As Iranian hypersonic missiles rain down on Israeli cities and US military bases across the Middle East, China is minutely observing every strike and every failed interception.
On February 28, the US and Israel launched an all-out war on Iran, and Tehran responded by launching drones, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles all across the Middle East.
While there were already serious doubts about the ability of even the most advanced US air defense systems to intercept hypersonic threats, this war has served as a live demonstration of this inability.
Ahead of the war, the US has amassed its most advanced air defence assets in the region, including Patriots, multiple THAAD batteries, Qatar’s AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), Aegis SM-3 ship-based midcourse defence systems, and Aegis SM-2 and SM-6 interceptors.
A Chinese research team published a paper titled “Tactical Missile Technology” on the ability of US missile defense systems to intercept hypersonic weapons. The researchers found that the US systems were dangerously outmatched by these threats.
“Existing US missile defences can theoretically intercept some hypersonic weapons in their final stage, but high speed, manoeuvrability and stealth make it very difficult,” the paper read.
In subsequent days, the prediction made by the research team seemed to be confirmed by video footage from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, showing Iranian missiles dodging as many as 10 interceptor missiles and hitting their targets at hypersonic speeds.
On March 5, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that during the 17th round of Operation True Promise 4, its hypersonic missiles and attack drones penetrated the US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, hitting the Israeli Ministry of Defence building and Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv.
In their paper, the research team analysed the strengths and weaknesses of these systems and found that for midcourse interception, the US relied on the Ground-Based Midcourse Defence system and the Aegis SM-3 ship-based midcourse defence system. Both interceptors are designed for hit-to-kill engagement.
“However, because the heat generated by high-speed travel through the atmosphere can blind the infrared sensors used to lock onto targets, these interceptor missiles are only effective against targets outside the atmosphere, which is above 100km (62 miles),” the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post quoted the paper as saying.
However, for intercepting these missiles, the US has also deployed terminal-phase missile defence systems.
Terminal-phase missile defence systems intercept incoming missiles during the final stage of their flight. These systems are also known as “in-atmosphere” defence systems and include THAAD, Patriot, and the Aegis SM-2 and SM-6 interceptors.
The UAE has two operational THAAD batteries, and Saudi Arabia has one. According to reports, ahead of the war, the US has also deployed THAAD batteries in Israel, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
“THAAD provides Combatant Commanders a rapidly deployable capability against short-range (up to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000–3,000 km), and limited intermediate-range (3,000–5,000 km) ballistic missile threats inside or outside the atmosphere during their final (terminal) phase of flight,” the US Congress said in its report last year.
“The system (THAAD) operates at altitudes between 40km and 150km. When hypersonic missiles glide at lower altitudes, they become difficult to intercept, and at higher altitudes, they are vulnerable to decoy interference,” the Chinese research team said.
Once the threat is below 40 km altitude, defence responsibilities fall to systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 MSE and ship-based Aegis SM-2 and SM-6 interceptors.
However, since the missile is in its terminal phase, the reaction and interception window is extremely small, and if the threat is also highly manoeuvrable, then its interception is even more difficult.
The Chinese research team also looked at the possibility of interception by modelling a scenario involving the PAC-3 MSE and the HTV-2 hypersonic vehicle.
“When a wedge-shaped hypersonic glider approaches its target, it can flip and use lift to dive sharply towards the ground,” the paper said.
“To intercept it, the PAC-3 MSE must strike with kinetic force. According to guidance theory, the interceptor needs two to three times the target’s lateral acceleration, greater speed, and strong lift for last-second adjustments.”
Calculating the lift factors of both the PAC-3 MSE and the HTV-2, the team concluded that a successful interception is possible only when the HTV-2’s speed is below Mach 6 and at a moderate altitude.
“If the HTV-2 enters its dive phase at initial speeds above Mach 9, it can maintain speeds above Mach 6 throughout the dive, remaining beyond the reach of interceptors,” the paper said.
“Other interceptors, such as the Aegis SM-2 and SM-6, travel at around Mach 4, slower than the Patriot PAC-3, and are even less effective in interception scenarios.
“Even if a hit is possible, it may not destroy the weapon. The interceptor might not hit a vital spot, or it may fail to cause enough damage to stop the missile. Hypersonic weapons are designed with damage resistance and redundant power systems, so even a partial hit might not stop them from completing their mission.”
The Chinese research team concluded that intercepting hypersonic missiles is extremely difficult for existing US air defense systems, such as Patriot, Aegis SM-2, SM-6, and THAAD.
