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Maduro vs Zelensky: Why Putin Failed To Nab Ukraine’s President On Day 1 While Trump Extracted Venezuela’s “Drug Lord” Easily?

By
Sumit Ahlawat
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“Cut off the head of the snake and the body will follow,” has been a popular military strategy ever since the dawn of war.

History is replete with instances of wars ending within hours when the king or the commander of an army was captured or killed.

For instance, in 1896, the conflict between Britain and the Sultanate of Zanzibar lasted just half an hour, as Sultan Khalid bin Barghash was forced to flee the island following the British bombardment of his palace, ending the resistance of his armed forces.

On the flip side, resistance continues as long as the king is alive and free.

In 333 BC, Alexander the Great decisively defeated Darius III, the king of Persia, at the Battle of Issus. However, Darius III successfully evaded capture and fled the battlefield.

Two years later, in 331 BC, Alexander once more defeated Darius III in the Battle of Gaugamela. However, Darius III once again evaded capture.

He fled towards Bacteria to rally support in Eastern provinces and challenge Alexander once again. However, he was betrayed by his own generals, who killed him in 330 BC.

It was only then, three years after the Battle of Issus, that Alexander could legitimately proclaim himself the “King of Asia.”

The shift capture of the Venezuelan President, Nicolas Maduro, by the US military after just a few hours of operation, has once again demonstrated the continued relevance of this military strategy of ending a war swiftly by killing or capturing the leader of the enemy forces.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in US captivity.

In contrast, Russia has been fighting a war of attrition in Ukraine for nearly four years.

Russia has repeatedly underlined that killing or capturing the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is not their objective.

However, the assertion that Russia would have been averse to capturing a democratically elected leader does not hold merit, as Russian forces had indeed captured mayors at gunpoint during the initial phase of the conflict.

For instance, in March 2022, Russian special forces walked into the office of Melitopol mayor Ivan Fedorov and abducted him at gunpoint.

Had Moscow succeeded in capturing Zelensky or capturing the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, in the initial assault, the war would have been over in the first three days, as Vladimir Putin had planned.

That initial failure to capture Kyiv is still hurting Russia, as it has reportedly lost nearly a million soldiers, hundreds of aircraft, tanks, and other military equipment, and hundreds of billions in military operations.

So, why did the US succeed in Venezuela and Russia failed in Ukraine? Is it just the qualitative difference in US and Russian military strength and strategy? Or, is there more to this story?

Why Venezuela Folded Within Hours?

Many people believe that Venezuela can not be compared to Ukraine, so some perspective is necessary.

Venezuela is actually larger than Ukraine and has a population nearly as large.

Venezuela’s total area is about 912,050 sq km (352,140 sq miles), roughly 1.5 times that of Ukraine’s 603,500 sq km (233,032 sq miles). They both have populations of 30-40 million people.

Venezuela also has one of the strongest military presences in Latin America.

The country possessed CASIC HK-JM2 radar systems with a range of 500 km, JYL-1 3D radars with a range of 320 km, and a variety of other Chinese radars with shorter ranges. These are integrated with S-300VM and Buk-M2 batteries, which complement 11 Pechora batteries with an 80 km range.

The country also possessed C-892A anti-ship missiles capable of reaching 180 km, along with Iranian fast boats equipped with missiles. Venezuela also has more than 20 combat aircraft, notably Su-30s armed with KH-31 anti-ship missiles, as well as helicopters.

The Venezuelan Army also possesses 5,000 MANPADs and more than 100 air defense systems.

During the US military operation over Caracas, several US helicopters, such as Chinook and AH-64 Apaches, were flying extremely low. Venezuelan MANPADs could have easily engaged these low-flying US military helicopters.

However, the fact that not even a single US soldier lost their life in the operation demonstrates that there was literally no resistance from the Venezuelan Army.

There was always some doubt about how loyal the Venezuelan Army would be to Maduro. However, as a general rule, even in the face of discontent against the leader/dictator, there is at least one faction of the army that remains loyal and fights for the leader when attacked by a foreign power.

However, in the case of Venezuela, there was no resistance at all, which strongly suggests that Maduro was sold to the US by his own generals, the same way Persian king Darius III was killed by his own generals after losing twice to Alexander the Great.

This is the most crucial difference between Venezuela and Ukraine: the loyalty of the army.

However, in February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow knew fully well that it could not count on the disloyalty of the Ukrainian Army.

Moscow has accounted for fierce resistance from the Ukrainian Army, which had been preparing for a conflict with Russia at least from 2014, when Moscow had annexed Crimea.

