Russia’s Special Military Operation against Ukraine appears to be running out of steam.
Having survived the winter through a grueling Russian offensive that nearly crippled its power generation capability, Ukraine is now beginning to seize the initiative.
Ukrainian forces have considerably slowed down the Russian offensive. They have been successfully recovering a significant amount of territory that they had earlier ceded.
Russian group strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure using drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles are becoming smaller and less effective. It is being reported that air defense missile stocks available to Ukrainian forces have been depleted.
However, the losses sustained by Russian drones and missiles suggest that Ukrainian air defense capability remains potent.
Improved counter-drone tactics and systems—electronic warfare, interceptor drones, and attack helicopters—are proving effective despite continuous upgrades to Russian kamikaze drones such as the Geran series. Also, Ukrainian Air Force fighters are making better use of air-to-air missiles to take down Russian cruise missiles.
Despite numerous reports last year that Russia is stepping up production of Geran drones, on some days now, Ukraine is launching more one-way attack (OWA) drones against Russia than vice versa.
Western sanctions also appear to have denuded the capabilities of Russian drones, as substitute electronic components from China and Taiwan are reportedly less effective.
Ukrainian Tech Advances
Ukrainian technological advances have facilitated the deployment of more lethal kamikaze and interceptor drones. Ukrainian drones are using more advanced optical sensors and AI-based machine-vision algorithms, enabling them to achieve mission objectives despite disruptions to SATNAV signals and communication links.
Kamikaze drones can shrug off Russian EW spoofing of SATNAV signals and degradation of command links. These drones, featuring low acoustic signatures, inexorably continue on course and strike their targets.
Similarly, Ukrainian interceptor drones are faster, feature more advanced machine vision, and use more advanced AI-based homing algorithms. They, in turn, can shrug off attempts by Russian drones to evade them through maneuvering.
Excessive Caution
The Russian approach to its ongoing military operation in Ukraine has been overly defensive. Russia has been wary of an intervention by NATO forces in the conflict—to an extent where, for four years, it has refrained from using its full military potential against Ukrainian forces, fearing that NATO could take advantage of any depletion in Russian fighting capability—through losses in manpower and equipment—to send its forces in.
As a result, Russia has fought at a pace and intensity that has limited degradation of its combat potential and thereby preserved its ability to deter NATO intervention.
Ukraine has taken advantage of Russia’s overly defensive posture through bold and relentless escalations. It has taken the initiative throughout the war, escalating the conflict, often spectacularly, by crossing Russian red lines. More than once, it has struck Russia’s strategic assets.
These include drone strikes on strategic bomber bases such as Engels, attacks on the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, and repeated hits on the Kerch Strait Bridge linking Crimea to mainland Russia. Ukrainian forces have also targeted long-range radar installations and fuel depots deep inside Russian territory, demonstrating both reach and intent to impose costs beyond the immediate battlefield.
Ukraine is now striking deep into Russia using NATO-supplied weapons such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles, as well as its own drones and missiles. It is degrading Russian energy export potential, thereby limiting its budgetary resources and constraining Russia’s ability to continue hostilities.
Upping the Ante
In a potentially significant recent escalation, Ukraine may have started using the airspace of Baltic countries to strike targets along Russia’s periphery—targets that Russia has considered out of Ukraine’s strike range.
Ukrainian drones have struck targets such as airbases at Engels and fuel infrastructure near St. Petersburg.
Ukrainian drones would have almost no chance of safely reaching these targets if they flew through Russian airspace.
Effectively, Ukraine is lengthening the front for Russia but not for itself.
To protect itself from Ukrainian attacks from NATO airspace, Russia would have to deploy its forces along its border with NATO, effectively thinning out its deployment along the Ukrainian frontier, where its forces are already stretched.
Imponderables of War
The Russian leadership has stretched its campaign against Ukraine for over four years now, showing classical signs of paralysis by analysis. It has not demonstrated the will to finish the job despite escalating risks.
In contrast, Russian forces have faced an adversary that has continuously innovated and taken risks, refusing to be cornered into capitulation.
The Russian leadership has been playing a chess game, meticulously and patiently following a winning strategy. In contrast, Ukraine has been fighting a war with just one rule—it cannot lose.
However, time is not on Russia’s side because of the imponderables of war. The conflict in Iran is a standout example of such imponderables.
Russian Leadership Failures
Russia’s strategy to win the war appears to have focused on denuding the will of the Ukrainian people to continue fighting, rather than on crippling the ability of the AFU to fight. The strategy is deeply flawed. No amount of attacks on Ukraine’s power generation can dent the will of the Ukrainian people to continue protecting their sovereignty.
Russia’s precondition for a ceasefire—withdrawal of Russian forces from Donbass—is almost laughable.
The Russian leadership needs to understand that only after vanquishing a nation is it possible to convince its people that continuing the fight is pointless. Logic can never be persuasive enough to convince a nation to simply lay down its arms.
An evident weakness of the Russian leadership has been its proclivity to fight the war with an eye on maintaining good relations with the Trump administration. This approach makes little sense and could well prove to be the last straw on the camel’s back.
- Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
- This is an Opinion Article. Views Personal of the Author
- Follow the author @vkthakur