The Iran War has validated the conclusions of the team, as during the conflict, multiple Iranian missiles penetrated Israel’s multi-layered air defense shield.
However, that does not mean that intercepting hypersonic missiles is impossible. The research team suggests that better coordination between space-based early warning systems and ground radar was key to improving land-based defences against hypersonic glide vehicles.
“This would boost accuracy and cut reaction times. One example is the US Missile Defence Agency’s HBTSS satellite system, which aims to use around 200 space-based sensors for detection,” the paper said.
Trump’s proposed Golden Dome, which would connect hundreds of space-based sensors, satellites, and interceptors to ground-based radars to create a global early-warning system and a layered missile-defense shield, might prove more effective against hypersonic threats.
The inability of the US missile defense shield to intercept hypersonic threats is even more concerning, as this is one of those critical areas where the US is behind its adversaries, such as China, Russia, and even Iran.
What Are Hypersonic Weapons?
Hypersonic speed is considered anything faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, equivalent to approximately 100 kilometers (60 miles) per minute, or about a mile every second.
And besides its high speed, its flight is highly maneuverable, making it extremely difficult to shoot down.
Though, like ICBMs, hypersonic glide weapons are launched by rockets high into the atmosphere, unlike the former, whose warhead is primarily powered by gravity once it begins its descent to its target, hypersonics dive back to Earth sooner before flattening out their flight path and then uses internal navigation devices to make course corrections and keep it on target while traveling even up to 12 times the speed of sound.
An ICBM follows a parabolic trajectory, which means it ascends and then descends in a high arc. In contrast, a hypersonic one orbits the Earth at a lower height and is maneuverable. The ability to change track, target, and speed mid-trajectory makes them tougher to track and defend against.
There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons. One is a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) launched from a rocket, which then glides to its target. The other is hypersonic cruise missiles powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, also known as “scramjets.”
US: Long Wait For Hypersonic Weapons
It is common knowledge that the United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is developing multiple programs, though none have transitioned to operational service as of June 2025. The programs are primarily in the prototyping and testing phase, with significant investment, but also face challenges related to cost, technical maturity, and test failures.
The Pentagon’s FY2025 budget request for hypersonic research was US$6.9 billion, up from US$4.7 billion in FY2023. It was US$3.8 billion in fiscal year 2022.
The US is working on multiple programs simultaneously. Among them are: the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), the US Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), and the US Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program.
Additionally, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) supports programs such as the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC).
However, none of these programs has achieved operational status.
On the other hand, Russia has three operational hypersonic missiles: the Kinzhal, the Tsirkon, and the Avangard. Earlier this week, Russia also gave the order to start mass production of its fourth hypersonic missile, the Oreshnik.
Additionally, China is leading in the global race for hypersonic weapons. China possesses the “world’s leading hypersonic arsenal,” with systems like the DF-17 capable of targeting U.S. bases in the Pacific.
According to an analysis in the February issue of ‘Shipborne Weapons,’ a Chinese military magazine, China and Russia are the world’s only two countries with operational scramjet-powered hypersonic missiles.
China showcased its long-range hypersonic CJ-1000 missile and ship-launched YJ-19 missiles during the military parade in September last year.
Both of these missiles are powered by advanced air-breathing scramjet engines.
Russia’s ship-based 3M22 “Zircon” is also based on air-breathing scramjet engines.
Scramjet engines represent a technologically superior – yet more difficult – development path for hypersonic missiles compared with glider vehicles such as China’s DF-17 and Russia’s Avangard, the magazine said.
“The emergence of the CJ-1000 missile marks China’s transition from closely following to taking a leading position in the most advanced aerospace domains,” it said.
Ironically, once upon a time, the US led the world in scramjet propulsion systems.
The US was the first country to demonstrate scramjet-powered flight, as early as 1998, and the first to achieve sustained 240-second operation of a hydrocarbon-fuelled scramjet engine in flight in 2013.
However, “The US has fallen behind China in the weaponisation and operational deployment of scramjet-powered hypersonic systems,” it said.
“Meanwhile, China’s massive investment in scramjet development, more scientifically sound testing methodologies, strong integration of industry-academic-research collaboration, and resolute national-level support have all been critical factors enabling its eventual leap ahead,” it added.
In the current war, the US’s lack of hypersonic missiles is on full display. While Iran is attacking Israel with hypersonic missiles, such as the Fattah-1 and the Fattah-2, the US is still using the same Tomahawk missiles that were used in the First Gulf War as well.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
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