Moscow had a plan in place even after accounting for fierce resistance from the Ukrainian Army. However, if Moscow failed to occupy Kyiv during its initial assault, it was because the Russian Army failed to execute its plan on the ground.

(COMBO) Photo by SAUL LOEB and Federico PARRA / AFP)

Why Russia Failed To Take Kyiv In Three Days?

Many experts have repeatedly mocked Putin for believing that Russia can take Kyiv in three days. In hindsight, it’s hard to believe, but Russia indeed had a plan to capture Kyiv and force the surrender of Zelensky’s regime within the first 3-4 days.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s Airborne Forces launched an airmobile operation toward Kyiv, supported by missile strikes and air cover, using attack and transport helicopters. The objective of this blitzkrieg-style maneuver was to seize Antonov Airport in Hostomel, north of Kyiv, establish a bridgehead there, create a secure air corridor for additional airborne troops, and then rapidly advance into the Ukrainian capital with combined forces.

The plan was to quickly deploy Russian Special Forces and military equipment at Hostomel, near Kyiv, and then overwhelm Ukrainian resistance swiftly after a couple of initial hard blows.

If successful, Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supplies could be flown into the airport, allowing them to deploy into Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government rapidly.

To execute this mission, Russia tasked its elite Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience from operations in Chechnya, Crimea, and Donbas.

The operation began on February 24 with a coordinated attack involving a large number of Russian Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, which used low-flying tactics to avoid radar detection.

These helicopters launched guided missiles and fired cannons at the airport’s defenses, hoping to suppress Ukrainian forces long enough for a landing. Despite strong resistance, which resulted in the loss of several Russian helicopters, the assault continued for several hours.

Russian forces fully captured Hostomel Airport on February 25, 2022. Following this, the Russian Army and the VDV (Russian Airborne Forces) aimed to transform the airport into a critical forward operating base for their planned push toward Kyiv.

However, at this point, Russia’s offensive began to face significant setbacks. Russia’s failure to clear the area around the airport quickly led to disaster.

Ukrainian forces, including special operations units from the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, launched a counteroffensive.

Local partisan fighters and Ukrainian forces on the ground inflicted major damage on the Russian troops. In one of the most pivotal moments of the battle, a sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the commanding general of the Russian 7th Airborne Division, by the end of February 2022.

The invasion’s initial momentum slowed, leading to the infamous 40-mile-long convoy and entire units of Russian troops stalling due to fuel shortages, significantly hindering their advance.

By March 4, Russian state television aired footage showing large numbers of destroyed Russian military equipment, struck by Ukrainian artillery, scattered across the base. The Russian forces stationed there had become immobilized without clear orders to advance or retreat.

The situation remained dire until March 29, when Russian commanders finally issued the order to retreat from Kyiv Oblast. This marked the beginning of the Russian withdrawal from Hostomel, with damaged equipment that could not be evacuated. Ukrainian artillery fire targeted the retreating forces, further complicating their situation.

Among the equipment left behind were 16 modern BMD-4M armored fighting vehicles and a 1L262E Rtut-BM electronic warfare system. These items were either destroyed during the retreat preparation or intentionally blown up by Russian forces.

When Ukrainian troops reentered Hostomel, they found evidence of the hastily abandoned Russian positions, with remnants of daily life scattered around.

These included unopened food packages, personal items like passports and bank cards, and even Ukrainian armored vehicles that had been captured by Russian forces but could not be taken with them.

The loss of surprise, the inability to clear surrounding areas, and the vulnerability of airborne operations to counterattacks demonstrated how quickly airborne missions can go wrong.

The Russian failure to capture Hostomel Airport proved fatal for Moscow’s overall military strategy in Ukraine. After the Hostomel disaster, Russia withdrew from Kyiv oblast and then regrouped in Ukraine’s southern and eastern provinces to stabilize the frontlines.

This initial failure to capture and secure Hostomel and then advance to Kyiv also allowed Western countries to mobilize support for Ukraine and resume the supply of critical military and humanitarian aid to Kyiv.

In 2023, the conflict entered trench warfare, not very dissimilar to the First World War military tactics, and the frontline hardly moved.

In 2024 and 2025, the Russian forces finally started making incremental progress, but took heavy casualties for every inch of territory. The conflict had entered a war-of-attrition phase, where progress essentially involves taking heavy casualties, both among soldiers and in military equipment.

Russian forces failed to execute the plan in the initial days. Had Russia succeeded in capturing and securing Hostomel airport, creating a secure air bridge for Russian troops and military equipment, and using the airport as a forward base to advance to Kyiv, it was entirely possible that Moscow could have forced the surrender of Zelensky and the current Ukrainian government within the first few days of the war.

That initial failure is still hurting Russia.

  • Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
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  • He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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