As it prepares to counter an impending invasion by the Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army), Taiwan appears on track to have the highest density of anti-ship missiles in the coming years.
China considers Taiwan a rogue province and has vowed to seize it, by force, if necessary. The PLA routinely conducts military drills and rehearses encirclement of the self-ruled island, signalling that an armed attack may be around the corner.
Taiwan’s military posture is centred on the “porcupine strategy,” an asymmetric warfare concept intended to deter an invasion by making any attack very costly for the PLA, as EurAsian Times previously explained in a detailed article. This strategy includes anti-ship missiles, both locally manufactured and those purchased from the USA in recent years.
Reports in local Taiwanese media have claimed that Taiwan would have the world’s highest density of anti-ship missiles in the future, with the conclusion of the mass production of its homegrown Hsiung Feng missile series.
Citing a defence official, Taipei Times claimed that Taiwan will complete mass production of more than 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III (including extended-range variants) anti-ship missiles by December 2026 under the Sea Air Combat Power Improvement Plan.
This milestone has been attributed to the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, the manufacturer of the Hsiung Feng missiles, which has been meeting production targets ahead of schedule. The official cited by the report stated that the institute has been manufacturing 70 Hsiung Feng III and Hsiung Feng III extended-range missiles, and 131 Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng II extended-range missiles, annually.
Combined with phased deliveries of the 400 US land-based Harpoon Coastal Defence System, Taiwan’s arsenal is projected to exceed 1,400 missiles in the coming years. Notably, deliveries are expected to take place this year and run through 2028.
Notably, the assertion that Taipei has the highest density of anti-ship missiles is based on the fact that density here is defined as the concentration of missiles relative to the length of the defended coastline, rather than the total number of missiles.
These anti-ship missiles would defend the small coastline, emphasising a strategy of asymmetric, distributed, mobile launchers for coastal denial across the Taiwan Strait.
The main Taiwanese island has a coastline of about 1,566 kilometres, which means it would have about 0.9 missiles per kilometre. However, the actual density is likely to be higher when factoring in deployment along the western coast facing the Taiwan Strait and mobile systems capable of concentrating fires.
In contrast to Taiwan, China has a massive inventory of anti-ship missiles, including land-based coastal cruise missiles such as the YJ-12, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) such as the DF-21D and DF-26, and air-launched anti-ship missiles such as the YJ-18 and YJ-21. This means Taiwan trails China in both the sheer volume of anti-ship missiles and in their speed, range, and overall lethality.
However, China also has a massive coastline stretching about 14,500 kilometres, meaning the density of missile deployment will be lower than Taiwan’s. China’s missile arsenal is spread across a much longer, more dispersed coastline from the Bohai Sea in the north to the South China Sea, creating a formidable A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network.
This is also because China’s strategy focuses on power projection across the Western Pacific and saturation attacks against distant fleets rather than ultra-dense local coastal defence, like Taiwan’s, tailored to thwart a Chinese invasion attempt.
Taiwan’s Anti-Ship Missiles & Porcupine Strategy
Anti-ship missiles are the cornerstone of Taiwan’s porcupine strategy.
In the event of an amphibious invasion by PLA forces, these missiles would be employed to target the PLA Navy’s amphibious and support vessels during the transit and landing phases, which are considered the most vulnerable steps of the invasion.
In a cross-strait situation, China would have to use civilian ferries, landing ships, and aircraft carriers to transport tens of thousands of troops, vehicles, and supplies across the strait, creating a logistical nightmare.
The three main anti-ship missiles that Taiwan is filling its inventory with are the Hsiung Feng II, Hsiung Feng III, and US-origin Harpoon Block II.
In 2023, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) published a video showing road-mobile launchers carrying the HF-II and HF-III missiles, whereas the Harpoon was shown being fired from a naval warship and a land launcher, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times. Footage of an overhead drone with a targeting reticule captures the Harpoon hitting the rear and the HF-II and HF-III striking the middle sections.
Subsequent photos showed three holes on the target ship, colour-coded to mark the left, centre, and right-most holes punctured on the vessel’s hull to be made by the HF-III, HF-II, and Harpoon missiles. Therefore, demonstrating the sheer importance the Taiwanese military places on these munitions.
Hsiung Feng II is a subsonic missile with a range of about 150 to 250 kilometres. It can be deployed from land-based truck launchers, ships, aircraft, or small boats, and is considered versatile for saturating PLA escorts.
It has been integrated into Taiwan’s Kuang Hua-class fast-attack craft and the new Tuo Chiang-class corvettes. In fact, in 2022, the missile was tested from a coast guard ship.
It uses a solid-propellant booster for launch and a turbojet engine for cruise, which gives it a sea-skimming flight profile to evade hostile air defences. The missile typically uses an inertial navigation system (INS) and GPS for mid-course guidance and targeting.
Hsiung Feng III is Taiwan’s flagship supersonic “carrier killer” missile with a range of up to 400 kilometres in the extended-range variant. Developed to counter the growing number of China’s surface vessels and its advancing fleet defence systems, the Hsiung Feng III is propelled by a solid-fueled booster and liquid-fueled ramjet engine, and carries a single 120-kilogram high-explosive, semi-armour-piercing warhead.
INS uses terminal active radar homing to guide the missile. According to reports, it contains a smart fuse that maximises damage by directing the majority of the explosive force downward after it detects that the missile is within the target ship’s hull.
Launched from coastal batteries and frigates, the missile is designed to overwhelm PLA defences with speed and manoeuvrability. Additionally, the missile is available in an air-launched variant, which was reportedly deployed for the first time during a live-fire test in December 2025.
The Harpoon Coastal Defence System (HCDS) is a land-based variant of the Boeing Harpoon Block II missile, designed to target a range of maritime and land-based threats, including coastal defences, surface-to-air missile sites, ports, and moored ships.
The Harpoon missile system can strike stationary and moving targets from at least 124 kilometres, which places much of the Taiwan Strait within its range.
The missile incorporates a GPS receiver and advanced flight-control systems, which allow it to navigate complex littoral environments with greater precision. Additionally, the missile features a two-way data link, enabling mid-flight retargeting. This is essential in dynamic combat scenarios where target priorities shift rapidly.
The Harpoon is radar-guided, allowing it to function in any weather conditions. This is a major advantage, particularly in maritime environments where visibility can be unpredictable. However, adversaries can detect radar emissions, rendering the missile susceptible to jamming.
In addition to these cutting-edge weapons, Taiwan is reportedly developing a next-generation anti-ship missile with a longer range. Taiwan’s defence ministry announced a new weapon described as a “long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile” in a list issued under the Defence Industry Development Act in August 2025.
“The new missile is believed to be a key weapon to make up for the range shortfall of Taiwan’s current anti-ship missiles, with performance expected to surpass that of the Hsiung Feng III and give the military a true ‘carrier killer’,” Lu De-yun, a former press secretary for Taiwan’s defence ministry was quoted as saying by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post at the time.
This setup creates an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble over the strait, deterring not only full invasions but also blockades by threatening the Chinese logistics. In previous war games, it has been estimated that dense anti-ship missile barrages could sink 20–50% of invading PLA fleet in the first 24–48 hours.
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