Israel has the world’s most extensive layered air defense system, comprising Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Patriot, THAAD, TPY-2, Aegis, and even aided by Qatar’s AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR).
For a small country the size of Israel, this offers the most comprehensive air defense coverage anywhere on earth.
However, despite the presence of some of the world’s most advanced air defense systems, multiple Iranian drones and missiles have been able to penetrate the country’s layered air defense systems.
This failure to intercept Iranian missiles has led many to question why Israel is failing to intercept these projectiles fired from Iran, and whether it represents a systematic weakness in Israel’s layered air defense network.
However, Israeli officials defended the country’s missile defense architecture, saying that it has shot down over 92% of Iranian drones and missiles, and no air defense system in the world, howsoever perfect, could provide 100% protection.
Still, one particular Iranian strike over the weekend has raised disconcerting questions about Israel’s multilayered missile defense system and its ability to protect its citizens, or any high-value site at all.
Few sites in all of Israel are better protected than its main nuclear research facility and reactor, located nearly eight miles from the town of Dimona in the southern Negev Desert.
Yet, on March 21, two Iranian ballistic missiles dodged Israel’s vaunted air defense systems and crashed into residential areas in Dimona and in a nearby city, Arad.
Apart from the destruction caused by these two strikes, which injured over 200 people, it raised serious questions as to why Israel failed to protect its most highly protected cities.
There were fears that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) might be holding back on firing its most costly and sophisticated missiles, as the magazine depth of its interceptor stocks was running dangerously low.
The stocks were depleted first during the 12-day war with Iran in June last year and further during the ongoing war.
But then came the IDF’s admission that it had tried to intercept the two Iranian ballistic missiles, which struck at an interval of nearly three hours. This confirmed that the Iranian missiles struck despite the IDF firing missiles to intercept them.
The fact that two missiles struck in the same area within a mere three hours gave rise to two distinct fears: either the same mistake was made twice, or the two back-to-back missile strikes represent a structural flaw in Israel’s multi-layered air defense system.
As questions mounted, the IDF stated that the Israeli air defense system that failed to shoot down two Iranian ballistic missiles was the medium-range David’s Sling.
David’s Sling, named after the mythical Biblical figure, represents the second tier of Israel’s multi-layered air defense system.
The first tier is the Iron Dome, a short-range missile defense system. It can intercept missiles at ranges of 4-70 km. Iron Dome was designed primarily to stop short-range missiles from Hamas.
David’s Sling is the second tier of Israel’s air defense system. It can intercept missiles at a range of 40 to 300 km. Then comes Arrow-3, which has a range of over 2,300 km.
The air defense architecture is also complemented by Patriot (160 km range) and THAAD (870 to 3,000 km range).
On March 21, David’s Sling fired two interceptor missiles. However, they both failed to intercept incoming Iranian missiles, leading to destruction rarely seen in Israel.
According to the Israeli Air Force’s probes of the incidents, there was no connection between the errors that led to the missile impacts.
The fact that the incidents occurred in the same area within two hours was entirely coincidental, the IAF said.
The interception failure is even more shocking since the Iranian missiles that struck Dimona and Arad carried conventional warheads and not cluster munitions.
The IDF has already stated that it has very little chance of intercepting missiles that carry cluster munitions.
The Israeli military said the Iranian missiles were likely from the Ghadr family of projectiles and are a known threat.
The David’s Sling system had engaged both projectiles, but its interceptors failed to knock them down, the Times of Israel reported.
Two earlier missile attacks on the same area in southern Israel were successfully intercepted using the same air defense system, according to the IAF.
There are also questions about why the David’s Sling system was used to intercept the incoming missiles, when Israel also has the long-range Arrow-3, which can intercept ballistic missiles while they’re still outside Earth’s atmosphere.
Initially, David’s Sling was not designed to intercept the kind of Ballistic Missiles Iran fired. It was first used to intercept ballistic missiles during the 12-day war in June last year, when it shot down several Iranian missiles.
In February, the Israeli defense ministry informed that it had completed a series of “complex” tests with David’s Sling aimed at “upgrading readiness for future threats.”
However, the use of the medium-range system instead of the Arrow 3 to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles is believed to be part of the military’s efforts to conserve Israel’s stockpile of expensive long-range interceptors.
While each David’s Sling missile costs roughly US$1 million to use, the Arrow 3 system can cost Israel over US$2.5 million per use.
Arrow-3 interceptors are also more complex and time-consuming to build.
While Israel does not disclose its annual production rate for Arrow-3 interceptors due to national security reasons, open-source intelligence suggests the number is extremely low, possibly as few as 24 to 30 interceptors per year.
After last year’s war with Iran and an Arrow-3 export deal with Germany (US$4.6 billion), Israel is ramping up Arrow-3 interceptor production. However, it will be some time before these efforts show results.
Furthermore, while Iran has used over 500 ballistic missiles, according to various estimates, Tehran still has a large stockpile of missiles in its underground facilities, possibly in the range of 1500.
On March 23, Iran’s state-run IRIB News released a new video showing rows of drones and missiles in some underground facility.
If Israel is running low on interceptors and already prioritizing targets, then if the war stretches, many more Iranian missiles can penetrate Israel’s missile defense shield.
More worryingly, low stockpiles of interceptor missiles are only one of Israel’s problems.
During this war, Iran has surprised the world with its missile technology. It has demonstrated its capability to produce cluster munitions, hypersonic missiles, and highly maneuverable ballistic missiles (also known as Iran’s dancing missiles).
These missiles are extremely difficult to intercept, even with Israel’s most advanced air defense systems.
An Israeli military official said that about half of all ballistic missiles fired at Israel during this war have been equipped with cluster munitions.
Once the missile disintegrates into sub-munitions, it is quite difficult to intercept them.
“Iranian designers have probably turned to a high-altitude dispersal approach in part to minimize the chance of a successful ground-based interception,” said N.R. Jenzen-Jones, a munitions expert and the director of Armament Research Services, adding that the munitions are small and falling at high speeds.
“Whilst there are Russian and Chinese munitions that employ a similar approach, Iranian examples appear to disperse a relatively small number of submunitions over a much wider target area – resulting in a less militarily efficient design.”
There are also Iran’s highly maneuverable ballistic missiles, which can dodge multiple interceptors.
Israel has intercepted nearly 90% of Iranian missiles. Still, Iran’s large intact stockpile of ballistic missiles, its recent technological breakthroughs in missile technology, and Israel’s low interceptor magazine depth are worrying signs that Tel Aviv cannot ignore.
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