OPED By Imran Khurshid, PhD
The India–U.S. tariff debate reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Trump’s transactional approach and Pakistan’s limited strategic agency. India’s principled diplomacy and civilizational stature, not flattery, define its long-term strategic credibility.
Recently, an Indian economist, Raghuram Rajan, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and a former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund, argued that Russia’s oil exports were not the primary reason behind U.S. President Donald Trump imposing 50 percent tariffs on India while limiting Pakistan’s tariffs to 19 percent.
According to Rajan, the real issue lay not in oil but in personalities, particularly Trump’s ego-driven approach, and how India responded after Trump claimed credit for preventing a conflict between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
Speaking at a forum in Zurich, Rajan said: “Russian oil wasn’t the issue… I think the central issue was more personalities, especially a personality in the White House, and how they treated certain comments made by India after Trump claimed credit for stopping a conflict between India and Pakistan… Pakistan played it right and said it was all because of Trump… India said the two countries had reached an agreement without Trump. The net effect was that India got 50 per cent tariffs and Pakistan got 19 per cent.”
From this, it can be inferred that Pakistan “played it right” by publicly crediting Trump, whereas India’s refusal to do so contributed to the deterioration of India–U.S. ties and the imposition of punitive tariffs. Several analysts have echoed this interpretation.
This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed.
First, India would never—and should never—credit Trump for something he did not do. India and Pakistan reached an understanding through their own channels; external mediation, particularly on Kashmir, contradicts India’s long-standing policy of bilateralism and non-intervention, as repeatedly affirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs.
Expecting India to compromise its core principles merely to satisfy Trump’s ego reflects a limited and superficial reading of diplomatic dynamics, reducing complex strategic interactions to personality management.
It misunderstands both India’s strategic culture and its civilizational self-respect. While some may argue that this runs counter to the realpolitik nature of international politics—where states adjust their actions in response to evolving geopolitical realities—it does not; principled diplomacy and national self-respect remain central to India’s strategic approach.
More importantly, the assumption that flattering Trump would have fundamentally altered outcomes is deeply naïve. Trump is not merely a leader who seeks praise; he is also relentlessly transactional.
Appeasement does not end demands—it invites more.
Had India credited him once, it would only have opened the door to further pressure and additional concessions. Pakistan did not “play it well”; it simply complied—because it has little choice.
In reality, Pakistan has very limited strategic agency. It does not balance between powers out of skill or autonomy; it is repeatedly used by larger powers to pursue their own geopolitical objectives. When analysts say Pakistan “played it well,” they misunderstand the structural realities of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan is not shaping events; it is being shaped by them.
Pakistan In The U.S. Strategic Calculus
The United States’ renewed engagement with Pakistan has little to do with admiration or appeasement and everything to do with regional calculations. There are at least four major reasons for Washington’s current posture.
First, China’s deep strategic penetration into Pakistan—through CPEC, Gwadar port, and growing investments in Balochistan—has alarmed the U.S. deep state. In response, the United States has supported strategic initiatives in Pakistan, including backing for the proposed Pasni Port near Gwadar, facilitating IMF bailout packages, and providing other economic support mechanisms.
It has also recently announced several additional strategic and economic packages while closely monitoring China’s growing influence in this and the surrounding regions.
There are also other forms of cooperation, both implicit and explicit, including intelligence coordination and security-related engagements. In this context, Pakistan is not a partner but a counterweight—used to limit Chinese influence.
Second, Pakistan remains useful for U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Even without immediate normalization with Israel, keeping Pakistan diplomatically aligned helps Washington dilute criticism over Gaza and manage narratives at international forums such as the United Nations, where Pakistan can otherwise mobilize Islamic opinion.
Even Pakistan’s silence on certain issues matters, as it helps avoid complicating U.S. and Israeli initiatives. This alignment also helps legitimize current U.S.-Israeli proposals in the region, as demonstrated by the extensive praise Trump received from Nawaz Sharif at the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, highlighting the strategic value of maintaining such partnerships.
