OPED By Zahid Khalili
Iran hosted a regional meeting on Afghanistan last week, a meeting in which the Afghan government did not participate for its own reasons. Representatives of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries—including Iran, Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, as well as Russia—attended the meeting.
In his remarks, Iran’s foreign minister described stability in Afghanistan as a necessity for regional security. Similarly, the joint statement issued by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized the importance of strengthening stability in Afghanistan.
Following the collapse of the former Republican government in August 2021 and the establishment of a new government in Kabul, there were widespread concerns that Afghanistan’s security situation would deteriorate further.
Many feared the outbreak of a second civil war between the Taliban and the former Northern Alliance. However, the new Afghan government quickly consolidated control over the country and prevented the emergence of large-scale internal conflict.
During the 1990s, intense fighting took place between the Taliban (the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) and the Northern Alliance.
The former Northern Alliance, which has since rebranded itself as the National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of former warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, and seeking to regain power from the Taliban, currently has no significant presence in Afghanistan.
Iran & Taliban: A Changing Relationship
In the 1990s, during the Afghan civil war, Iran supported the weak and internally divided Mujahideen government, led by Jamiat Islami party leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and his defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Iran also supported Afghan Shiite communities and maintained close ties with them. That so-called government was challenged by the Taliban, who claimed to be liberating Afghanistan from “corruption and chaos.”
Iran initially viewed the Taliban with deep suspicion. The killing of Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan’s northern Balkh province severely damaged relations between the two sides.
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, despite deep tensions between Washington and Tehran, Iran did not oppose the U.S. intervention. Instead, it cooperated with the U.S.-backed new Afghan government and developed relatively warm relations with Kabul.
As time passed—and especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the deterioration of U.S.–Iran relations—Iran began advocating for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.
Gradually, Tehran also established contacts with the Taliban. Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, Iran hosted meetings with representatives of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and Iranian officials sat at the negotiating table with them.
Iran welcomed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021, describing it as a “military failure” for the United States and an opportunity for long-term peace in Afghanistan.
Over the past four years, relations between Iran and the Islamic Emirate have remained largely positive, with political and economic cooperation steadily expanding.
Given the realities on the ground and the Afghan government’s nationwide control, Iran no longer supports the Northern Alliance (now the National Resistance Front) as it once did, though it continues to maintain limited contact with it.
Calls for intra-Afghan negotiations and the formation of an inclusive government—aimed at incorporating figures from the former Afghan government—appear to have been reduced largely to statements and formal meetings, with little practical impact.
Why Does Iran Support Stability in Afghanistan?
The key question is why Iran has supported stability in Afghanistan over the past four years and maintained constructive relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Several important factors have brought Tehran and Kabul closer and contributed to growing mutual trust.
First: The Threat of ISIS-Khorasan: ISIS (or Daesh) first emerged in Afghanistan in 2014 and carried out numerous deadly attacks across the country, including in Kabul. When the new Afghan government was formed in 2021, several countries feared a resurgence of ISIS.
Although the group initially conducted attacks in various regions, decisive operations by Afghan authorities significantly weakened ISIS’s presence. Over the past two years, ISIS has carried out no major attacks inside Afghanistan. A recent report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also confirms a decline in ISIS-related violence in Afghanistan.
Iran views the Afghan government’s firm stance against ISIS as a major factor in bilateral rapprochement. Had ISIS not been contained, Afghanistan’s instability and the group’s presence would have posed a direct security threat to Iran. Stability and security in Afghanistan, therefore, have a tangible impact on Iran’s own security.
Second: Afghan Refugees: Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, millions of Afghans have been displaced, with large numbers seeking refuge in Iran, both legally and illegally. In recent years, Iran has accelerated the deportation of Afghan refugees, citing “economic necessity.” According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 700,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan in the first six months of 2025, a trend that intensified following the Iran–Israel conflict in June 2025.
Iran fears that renewed instability in Afghanistan could trigger another large wave of refugees. This concern has driven Tehran to construct barriers along the Afghan border to prevent irregular migration. Supporting stability in Afghanistan is therefore seen as a way to manage domestic economic and social pressures inside Iran.
Third: Afghanistan as an Important Market for Iran: Due to decades of war, Afghanistan’s economy remains underdeveloped and heavily dependent on imports. Sanctioned by the West, Iran has secured a significant share of the Afghan market. Iran exports large volumes of both oil and non-oil goods to Afghanistan.
Figures show that Iran’s exports to Afghanistan reached approximately USD 3.143 billion in 2024. Before recent tensions and route closures between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran held around 25 percent of the Afghan market. Following disruptions in trade routes over the past two months, Iran’s share is likely to have increased further.
Afghanistan’s weak economy has provided Iran with a major opportunity to expand its trade. Any instability in Afghanistan would threaten Iran’s commercial interests and place additional strain on an already weakened economy.
Fourth: The Water Issue: In addition to these factors, the issue of shared water resources remains a sensitive point in Afghanistan-Iran relations. Iran seeks to secure its water rights under a bilateral agreement. Afghan authorities have repeatedly stated that they are committed to respecting Iran’s legal water rights. However, instability and conflict in Afghanistan could cast a shadow over drought-stricken Iran’s water security and create substantial obstacles.
To conclude, although Iran has not formally recognized the current Afghan government, it engages with it pragmatically and treats it much like a recognized government. Iran understands that instability in Afghanistan and the absence of a strong and stable government could destabilize Iran itself, trigger new refugee flows, and further strain its already pressured economy by jeopardizing access to the Afghan market.
From Tehran’s perspective, supporting stability in Afghanistan is therefore not an ideological choice, but a pragmatic strategy shaped by security concerns, economic interests, and regional geopolitical realities.
- Zahid Khalili is a Kabul-based researcher and former university lecturer. He holds two M.Phil. degrees, one in History and the other in Political Science. He has published analyses on Afghanistan’s political and social issues in various Afghan online and print media outlets, and his work has also appeared in Eurasia Review. Khalili is the author of two Pashto-language books, Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations (1947–2019) and The History of Afghanistan’s Foreign Relations (1919–2020).
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- He can be reached at @khalilizahid
