OPED By Imran Khurshid, PhD
President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India comes at a crucial geopolitical moment. Russia today is navigating an increasingly challenging environment shaped by Western isolation after its invasion of Ukraine.
While the annual India–Russia summits resumed in July 2024 in Moscow after a two-year gap, this visit to New Delhi on 4–5 December 2025 carries far greater significance.
Putin will address the plenary session of the Russia–India Forum 2025 and attend the 23rd Annual Summit—his first visit to India since the Ukraine war began and his first since 2021.
The India–Russia Annual Summit, institutionalised in 2000 following the formal declaration of the Strategic Partnership, provides the highest-level platform for both countries to review and strengthen their cooperation.
Held alternately in India and Russia, the summit has become a key mechanism for political consultation, defence collaboration, economic engagement, energy cooperation, civil-nuclear projects, and broader strategic dialogue.
During this visit, both sides are expected to review the full spectrum of the “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” including defence cooperation, energy ties, civil-nuclear projects, and efforts to diversify bilateral trade.
According to Kremlin officials, the visit “will enable a comprehensive discussion of the full spectrum of bilateral relations … across political, trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and humanitarian spheres.” Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov also noted that the agenda includes expanding and diversifying trade, industrial cooperation, joint investment projects, and collaboration in high‑technology sectors.
For India, the visit reaffirms the country’s strategic autonomy amid Western pressure and punitive measures, including a 25 percent tariff on Indian exports, with an additional 25 percent applied to items linked to energy trade with Russia.
This comes at a time when Western sanctions on Russia continue, India has scaled back its oil imports from Moscow, and exploratory discussions between Russia and Western capitals on a possible peace framework are underway.
The visit strengthens energy security, defence preparedness, and economic cooperation, underscoring New Delhi’s ability to balance multiple partnerships, ensure uninterrupted access to critical defence systems, diversify trade, and advance long-term civil‑nuclear and economic projects — all while safeguarding national interests in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.
This high-level engagement reinforces the enduring, multi-dimensional India–Russia strategic partnership, which extends beyond bilateral ties to regional and global cooperation.
Enduring Partnership
India’s relationship with Russia is rooted in history and has consistently demonstrated stability, a hallmark of this partnership.
From the early years of India’s independence, New Delhi cultivated close ties with Moscow, which became a critical source of defence hardware, technical know-how, and diplomatic support. During the Cold War and in the decades that followed, Russia stood by India on several defining occasions, including in the United Nations and other major international forums.
Notably, in 1971, India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, at a time when it faced significant geopolitical pressures, providing strategic assurance during the conflict that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Of all the relationships that India maintains, this one has consistently shown stability. As External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly noted, the India–Russia partnership is “among the steadiest of major relationships in the world after the Second World War,” anchored in deep historical roots and a long tradition of trust and mutual respect.
In a world increasingly characterised by fragmentation, volatility, and rapid shifts in geopolitical alignments, such steadiness makes Russia a trusted and reliable partner for India. This continuity enables India to undertake long-term defence and technology projects with Moscow—from major platforms to joint development initiatives—without the geopolitical conditionalities that often complicate India’s other major partnerships.
The absence of political strings, coupled with decades of consistent cooperation and mutual trust, is precisely why this partnership is formally described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”
At moments of global uncertainty, the stability of this relationship becomes an additional strategic asset, allowing India to navigate diplomatic challenges with greater confidence.
While India certainly seeks stability across all its key relationships, not every partnership offers the same policy space, and Russia remains one of the few countries with which India has enjoyed such enduring consistency.
There are widespread misconceptions about the India–Russia relationship, particularly in Western commentary. This partnership did not emerge because of the Ukraine war; it has deep Cold War roots and a long history of strategic cooperation.
Nor is the relationship limited to energy. While India’s purchase of discounted Russian crude rose sharply after the 2022 war, the defence partnership predates this by several decades and remains anchored in long-term maintenance, joint development, training, and multi-year defence and technology commitments.
Even the U.S. leadership has publicly acknowledged this legacy, with State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller noting that “India has a longstanding relationship with Russia — that is well known,” a recognition that India’s ties with Moscow are decades old and structurally embedded.
Another senior U.S. official, Ned Price, recalled that India developed close ties with Russia “because the US was not ready” during earlier decades — implicitly acknowledging the historical roots of the India–Russia relationship.
In fact, when Western officials urge India to diversify its defence and strategic partnerships, they implicitly admit the depth and durability of India’s engagement with Moscow. This is not a temporary arrangement but a sustained, multi-dimensional relationship reflecting trust, continuity, and long-term strategic planning.
