India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, acknowledged some tactical errors on Day 1 of the Indian Air Force (IAF) campaign of Op Sindoor.
He was giving an interview to two international media houses. In a deliberate and calculated interview, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, he then went on to emphasise that quick lessons were learnt.
The IAF later went whole hog to hit terror and military targets all across Pakistan precisely and neutralized their capability to wage war. In fact, within just 90 hours of air operations, Pakistan capitulated and was forced to seek an unconditional ceasefire.
As DG Air Operations, Air Marshal AK Bharti stated that losses are expected in combat, but what ultimately matters is success and victory. The winning side had seen much larger losses in many past campaigns around the world. IAF dominated the campaign, operated with impunity, and hit a large number of targets with precision and effects, deep into Pakistan.
Militaries around the world go through detailed debriefs and derive lessons from each mission and conflict. Military history is taught in all defence academies.
Since WW II, air power has dominated the means of waging war. There are lessons derived from Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) in both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. The “Op Sindoor” air campaign has prompted the entire world to analyze and review how future air tactics and strategies will evolve.
Air Denial & Long-Range Strikes
The Op Sindoor and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have highlighted the concept of air denial. Effective long-range air defense systems forced both sides to keep their aircraft deep within their own territories, far away from enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) and air-to-air missile (AAM) ranges.
The role of AEW&C was reduced as it was pushed further away from the front lines. To compensate, satellite-based ISR, navigation, and targeting became more critical. India would require more low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations for continuous monitoring of the battle zones.
Stand-off Air-launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) like BrahMos and SCALP, and ground-launched Loitering Munitions (LM) like Harop and SkyStriker, and other drones gained operational importance.
Inventories of these would need to be increased, and indigenous production would require support. Smaller FPV drones have seen great success in Ukrainian strikes against strategic air assets (Bombers). Such innovative out-of-the-box techniques would be beneficial.
Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO) needs a new look. Fighter aircraft and attack helicopters engaging in CSFO in Tactical Battle Area (TBA) will be sitting ducks for mobile air defences. This job will now have to be done by stand-off weapons.
Mobile AD Systems Gain Importance
AD systems are not only important, but their being mobile is even more imperative. “Shoot and scoot” will have to be resorted to. Longer ranges will be the ultimate USP. Modern AD systems must evolve beyond traditional platforms.
This will need to counter a spectrum of threats, which include high-speed aircraft and cruise missiles, slow-moving drones, rockets, long-range missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic projectiles, and emerging near-space threats.
India will need to adopt layered and tiered hard-kill systems alongside soft-kill mechanisms, including Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). There will be a need to enable Active Denial and A2AD by integrating ground- and air-launched AD platforms and strike weapons.
To neutralise adversary AD systems, assets in space and other intelligence means must rapidly update locations of adversary AD systems for SEAD/DEAD, and also plan safe routes for their own aerial packages. Both hard-kill and electronic jamming means need to be extensively employed.
India will need to saturate enemy AD systems with a mix of strikes by drones, anti-radiation missiles, cruise and hypersonic missiles, among others. Civil Defence measures need to be activated more often.
Missile Advantage
India has a clear advantage in terms of the type and number of SAMs. The S-400 and Akash AD systems have performed well. Considering the two-front threat, should India seek more S-400 SAMs from Russia?
In the meantime, India must accelerate its own DRDO LRSAM project, “Kusha,” which will be capable of tracking stealth aircraft and have a range of 400 km.
If Pakistan has acquired the original Chinese variant of the PL-15 (180 km range) air-to-air missile (AAM), India must accelerate its own Astra 2 (175 km) and Astra III (350 km) programs. Russia has been open to selling the R-37M (200 km) air-to-air missile. India could acquire the same.
Electronic Warfare Aircraft
Pakistan has three Falcon DA-20, four Chinese turboprop ZDK-03, and one Bombardier Global 6000 dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft.
While all Indian fighters have electronic warfare suits, there are no dedicated EW aircraft with much more powerful jamming systems. India would also have to analyse in detail the performance of Rafale’s SPECTRA EW suite, and similarly, those of other fighters.
EW is now central to all conflict theatres. They have been very successful in the Ukraine conflict. It must evolve into hybrid, cognitive, and smart systems that combine SIGINT, active decoys, and the latest jamming capabilities.
There is a need to invest in quantum sensors, self-protection suites, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. Also invest in anti-jam technologies and miniaturisation. India should seriously consider acquiring a few dedicated electronic warfare (EW) aircraft.
Secure Data Links & Encrypted Radio
In a net-centric warfare environment, every platform, sensor, and weapons system must be connected through highly secure data links. Pakistan is known to have been better off in this. India must continue to advance in the technology chain in this regard.
Similarly, a secure jam-resistant radio is critical. Seamless information sharing can enable stealthy attacks, with the attacker’s radar and transmitters remaining silent, and weapons being updated through satellite or remote platforms to achieve long-range, cross-domain kill chains.
Drones & Counter-UAS
Drones, particularly attritable (relatively inexpensive and replaceable), and swarm variants, will dominate future operations, especially for SEAD/DEAD roles. Pakistani drone strike, even though not effective, comprised nearly 400 drones. Repeat strikes of this and larger magnitude would mean larger drone inventories.
Longer-range pinpoint-targeted kamikaze drones will be more effective. To cater to supply chain dynamics, these must be fully produced in India. The country must have surge production capacities. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen nearly 2 million drones used every year. We need to master core technologies for indigenous mass production.
Electronic and GPS jamming, directed energy systems, kinetic kills, and many other means are important. These need to be built in large numbers and proliferated across the country.
Procurement Procedures & Priorities
India needs to reassess the Integrated Capability Development System (ICADS) to ensure long-term resilience and mitigate future emergencies. India should not be forced into knee-jerk procurements. User-industry interaction has to be a continuous process.
Defence Acquisition Procedure DAP-2020 is under revision. Lessons of Op Sindoor should be incorporated before finalising DAP-2025. The operations branch of Service HQs must continue to have the power for fast-track procurements to meet emergent requirements.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
Modern warfare demands integrated, real-time, and resilient multi-domain operations. It requires secure communication networks with last-mile connectivity across land, sea, air, and space. There is a need for built-in redundancy. The three services are networked, but more needs to be done, and it needs to be done quickly. Software-defined Radios (SDRs) and Quantum-resistant cryptography are required for network security.
Distributed network architectures will support balanced Jointness with cybersecurity. Sensor proliferation among satellites, near-space platforms, manned platforms, UAS, ground/maritime sensors, OSINT, and HUMINT will ensure battle-space transparency.
These must be fused and processed by edge compute devices with AI-enabled high-performance. Cyber, AI, and robotics need to be exploited. MDO must reduce ambiguity and accelerate the OODA loop.
Space Remains Key For Operations
To ensure tactical and strategic advantage, India must plan a sub-30-minute satellite revisit rate. Space sensors must incorporate ELINT, COMINT, SAR, EO/IR, AIS, and SSA payloads to effectively monitor and counter the rapid deployment of AD systems and other forces.
India needs satellite manoeuvre warfare capabilities in orbit. More dual payload satellites, especially for MEO and GEO constellations, are required. Additional funding may be required for the space domain in the next ten years to transform ISR, communication, and PNT capabilities.
Space-based navigation and targeting have gained greater significance. NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation) is India’s satellite-based navigation system developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). It provides real-time positioning, navigation, and timing services across India and a 1500 km radius beyond its borders.
Currently, 7 of the planned 11 satellites are operational. The system needs early operationalisation, and accuracy needs further improvement. The Indian military also has to prepare for operations in GNSS-denied environments.
Decoupling Terror & Nuclear Threat
Operation Sindoor demonstrated the effectiveness of calibrated airpower as a key instrument in the national response to cross-border terrorism. The swift, proportionate response ensured control of the escalation.
Large-scale strikes against military targets, including on strategic assets, were managed with diplomatic and military finesse. Clearly, the Pakistani threat of use of nuclear weapons at the slightest instance has been called a rhetorical bluff. It has established a new normal.
China-Pakistan-Turkey Nexus
Despite the huge trade benefits that China derives from the large Indian market, Pakistan remains China’s deepest friend. Pakistan uses China as insurance against India, and China plays Pakistan to keep India engaged on the Western border.
China’s support is also intended to remind India not to get too close to the USA. Nearly 80 percent of Pakistan’s defence hardware is of Chinese origin.
The highest level of cooperation is evident in the aerospace sector, with the JF-17 and J-10CE being key aircraft programs. SAMs and aerial missiles (PL-12, PL-15) are another important area.
The two exercise regularly to improve interoperability. Chinese operational technical teams are in Pakistan to support their hardware. They are there to ensure the hardware succeeds or, at the very least, is seen in a favorable light. Chinese satellites provide secure communications, ISR, navigation, and targeting information. China supported Pakistan in Command and Control.
China gives great support in electronic warfare and cyberattacks. China supported Pakistan in the multi-sensor cooperative interception that purportedly shot down some Indian fighter aircraft. China will continue to support Pakistan for decades ahead. India must factor this in and build capability accordingly.
Turkey and Pakistan collaborate closely in the aerospace sector. Turkey supported Pakistan for the F-16 upgrade and its spares. Pakistan wants to partner in Turkey’s fifth-generation aircraft “Kaan”. The two countries work closely on UAVs and drones. Immediately after the Pahalgam terror attack, Turkey began a surge in the supply of drones. Expect Turkey to increase such support in the future and plan accordingly.
Information Warfare (IW)
With instant connectivity, information flows rapidly. During conflict, the highly polarized and surcharged nationalistic nature of the information space means that narratives are built and perpetuated to spread facts or falsehoods, showcasing the success of their own campaign.
It is also important to showcase one’s own military hardware in a positive light while attributing failures to adversary systems. Many countries have specially trained “Information Warriors” backed by technical teams who generate graphics to add authenticity.
Also in the narrative game are friendly or adversary foreign countries, and weapons manufacturers whose platforms are at play, among many others. Disinformation floods social media. Those who are quick to hit the keyboard have the first-mover advantage.
There are dedicated teams that replicate and multiply the narrative. Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) has been very active. They know that the only way for them to win the war is through narrative.
Democratic India has been a slow learner, but is catching up. Many Western analysts and some governments are not particularly enthused by the prospect of a rising India.
They continue to report with a colonial bias. Some governments hire respected international analysts to write in their favor. It may be time for the National Security Advisor (NSA) to establish a dedicated information warfare team to influence global and national opinion.
The fact that significant numbers of PL-15 air-to-air missiles fired from either J-10CE and/or potentially JF-17 fighters landed intact in India indicates missile failure or inflated firing range figures. Yet, Chinese media were quick to claim their success without any proof whatsoever.
That Indian strikes went through without interception speaks poorly of Pakistani HQ-9 and other air defence systems. These, and the accuracy of Indian strikes, are the narratives India should have pushed and not let the world concentrate only on the loss of Indian aircraft. In fact, more needs to be said about the Pakistani aircraft losses, a narrative that came much after the ceasefire.
It is time to have a national strategic communication doctrine. There is a need to introduce the study of military history and Kautilyan statecraft into education, media, and policy. Cultivate silent digital warriors who shape opinion subtly but powerfully. Assert our victories unapologetically as mature acts of sovereignty, not jingoism. Let us unite soldiers, scholars, coders, and communicators into a hybrid warrior ethos.
