OPED by Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan
Operation Epic Fury was designed to cripple Iran’s political leadership, economy, and military, all simultaneously.
On March 2, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine held a joint press conference at the Pentagon. Hegseth argued the U.S. goal is not Iraq-like regime change: “We set the terms of this war, from start to finish. Our ambitions are not utopian. They are realistic, scoped to our interests and the defense of our people and our allies. This is not Iraq. This is not endless.”
The campaign has moved beyond the original “decapitation and infrastructure strike” concept. After the initial strikes, Iran retaliated with missile and drone attacks on Israel and U.S. bases across the Gulf, triggering a wider regional crisis.
The U.S.-Israel strategy has shifted significantly toward defence and containment.
The campaign has now expanded into economic and energy targets. This indicates a strategic shift toward economic pressure on the Iranian state. Early messaging framed the war as stopping Iran’s nuclear program, but political messaging has shifted repeatedly, mainly implying regime change.
So, the emerging strategy seems to be pressure and attrition, with the hope that internal instability eventually weakens the regime. Another evolution is the conflict’s multi-domain nature.
The war is now affecting global oil flows and shipping, not just military targets. The strategy has shifted from a short “decapitation strike” campaign to a longer pressure war.
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that while there is no timeline for the military operation, there are clearly defined goals for what the United States hopes to achieve. In other words, Epic Fury now looks less like a quick knockout and more like a sustained campaign to drain Iran’s state power.
The facts show that the attackers have achieved tactical success but not yet a strategic victory, which has created pressure to escalate further, while the defender tries to widen the war. The U.S.–Israel coalition is now facing strategic dilemmas that could shape the coming phase(s).
The Dilemmas
Firstly, since 28 February, the attacking coalition has hit thousands of targets and destroyed much of Iran’s air defences and military infrastructure. Even after eliminating the supreme leader, U.S. intelligence assessments say Iran’s governing system remains intact and capable of continuing the war.
Therefore, the key political goal—breaking the Iranian regime—has not happened. If the regime survives, the dilemma could be that the war cannot end quickly, and the coalition must either escalate further or accept a limited outcome.
Secondly, Iran cannot win a conventional war, so it has focused on asymmetric escalation.
Iran has struck U.S. bases across the Gulf, launched missile attacks on Israel, attacked Gulf infrastructure, and activated proxy groups across the region. Iran has also targeted radars supporting U.S. missile defense systems in Gulf countries using cheap drones.
In such circumstances, the coalition leaders could face the dilemma of recognizing Iran’s horizontal escalation, i.e., Iran’s efforts to spread the war across the region, increase economic damage, and make the war harder to control geographically.
Thirdly, the most dangerous escalation point is the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of global oil supply passes. Shipping disruption has already begun, and oil prices are rising. This escalation has transformed the conflict into a massive global economic crisis.
Fourthly, another problem that emerged after the first week is the depletion of munitions and interceptors. U.S. lawmakers are warning that the war could drain critical weapons stockpiles.
The question that also arises here is whether it could affect supplies to Ukraine. The dilemma facing the coalition is to decide whether to escalate quickly to end the war or slow down and risk losing momentum.
Either choice has risks.
Recent strikes have expanded toward energy infrastructure inside Iran, including oil facilities near Tehran. These targets increase pressure on Iran to retaliate more severely.
In such a case, one could speculate on mass missile strikes on Israeli cities, more attacks on Gulf oil facilities, and proxy attacks worldwide. During World War I, U.S. inflation surged past 20% by 1918, while government debt nearly doubled as a percentage of GDP.
World War II saw similar patterns, with inflation exceeding 11% and federal debt skyrocketing from 44% to over 119% of GDP. Historically, wars often escalate when economic targets are hit.
The most dangerous scenario is major power involvement. If other major powers became more directly involved, the war could shift from a regional war to a great-power confrontation.
This is unlikely to happen, but there are reported instances of intelligence sharing and cyber operations. Open weapons transfers would be inviting disaster; there are already early signs of geopolitical spillover. Two Iranian missiles were intercepted near a NATO member state after flying across multiple countries’ airspace, raising tensions.
The U.S.-Israel coalition holds clear conventional military superiority, but Iran retains several asymmetric tools that can expand the war geographically and economically. Analysts often describe this as “military asymmetry vs. escalation leverage.”
That means the war’s most dangerous phase may not be the opening strikes—but the moment when the conflict spreads beyond Iran itself.
Finally, the war is fundamentally about Iran’s nuclear capability. Iran supposedly has stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (around 60%), close to weapons-grade levels.
Israel fears a future Iranian nuclear weapon, while Tehran fears regime destruction without nuclear deterrence. No open source has laid out how close Iran is to a nuclear bomb.
In case, under heavy coalition bombardment, Iran could even quickly assemble a rudimentary nuclear device, not even testing the weapon, and announce its potential deployment.
That could dramatically change the war.
This creates a security spiral in which each side’s defensive move appears offensive to the other. Israel’s nuclear doctrine includes the “Samson Option”, a last-resort policy for situations where national survival is threatened.
If conventional bombing cannot eliminate Iran’s nuclear program or nuclear threat, the coalition faces a “nuclear” dilemma.
It is no crystal gazing to see that the monetary drain on the U.S. due to this and the Ukraine war is colossal. The coalition would want to force an early capitulation of the Iranian regime.
This is easier said than done. These actions by the U.S. appear to be the proverbial getting on the back of a tiger, and now getting off may need a Machiavellian effort.
On the face of it, the coalition is not left with many options. It has enough military power to damage Iran severely, but not necessarily enough to force regime collapse.
The coalition mandarins may squeeze Iran more economically by rapid escalation with attacks on Iran’s remaining leadership and nuclear sites, or possible ground raids or special operations.
A negotiated ceasefire is also a possibility. That gap between military dominance and political outcome is what makes the next phase extremely dangerous. The prevailing and likely future battlefield dynamics require a very mature, forward-thinking approach to this volatile inferno.
- Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot, superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two frontline fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defence and Air Attaché to the UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
- Views Personal of the Author