Beyond Bilateralism
Another common analytical limitation, especially in Western analyses, is viewing the India–Russia relationship purely through a bilateral lens. The partnership has significant regional and global dimensions.
For example, in Central Asia, Russia views India as an important partner in a region where Moscow does not want China to achieve overwhelming dominance. With Russia’s strategic focus consumed by the war in Ukraine and China’s influence expanding rapidly in the region, India’s role becomes even more valuable.
It was largely due to Russian backing that India became a full SCO member in 2017, which also helped dilute the growing Chinese influence in this grouping. Even though Russia and China publicly describe their partnership as having “no limits,” there is growing unease within Russian strategic circles about China’s rising ambitions, particularly in regions that were once part of the Soviet sphere of influence.
Leaked Russian intelligence assessments have revealed concerns about China’s long-term intentions, including its historical territorial claims.
A similar dynamic exists in the Arctic. Russia wants India to expand its presence there, especially as China—despite not being an Arctic state—now calls itself a “near-Arctic state” and is steadily increasing its footprint. China has also begun asserting interest in regions like Vladivostok, signalling its readiness to widen its influence.
With new sea routes opening due to global warming, the Arctic has become a theatre of long-term strategic competition. Russia would prefer a greater Indian presence there to balance China’s growing reach.
According to a recent leaked Russian intelligence assessment, Russia risks losing control over up to forty percent of its Far Eastern territory due to expanding Chinese and North Korean influence — a scenario that underscores Moscow’s strategic interest in counterbalancing China with reliable partners like India.
That is why initiatives like the Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor — a direct sea link between the Indian east coast (Chennai) and Russia’s Far East (Vladivostok) — have become important, with India and Russia finalising the operationalisation of this corridor to enhance maritime connectivity, trade, and strategic-geographic engagement across the Arctic–Far East–Indian Ocean axis.
This also demonstrates that, despite the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s long-term geostrategic and geopotential vision aligns with that of the West in countering China’s rise.
Facing continued Western sanctions, Russia is also looking to deepen its engagement with Asia, making India one of its most important partners in the region. For India, the logic of engagement is equally compelling.
New Delhi does not want Russia to become too closely aligned with China, as such an alignment would significantly constrain India’s strategic space, given ongoing border tensions and broader regional rivalry.
India also needs to maintain uninterrupted defence supplies, particularly for systems like the S-400 missile defence platform, whose performance during Operation Sindoor reinforced confidence in Russian technology.
India has not only sought additional units of the S-400 but is also exploring the more advanced S-500 system, although its acquisition remains subject to production and delivery considerations.
Beyond defence, India and Russia collaborate in platforms such as BRICS, the G20, and other global institutions, reinforcing their shared commitment to a multipolar world order.
Peace Prospects & Strategic Continuity
If ongoing discussions between Russia and Western countries lead to a viable peace arrangement on Ukraine, it could ease pressures on India and create space for enhanced defence and strategic cooperation.
As Harsh V Pant, a leading Indian foreign policy expert, noted, “Recent U.S.–Russia talks to end the Ukraine war could help make it easier for Indian officials to engage with Moscow.”
A prolonged war risks pushing Russia into near-complete dependence on China—a scenario that would be strategically concerning not only for India but also for the broader Asian balance.
While the precise outcome of peace talks remains uncertain, even a limited agreement would benefit India–Russia relations by reducing Moscow’s vulnerabilities and allowing it to maintain a more autonomous global role, thereby strengthening the framework for continued collaboration in defence, energy, and multilateral diplomacy.
As Putin arrives in New Delhi, Western (American) commentary will inevitably intensify, often framing the visit narrowly through the lens of the Ukraine war or discounted oil purchases. Yet such interpretations overlook the deeper reality: the India–Russia relationship neither began in 2022 nor depends on short-term economic advantages.
It is a long-standing, multi-layered strategic partnership—historical, structural, and embedded across defence, energy, regional security, and global governance frameworks. In a period marked by geopolitical fragmentation, shifting power balances, and great-power contestation, the continuity and steadiness of this relationship stand out.
India’s engagement with Russia is shaped by long-term strategic considerations rather than temporary alignments and remains central to New Delhi’s broader foreign-policy calculus.
As Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific undergo rapid transformation, the India–Russia partnership continues to function as a key pillar of India’s strategic architecture and an important stabilising factor in the evolving regional and global order.
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE
