Indian Military To Join Russia & Belarus For “Nuclear” Zapad-2025 Wargames; NATO’s Eastern Flank On The Edge?

Russia and Belarus have launched their first but scaled-down version of military exercise, ‘Zapad-2025’, after the Ukraine invasion / special military operations.

These biennial exercises are always political as much as they are military, and this year the mix of theatre, numbers, and nuclear planning makes Zapad especially tense for NATO capitals nearby.

Zapad-2025  (West 2025)

The exercise officially enters its most active phase between September 12 and 16, but troops began moving into position weeks ago.

Russian units started arriving in Belarus as early as mid-August, underscoring how much preparation goes into these biennial maneuvers.

Zapad, which literally means ‘West’ in Russian, has always carried a political edge. While the stated purpose is to test the Union State’s ability to repel outside aggression, the timing, scale, and theatrics are meant to send a message to the West that Russia and Belarus are ready, and they want NATO to know it.

Nuclear Rhetoric On Display

What makes this year’s drills stand out is the nuclear element. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin confirmed that Zapad-2025 will include training for the deployment of nuclear weapons, specifically involving Russia’s Oreshnik missile system, which Minsk is expected to receive by the end of 2025.

At a press briefing in Minsk, Khrenin called nuclear weapons “an important element of strategic deterrence.”

By weaving nuclear planning into the exercise, Moscow and Minsk are blurring the line between routine drills and psychological pressure. Even if no nuclear weapons are actually moved or used, the symbolism is impossible to ignore.

The Numbers Game

Officially, about 13,000 troops are said to be participating. Western analysts, however, suspect the true figure is far higher. Previous Zapad exercises have often exceeded declared numbers, with tens of thousands of troops, tanks, aircraft, and missile systems moving into action.

The scenarios being rehearsed include air defense operations, countering sabotage units, and securing key territory against a hypothetical enemy attack. For NATO, especially the Baltic states and Poland, this exercise looks less like a defensive drill and more like a rehearsal staged uncomfortably close to their borders.

A Message To NATO

European officials warn that Zapad-2025 could serve multiple purposes: it tests real military readiness, but it also acts as a form of intimidation.

Large-scale drills provide cover for troop movements and equipment deployments that could, in theory, be used in a crisis.

For Moscow, the spectacle reinforces its narrative of a besieged Russia preparing to withstand Western aggression. For Minsk, it shows loyalty to its larger ally while reminding neighbors that Belarus is no passive player in regional security.

India & Pakistan Under The Same Roof

Belarus has tried to present Zapad-2025 as transparent, inviting foreign observers to watch the drills. More than 20 countries are involved in some form, either as participants or observers, which gives the exercise a multinational flavor.

The list is a mixed bag. On the participant side are Belarus, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Congo, Mali, India, Iran, Niger, and Tajikistan.

Observers include Cambodia, China, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Serbia, Thailand, the UAE, and Uzbekistan.

India has sent a 70-member team to Russia for the drills. While China and Pakistan are grouped together, India has been placed in a separate contingent.

The Indian contingent consists of 65 personnel, including 57 from the Army, seven from the Air Force, and one from the Navy. The Army team is led by a battalion of the Kumaon Regiment, supported by troops from other arms and services.

Even so, the symbolism is striking; this is the first time since Operation Sindoor that Indian and Pakistani forces are part of the same military exercise, even if they are not training side by side. Having rivals like India and Pakistan under the same umbrella adds weight to Zapad’s international dimension.

Vladimir Putin and Belarus Map. Edited Image.

Shifting Signals Between Moscow & Minsk

Zapad has always been more than just drills. It often serves as a snapshot of Russia and Belarus’ relationship with each other and the West.

Back in 2017, the two weren’t on the same page. Russia was isolated after Crimea, while Belarus tried to keep a working relationship with Europe by refusing to recognize the annexation. The split was visible enough that Putin and Lukashenka didn’t even appear together on the training grounds.

There was no Zapad in 2019.

By 2021, the tone had changed. After his brutal crackdown at home, Lukashenka leaned completely into Moscow’s narrative, echoing Russia’s criticism of Ukraine and the West. That alignment set the stage for the Union Resolve exercises, which turned out to be the prelude to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian soil.

Now, in 2025, the picture is more complicated. On the surface, Putin and Lukashenka appear to be in sync, but their long-term interests don’t fully align. Both are keen to show unity, yet each wants to send slightly different signals to NATO.

It’s also the first Zapad since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and that alone raises tensions. Kyiv and European capitals are watching closely, wary that drills so close to Ukraine could be used as cover for new provocations.

Ukraine has pointed out that in 2022, Russian troops also entered its territory under the guise of “exercises.” The memory of that maneuver still lingers, making Zapad-2025 far more unsettling than Moscow and Minsk care to admit.

Lukashenka’s Balancing Act

Belarusian officials keep stressing the importance of building nuclear capabilities, while at the same time talking about steps to avoid escalation.

When the exercises were first announced, Minsk said they would be held on the NATO border with about 13,000 troops. Later, the plan shifted.

The drills were moved deeper inside Belarus, and the number of participants was cut in half. The smaller scale meant Belarus was no longer formally required to invite Western observers, yet Minsk did so anyway, even extending invitations to Ukraine.

Officials have also been actively encouraging foreign journalists to come, eager to show that Belarus is not hiding anything.

In August, Lukashenka even spoke directly with U.S. President Donald Trump over a phone call, an unusual outreach given his close ties to Vladimir Putin.

The drills themselves may not be as large as in past years, but they have reopened dialogue between Washington and Minsk, something Lukashenka seems keen to build on.

His approach this year feels different. He is promoting the idea of de-escalation and hinting that he can influence Putin’s decisions. At the same time, his government has been highlighting Belarus’s role in brokering prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine and floating the idea of hosting negotiations between the two.

Lukashenka does not hide the limits of his sovereignty. Instead, he frames them openly, suggesting that Western support could help him carve out more independence from Russia. It is a pitch as much as a policy, but it shows how he wants to be perceived, less as a junior partner to Moscow, and more as a regional actor trying to keep doors open.

Watching The West

For Moscow, Zapad is not just about training troops. It is also a way to remind NATO that Russia and Belarus remain a military force to reckon with.

Drills staged in Belarus attract particular attention because of how close they are to NATO’s eastern borders. They also give Western analysts a window into what Minsk and Moscow consider their top security priorities, as noted in a recent Chatham House study.

Latvia Stays Wary

On September 3, Latvia’s Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) assessed Zapad-2025 as a low-level threat to both Latvia and NATO.

Officials stressed that Russia’s resources are still tied up in Ukraine, limiting what it can throw into these exercises. Even so, they expect the noise around the drills to grow louder as the active phase approaches, with more aggressive rhetoric and information campaigns directed at NATO neighbors.

The Latvian service also urged citizens living near the border to stay alert, noting that disruptions in communications or suspicious activity could be linked to the exercises.

The Suwałki Gap in Focus

Western observers are paying close attention to how Zapad unfolds near Poland and Lithuania, particularly around the Suwałki Corridor.

This narrow stretch of land between Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave is often described as NATO’s most vulnerable spot. If cut off, it would isolate the Baltic states from the rest of the alliance.

For NATO, the gap has become even more important since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That is why any Russian and Belarusian maneuvers in this area trigger immediate concern.

NATO Flexes Back

NATO is not sitting idle while Zapad plays out. Northern European allies are running Tarasis 25, while Lithuania is staging Thunder Strike, its own national defense exercise. Poland, meanwhile, has mobilized 30,000 troops for Iron Defender-25.

The result is that thousands of NATO and Russian-led forces are now training on both sides of the same narrow strip of land. For all sides, the Suwałki Gap has shifted from being a theoretical vulnerability to a real-world flashpoint that everyone knows could define a future crisis.

Zapad-2025 will be judged on several axes. One is reality versus rhetoric: will nuclear planning remain symbolic, or will any tangible nuclear movements occur?

Another is transparency: will observers and journalists actually get meaningful access, or will key activities be kept off limits?

A third is how NATO reads the exercise and responds in the weeks that follow.

  • Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
  • Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com