was the appropriate location for clustering so many high-value assets.
The planners have many such questions to answer.
Before the PSAB strike, Iran had already damaged or degraded several U.S./Saudi air-defense sensors and radars in the region. In this high-tempo exchange of kinetic attacks, the degradation meant the PSAB area was likely operating at reduced air-defense capacity.
None of these alone is a “smoking‑gun” mistake, but their combination created a critical vulnerability that Iran exploited.
Prince Sultan Air Base hosts both Patriot and THAAD missile defense batteries, yet Iranian missiles and drones still destroyed the highest-value aircraft stationed there.
Iran did not rely on a single “super-weapon” to breach THAAD and Patriot AD systems. Instead, it executed a classic saturation-and-degradation attack that exploited gaping holes in layered missile defenses.
The strike on March 27 combined roughly 6 ballistic missiles and dozens of Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. This attack was perfectly timed after weeks of preparatory strikes that had somewhat degraded U.S. and Saudi radars across the Gulf.
The THAAD battery at PSAB was operating at reduced effectiveness because its AN/TPY-2 radar had been damaged in an earlier Iranian strike. THAAD is optimized for high-altitude threats but does not engage drones, so once its primary sensor was compromised, the complete burden fell on Patriot PAC-3 interceptors.
However, the tried-and-tested Patriots were overwhelmed by the sheer volume and timing of the Iranian projectiles. Drone swarms served as “cheap bait” to lure Patriot interceptors, creating a brief detection-and-engagement hole through which the faster ballistic missiles could penetrate.
- Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot, superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two frontline fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defense and Air Attaché to the UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
- Views Personal of the Author
