Pakistan Fooled By S-400 Dummies At Adampur; Why India Must Fast-Track Pantsir-S1M Systems Before Next Clash: Op-Ed

The Hindustan Times reported that the Indian armed forces are considering procuring the Russian Pantsir missile system to counter armed and kamikaze drones.

The report suggests that the S-400 and Pantsir systems, when combined, can be more effective against aerial threats from across the border.

While that may be true from an academic point of view, the imperative to acquire Pantsir systems goes far beyond the HT report’s simplistic projection.

Before I elaborate, let us first understand what sets the Pantsir system apart from the S-400 systems India is procuring.

Pantsir-S1M

The Pantsir-S1M system, which India may acquire, is the successor to the Pantsir-S1.

The Pantsir-S1 was designed to protect a VA/VP from adversary aircraft, helicopters, precision munitions, cruise missiles, and UAVs. In contrast, the S-400 is designed to provide sector defence against aerodynamic and missile threats.

The Pantsir system has an effective range of 20–30 km; it carries 12 missiles and two 30 mm guns. Each gun can fire up to 40 rounds per second. The single-vehicle mobile system carries 1,400 rounds of ammunition and is operated by a crew of three.

The Pantsir-S1 fire-control system includes a target-acquisition radar and a dual-waveband tracking radar that operates in the UHF and EHF bands. Additionally, the fire-control system features an electro-optic channel with a long-wave thermal imager and an infrared direction finder.

Pantsir-S1M Improvements

The Pantsir-S1M system incorporates many improvements over the Pantsir-S1. It uses a new surface-to-air missile with an increased ceiling from 15 to 18 km, an engagement range of 20 to 30 km, a speed of 1,300 to 1,700 m/s, and a heavier 25 kg fragmentation warhead (compared to the 20 kg warhead of the standard 57E6-E missile).

In addition to missiles that engage conventional aerial threats, the Pantsir-S1M is also armed with small TKB-1055 “Gvozd” missiles to tackle mini-drones—a feature the Pantsir-S1 lacked.

The TKB-1055 missile has a lightweight composite body. It features a solid-propellant booster that is discarded as soon as it is expended; the missile then flies by inertia.

The missile can engage targets at ranges of 500–7,000 m and altitudes of 15–5,000 m. A package of four missiles weighs 115 kg.

The most outstanding feature of the TKB-1055 missile is its relatively low cost, and it is being produced in large numbers.

In April 2024, Sputnik News reported that the Pantsir-S1M can reportedly detect a GMLRS rocket at twice the range of the S1 variant, thanks to the new phased-array guidance radar.

Its interceptor missile launch speed is 1.2 times faster. As a result, only three Pantsir-SM AD missile systems are now required to intercept 24 GMLRS projectiles launched by two M270 MLRS launchers.

One of the important roles of the Pantsir-S1M is to provide air defence to S-400 missile systems against adversary air attacks employing precision munitions, especially at low to extremely low altitude.

A Russian surface-to-air missile systems Pantsir S-1 is pictured at the Russian military base of Hmeimim, located south-east of the city of Latakia in Hmeimim, Latakia Governorate, Syria, on September 26, 2019. With military backing from Russia, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces have retaken large parts of Syria from rebels and jihadists since 2015, and now control around 60 percent of the country. Russia often refers to troops it deployed in Syria as military advisers even though its forces and warplanes are also directly involved in battles against jihadists and other rebels (Photo by Maxime POPOV / AFP)

The IAF’s Dangerous Cost Saving

Surprisingly, the IAF ordered its initial five S-400 systems without placing a corresponding order for Pantsir systems to protect them. Budgetary limitations may have been a factor, but the decision was still flawed.

It would have been wiser to acquire fewer S-400 systems rather than acquire them without the Pantsir system’s protection.

The IAF has so far relied on medium-range missile systems such as MR-SAM—deployed to defend airbases that host S-400 systems—also to protect S-400 radars and launchers. Such planning appears flawed for two reasons:

The S-400 is a mobile system. It must be able to move with its air defence cover.

Medium-range and short-range missile systems currently in the IAF inventory are not capable of defending an S-400 system against coordinated drone and air-to-surface missile strikes.

S-400 Mobility

The S-400’s ability to quickly relocate is one of its greatest strengths, alongside its long range, its layered multi-range missile architecture, and its ability to integrate non-organic (any) air-defence missile systems.

During hostilities, the S-400 system must be moved away from its peacetime deployment at airbases. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistani forces reportedly struck S-400 launchers at Adampur airbase. However, no damage occurred because the IAF, with good foresight, had moved its S-400 batteries to different locations.

The S-400 components at Adampur that may have been struck were all dummies.

It is, however, noteworthy that the IAF dodged a bullet when Pakistan struck the S-400 system at Adampur because Pakistan did not have up-to-date intelligence. This may not always be the case.

Ukraine War Lessons

During the course of the Ukraine war, Russian S-400 systems protected by Pantsir-S1M systems have proven vulnerable to saturation strikes by cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow—and, surprisingly, to slow-flying drones.

Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck Russian S-400 systems using coordinated attacks with drones, despite periodic relocation of the S-400 systems.

Ukrainian success can largely be attributed to the ability of US and NATO aerial ISR assets patrolling over the Black Sea to detect relocation of Russian S-400 batteries and pinpoint new locations using electronic intelligence (ELINT).

Indeed, US/NATO ELINT cannot only detect the location of Russian S-400 systems but also pinpoint the Pantsir systems deployed to protect them. Using live data, Ukrainian drones can be routed to skirt the Pantsir systems, flying at very low altitude to destroy Russian S-400 launchers and radars.

It is conceivable that Pakistan could receive similar intelligence support from China or the US in the future.

Conclusion

India has likely been trying to acquire Pantsir systems for a while. In August 2020, Izvestia reported that several foreign countries had expressed interest in purchasing the Pantsir-S1M.

India’s attempt to acquire the system may have faltered because of Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine.

In April 2024, it was reported that Russia is set to double the supply of Pantsir AD missile systems to its forces. Increased production may now allow Russia to spare systems for export to India.

India reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Russia in November 2024 for collaboration on developing and potentially producing customized variants of the system.

  • Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst. 
  • Follow the author @vkthakur