The 29-page National Security Strategy (NSS) that the Trump Administration announced on December 3 may have pleased America’s major allies in the Indo-Pacific overall, but its view of the Chinese challenge seems to have caused some differences between Japan and South Korea.
In fact, until yesterday (December 9), Japan was not exactly happy with the Trump Administration for its lack of understanding of and support for the new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who had angered China considerably for saying that “a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an ‘existential threat’ that would justify Japan deploying its military”.
This had led China to threaten Japan with economic retaliation. And on December 5, Chinese warplanes had locked their radars onto Japanese fighter jets south-east of Okinawa, in what she described as an “extremely regrettable” incident.
Apparently, the Chinese consul-general in Osaka had even suggested that Takaichi should be killed over her comments on Taiwan. If a “filthy neck sticks itself in uninvited, we will cut it off without a moment’s hesitation”, he wrote in a since-deleted post.
Japanese officials expected American support for their Prime Minister in all this, given the security alliance between Tokyo and Washington. However, the Trump Administration not only avoided commenting officially on her comment on Taiwan but also took a long time to respond to the Chinese display of warplanes against the Japanese fighters.
It was only after nearly four days after the incident that the U.S. Department of State spokesperson said on late Tuesday (December 9) that “ China’s actions are not conducive to regional peace and stability, The US-Japan Alliance is stronger and more united than ever. Our commitment to our ally Japan is unwavering, and we are in close contact on this and other issues.”
Some analysts say that the Trump Administration wants to avoid any critical remarks on China over Taiwan at a time when it is negotiating a trade deal with Beijing. But on closer scrutiny, the American commitment to the island nation remains largely intact.
The NSS clearly says that it “does not support any unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait.” Besides, it asks its Indo-Pacific allies “to reinforce capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.”
Besides, on December 4, President Trump signed the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act into law. Its passing without objection in the US Senate last month underscores how bipartisan US support for Taiwan has evolved.
The Act requires the U.S. State Department to conduct reviews of contacts with Taiwan at least once every five years. It is also said to “affirm the value of U.S. interaction with Taiwan, support closer Taiwan-U.S. relations, and stand as a firm symbol of Taipei and Washington sharing values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights”.
Incidentally, this Act was enacted into American law soon after the Trump Administration announced a $330 million package of advanced US arms sales to Taiwan. If Austin Dahmer, President Trump’s nominee for assistant secretary of war for strategy, plans and capabilities, is to be believed, “The US strategy of denial complements Taiwan’s plans for layered defense by providing combat-capable forces on operationally relevant timelines, to provide a strong local defense that is difficult and painful to dislodge while bolstering allied confidence in our resolve.”
That American commitment towards Taiwan remains strong can be further seen from the Trump Administration’s overall NSS, the largest section of which (six pages out of the total 29) concerns America’s interests in the Indo-Pacific and resolve toward its security. Trump would only like his allies and partners to increase their military contributions to the American deterrence in the region. And here, the NSS expects Japan and South Korea to play a leading role.
The document states that: “We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend — and more importantly, do — much more for collective defence”.
The NSS goes on to say, “Given President Trump’s insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defence spending, with a focus on the capabilities — including new capabilities — necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”
But then, both Japan and South Korea have already agreed to increase their defense expenditures. Japan, which hosts more than 50,000 US troops, has pledged to increase its defence outlay to 2 percent of its GDP, two years ahead of schedule.
South Korea, which hosts 28,500 American soldiers as part of the US Forces Korea (USFK), is aiming for 3.5 percent of its GDP in this regard.
Incidentally, in a recently released joint fact sheet on trade and security agreements between South Korea and the US, the two sides unveiled an agreement to enhance the US conventional deterrence posture against “all regional threats” to the alliance, language that underscores Washington’s call for Seoul to help deter China.
Along this line, Trump’s approval for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines is seen by many as part of a US effort to leverage allies’ security to enhance their collective capabilities to counter “regional” threats such as China and North Korea.
But then, South Korean ruling elites will not go too far to project themselves as anti-China. After all, Seoul navigates the increasingly convoluted geopolitical landscape under a “pragmatic” foreign policy to maintain stable relations with China, which is crucial for trade as well as diplomacy for North Korea’s nuclear and missile restraint.
Secondly, South Korea has some reservations that, in the name of the allies’ “collective defense”, Japan would be given primacy by the U.S. In this context, they are particularly not enthusiastic about Tokyo negotiating with Washington on its “One Theater Concept,” which, if realized, would integrate command and control (C2) in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula into a single operational theater.
As Dr. CHOI Kang, the President at the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies, apprehends, “Japan’s intention is not simply to improve combat effectiveness. By integrating the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) with United States Forces Japan (USFJ), it aims to expand its C2 authority and access to intelligence while positioning itself as the hub for regional military operations encompassing the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. The ‘One Theater’ concept is a strategic idea to institutionalize a Japan-led Indo-Pacific order, which would in practice elevate Japan’s status as an equal operational partner to the U.S. military”.
Apparently, the South Korean government has stated that “including the Korean Peninsula in Japan’s war planning framework is inappropriate ”as that could dilute United States Forces Korea’s (USFK) mission to defend the Korean Peninsula; undermine the mission of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) for the defense of the Korean Peninsula and South Korea’s decision-making authority; and strengthen Japan’s operational role amid unresolved historical issues that could provoke public backlash and sovereignty disputes within South Korea.
Therefore, Kang argues that South Korea needs to step forward as a strategic architect with its own proposal for a “Korean Peninsula–centered One East Asian theater.” Since North Korea’s provocations and China’s pressure on Taiwan are fundamentally linked, crises could occur simultaneously in both theaters.
Therefore, USFK should assume the central command role within this theater, he adds. “Establishing an integrated system of ROK-U.S.-Japan intelligence sharing and joint training based on this framework would strengthen South Korea’s influence and position within the theater”.
Kang also cites yet another reason why, instead of Japan, South Korea should have the leading role in this proposed theater.
“China and North Korea already field tactical nuclear weapons at combat-ready levels, but Japan’s pacifist constitution and Taiwan’s lack of a U.S. military presence make it difficult for them to secure credible nuclear deterrence.
Ultimately, the only viable base capable of fielding tactical nuclear weapons is South Korea. If tactical nuclear weapons are redeployed to South Korea, they will provide immediate deterrence within the one theater and serve as justification for South Korea to cement its place as East Asian security’s key state”.
In essence, the point that the likes of Kang make is that if the “One Theater” concept is to be a new axis of Indo-Pacific security discourse, then its key player has be South Korea, not Japan, as it is the ROK-U.S. alliance that would evolve from “defense of the Korean Peninsula” to an “alliance contributing to regional stability.”
Viewed thus, the success of the Trump Administration’s NSS has to remove this emerging rivalry between Tokyo and Seoul, the only two major military allies of Washington in the Indo-Pacific, allies who, otherwise, are serious about America’s burden-sharing.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
