In the ongoing crisis in West Asia, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) occupies analytical space in every mind. It is an extraordinary institution within Iran’s political-military space, though it is not a conventional armed force.
It serves as a guardian of ideology, a military unit with influence over the economy, and a body overseeing the implementation of religious laws.
The IRGC was created after the fall of the Shah and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It succeeded in becoming a paramilitary state organization with immense power in the region.
Its success has not been due to its military capacities, but to its ability to wage asymmetric warfare, build associated networks in the region, create rocket forces, build coastal defence for the Persian Gulf, and develop technological know-how.
Originally, the IRGC was established by Ayatollah Khomeini to protect the Islamic Revolution from perceived threats. It was organized to work in parallel with the Iranian Armed Forces, known as the Artesh. That had the responsibility for the state’s defence posture, while the IRGC was to guard the gains of the Revolution.
Since then, the IRGC, like many other parastatal bodies, has grown larger and developed branches, including ground forces, aerospace capabilities, naval capabilities, and the feared Quds Force, which was essentially tasked with undertaking regional and overseas operations.
The Basij paramilitary network was also part of the IRGC. Altogether, these units created a hybrid military organization with conventional aspects and capacities for irregular warfare
As the seemingly more potent arm of the Iranian ruling class, the IRGC remains in the news as the front-line fighters against Israel and other aggressors.
Recently, it has been more in the news because after the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian, assured the Gulf countries that Iran would not attack them unless their territories were used in attacks on Iran, the IRGC overlooked his statement and continued relentless attacks on GCC countries’ facilities, military, and economic.
Similarly, the choice of Ayatollah Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as his successor seems to emanate from the power wielded by the IRGC. Since his youth, he has been associated with the IRGC and later with the religious community in Qom. His nomination as the new leader shows the power that the IRGC continues to wield.
The IRGC is reported to have approximately 200,000 personnel in its ranks. If paramilitary militias and their associates are included, it could reach 250,000.
It reportedly mobilizes thousands of volunteers in times of crisis. Many of these are well-trained, and these networks provide the IRGC in Iran with a strong domestic security organization and human reserve.
The IRGC’s own ground army, which is tasked with defending Iranian territory and controlling domestic upheavals, also includes armoured units, mechanized infantry, artillery, and Special Forces. Unlike a traditional military designed for conventional warfare, the IRGC emphasizes rapid mobility, decentralized operations, and guerrilla strike tactics. Their aim is to make any invasion of Iran costly and thus deter it.
The IRGC, besides having its ballistic missiles, has an important drone program. Iranian UAVs have become increasingly potent and are used for reconnaissance, deep strike missions, and proxy warfare. IRGC drones are often supplied to associated groups in the region, multiplying their reach, though much of this appears to have declined in recent years.
The IRGC Navy is also seen as an important cog in Iran’s strategy in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. While the Iranian Navy relies on larger warships, which have recently been targeted by the US Navy in the Indian Ocean, the IRGC Navy focuses on asymmetric maritime tactics to guard, control, and guide the narrow straits of Hormuz and to threaten or escort oil tankers through them.
Due to their effective manoeuvrability, they are often seen as opportunities to curb the power of better-endowed naval forces without seeking to achieve naval dominance. They are the main leverage that Iran uses in the Straits of Hormuz.
Regionally, the visible part of the IRGC is the Qods Force, which is its external operating arm. This supports militias like Hezbollah, Hamas, and others, provides them with training and necessary equipment, and often coordinates with them for regional strikes in support of Iranian objectives or defence.
The Quds Force regional network had become the central pillar of Iran’s regional operations, and these non-state actors, powered through the IRGC, gave Iran considerable clout in the region till Israel clobbered them severely.
The IRGC also has technological and cyber capabilities beyond military power. They have been known to target infrastructure, banking institutions, and government networks in the region to cause disruption. This contributes to Iran’s asymmetric leverage, often challenging the conventional might of its adversaries. The IRGC’s cyber capabilities are seen as providing strong intelligence support for Iran.
The IRGC has further expanded domestic defence production, working with state-owned enterprises to develop missiles, drones, and cyber technologies despite international sanctions.
This is the factor that has led the IRGC to evolve by getting involved in Iran’s domestic economic development through its public-sector undertakings. These include construction companies, energy projects, telecommunications and infrastructure companies, whose contracts are often awarded to IRGC associates, giving them an outsized role in the Iranian economy.
The critical strength of the IRGC emerges from its asymmetric doctrine. It does not seek to challenge the technological superiority of its adversaries. Nor has it a weapon for a weapon match. Instead, it looks at strategies that exploit its maritime geography, apart from building proxy alliances and using unconventional tactics.
The use of UAVs, drones, missiles, and cyber operations gives the IRGC and Iran stronger power at a much lower cost, aspects of which are seen to sustain Iran in the current war underway.
The IRGC has evolved into a multifaceted military institution in the Gulf, a hybrid of conventional forces, irregular warfare expertise, technological capabilities, and regional networks.
Its power emerges not only from the size of its troops or its weapons capabilities, but also from its capacity to operate across various domains and to undertake surprises, which conventional militaries often lack.
Viewed thus, in West Asia, which is prone to political instability and strategic rivalry, the IRGC is among the more potent actors, which guides Iran’s military position, and its never-say-die attitude brings it back to life like a phoenix, even after its Hydra-headed leadership is repeatedly decapitated.
- Gurjit Singh is a former Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union Chair, CII Task Force on Trilateral Cooperation in Africa, Professor, IIT Indore.
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