Mastering Key Technologies
Air superiority in the 21st century requires stealth, advanced sensors, and networked lethality. Pakistan and China are already working on the details to transfer the J-35A fifth-generation aircraft. The process has accelerated during Op Sindoor. India’s home-grown AMCA is still far. India needs to accelerate the process.
India may adopt a two-pronged strategy. In the short term, acquire 5th-generation fighter capabilities through imports or collaborative development of next-generation platforms with trusted partners. Finally, work on a fully indigenous AMCA program with full-spectrum combat capability. Indian defence industries should work towards developing “Brand INDIA.”
India must simultaneously bolster its defensive counter-stealth systems, including VHF radars, Passive Surveillance Systems, ROTHR (Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar), Near-space and space-based surveillance, Quantum sensor development, CATS (Combat Air Teaming System), and loyal wingman drones.
Since India is working on hypersonic BrahMos II, the day may not be far when China gives Pakistan hypersonic missiles. There is a need to accelerate the indigenous development of hypersonic technology.
There is huge action and future in Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). Survivability must be built into the design. Capability to operate in denied and degraded environments.
Fresh Doctrinal & Tactical Approach
Continuous tactical and doctrinal changes are required to imbibe new technologies and evolve out-of-the-box combat solutions. There is a need to examine operational scenarios both with and without 5th-generation platforms.
Foster interoperability between 4.5 Gen and 5th Gen aircraft through advanced data links, shared EW packages, and joint mission training.
Networked operations across platforms will be the new normal. These require high-speed, secure data links, potentially space-based. These must allow for sensor-to-shooter coordination and enable cooperative jamming, as well as missile guidance by remote assets. There is a need to re-examine HR policy to create and use operational specialisation.
Rethinking Theatre Commands
The joint staff at the Integrated Defence HQs has been working on the Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), where operational control will rest with theatre commanders rather than the traditional service chiefs, who will retain responsibility for “raise, train, and sustain” (RTS) functions.
The practical experience in Op Sindoor has been much more complex and different. This operation and the Ukraine conflict have demonstrated the primacy of air power and the strategic necessity of centralized command for limited aerial resources.
The decision-making and resource allocation were all happening in New Delhi. Even target systems were being evolved in consultation with various agencies. The operational jointness was adequately visible at the Service Chiefs’ levels. Rushing into implementation without resolving these fundamental issues risks creating a system that looks integrated on paper but is fragmented in practice.
Will a theatre with limited assets enhance war-fighting capability? Can a theatre commander be given the extent of freedom of assets and operations currently?
Fragmenting these scarce resources among multiple theatre commands could drastically reduce their operational effectiveness and weaken national-level response capability. India is a highly threatened nation. Premature implementation would be risky. There is a need for strategic reassessment.
To Summarise
Op Sindoor has been a spectacular victory for India. For all practical purposes, India has fought a single-front war but with the combined might of two (Pakistan and China). There have been valuable lessons that, once imbibed, can accelerate victory and make it more complete.
We need not only battlefield victories but also dominance in the information and narrative spheres, ensuring our military successes translate into enduring national strength. Focused, fearless action drives real power. Aerospace will remain the domain of action.
The framework outlined above is highly agile and scalable. Modernization, grounded in technological foresight and strategic clarity, is imperative. India must be decisively proactive in its capability development to effectively anticipate, deter, and counter the full spectrum of threats.
India’s rising economic muscle will ensure funding. Sustained funding for R&D and procurement, as well as the development of indigenous technologies, is a must.
The new advanced systems must be integrated seamlessly. It is also time for reforms in DRDO, acquisition processes, and public-private partnerships. Recommendations of many committees need to be implemented as a priority. Battlefield-driven innovations are important. Indigenization and Atmanirbharta require a continuous push and review.
Technology-driven operational doctrinal reviews are required. Conflicts will start from trigger events. Capability has to be in place at all times. Time to Act is Now.
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran fighter test pilot and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies in New Delhi. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals while serving in the IAF for 40 years.
- He tweets @Chopsyturvey
- Follow EurAsian Times on Google News