Third, counterterrorism cooperation—though far less significant than in the past—still occasionally becomes relevant, particularly when U.S. interests require intelligence gathering or logistical access in the region. It can also involve surveillance or operational support in sensitive areas such as Iran, Afghanistan, and other neighbouring regions.
Fourth, and crucially, Pakistan serves as a pressure point on India when it does not follow the U.S. line, as seen in New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil and its refusal to open sensitive sectors such as agriculture and dairy to American companies.
Thus, even if India had lavished praise on Trump, the structural factors shaping U.S. policy would not have disappeared. Tariffs were driven not only by personality politics but by hard economic and geopolitical disagreements—on Russia, market access, and strategic autonomy.
Those who argue that India should have “handled Trump better” are effectively shifting blame away from Trump’s own erratic and coercive behaviour and placing it squarely on India’s foreign policy decisions.
This absolves Trump of responsibility while undermining India’s principled diplomacy. Similarly, those who suggest that Pakistan’s provision of lucrative cryptocurrency deals to Trump and his family explains the improvement in U.S.–Pakistan ties fail to recognize that U.S. deep state policy does not operate on cryptocurrency.
While such deals may have helped create a favourable environment to some extent, crypto alone did not drive strategic alignment or bring the countries closer.
India’s Civilizational Approach
Trump alienated not just India, but many of America’s closest allies. Canada—one of Washington’s most reliable partners, which fought alongside the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan—expressed alarm at his tariff threats and provocative rhetoric; Trump even repeatedly referred to Canada as his “51st state.”
Denmark also experienced diplomatic friction, including over Greenland, where Trump’s territorial remarks and pressure led to official protests. Japan’s prime minister resigned after being pressured into an unfavourable trade deal.
Ukraine’s President Zelensky was publicly ambushed in a confrontational Oval Office meeting. NATO allies were routinely berated, and leaders like South Africa’s Ramaphosa also experienced Trump’s aggressive style. Even his associate, Elon Musk, who spent over $270 million supporting Trump in his 2024 election campaigns, was publicly rebuked after Trump had a feud with him, with the latter telling Musk to “go to Africa.”
From Europe to the Indo-Pacific, the story is the same: Trump consistently alienated allies and partners across regions.
The pattern is clear: the problem lies not in India’s diplomacy but in Trump’s personality and governing style.
India cannot—and should not—behave like Pakistan. Pakistan oscillates between China and the United States because it lacks strategic weight and agency. India, by contrast, represents one-fifth of humanity, is the world’s third-largest defence spender, a key Indo-Pacific power, and, importantly, a civilizational state—meaning its identity, governance, and long-term strategic vision are rooted in thousands of years of continuous civilization, historical continuity, sovereignty, and long-term strategic restraint.
With its significant geopolitical weight, India cannot—and does not need to—oscillate between powers; even if it wished to do so, its sheer size, responsibilities, and global consequences would not allow such manoeuvring.
India, therefore, acts with full agency, unlike countries that lack strategic influence and are forced to balance externally. Appeasing narcissism is not pragmatism; it is surrender.
Some countries did follow this strategy—offering lavish praise, luxury aircraft, or public deference—in hopes of securing favour or protection. Even Qatar’s offering of a luxury aircraft to Trump did not prevent it from facing Israeli military action, despite Israel being a key U.S. ally.
India chose dignity. That choice may come with short-term costs, but it preserves long-term credibility.
Even hypothetically, had India praised Trump, outcomes would likely not have changed. U.S. regional objectives, trade demands, and strategic pressures would have remained intact. To argue otherwise is to misunderstand both Trump and geopolitics.
In the end, claiming that Pakistan “played it well” gives it undeserved credit. Pakistan is not playing a clever balancing game; it is being used—sometimes by China, sometimes by the United States, and occasionally by both—often at the cost of its own stability and sovereignty.
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE
