As of early April 2026, the US has sustained several air asset losses during the conflict with Iran, including the downing of three F-15E Strike Eagles (friendly fire). An additional F-15E was downed over western Iran on April 3, 2026.
One F-35 Lightning II aircraft, one A-10 Thunderbolt II, one E-3 Sentry AWACS, 17 MQ-9 Reaper drones, and damage to KC-135 aerial refueling tankers make it an expensive military campaign for the US.
Three Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks were also reportedly damaged that were involved in the F-15 search and rescue efforts, which were struck by Iranian fire, according to reports.
An Emirati helicopter crashed in a combat mission, killing two servicemen, Emirati officials reported. On 21 March, at least five aircraft parked at airports sustained damage from Iranian attacks. Two of these – including an Emirates Airbus A380 and a smaller Saudia Airbus A321 – were hit while parked at Dubai International Airport.
A mid-air collision killed six crew members, while an Iranian missile strike on Prince Sultan Air Base damaged another six KC-135 tankers. Iran also hit high-value US ground radars linked to the THAAD AD System, as well as other early-warning radars.
Iran’s strategy aims to create a “war of attrition” to increase costs for the US and its allies, despite US air superiority. On the other hand, Israel lost 18 slow-moving UAVs, such as the Elbit Hermes 450/900 and the IAI Eitan/Heron. Also, three unknown civilian aircraft were damaged on the ground.
The USA and Israel have flown more than 10,000 combat flights since the conflict began. It is interesting to understand why the Americans lost many more air assets vis-à-vis Israel.
Iranian Hits on Airborne US Aircraft
The Iranian Air Force was grounded or destroyed in the early air action by the USA and Israel. While a significant number of Iranian air defenses were also neutralized, enough survived to engage adversary assets.
Iranian’s have claimed to have hit F-35s, one F-15, one A-10, three helicopters, and a large number of MQ-9s in the air using ground-based air defenses. All other American assets were hit on the ground at airbases in Gulf Countries.
In view of powerful radar jamming capabilities with the USA and Israel, Iran mostly used IRST (infra-red search and track) systems to track and IR missiles to engage and shoot down aircraft. MQ-9 and Heron are subsonic, slow-moving targets and, as such, are easier to engage.
The fact that F-35 stealth aircraft could be tracked and engaged indicates the possibility of Iran using Chinese YLC-8B and YLC-8E advanced, mobile Chinese UHF-band 3D surveillance radars specifically designed to detect low-observable, stealth aircraft.
Iran may also have up-to-date intelligence from Russian satellites, often including the position of airborne aircraft.
Iranian Strikes on US Radar & Comm Systems
In the first 4 days of the war, Iran struck virtually all US military bases (or locations from which US aircraft operate) in the Gulf.
Analysis of video footage and satellite images shows that several strikes targeted radar and communication systems. Specifically, at the Al-Jufair base in Bahrain, two radar domes were destroyed by Shahed-2 drones. According to US press sources, these radar domes housed AN/GSC-52B SATCOM satellite communication systems.
In the United Arab Emirates, an area within the Al Dhafra base was hit, where several satellite antennas had previously been located. At the same time, it remains unclear whether the AN/TPY-2 radar, part of the THAAD anti-ballistic system in Al Ruwais, was also damaged.
In Kuwait, in addition to damage to some structures at the Ali al Salem base that appear to be connected to SATCOM systems, at least three radar domes at Camp Arifjan were destroyed.
At least one strike was also recorded at the Saudi Prince Sultan base, again in an area of the base that appears to be used for satellite communications and where an AN/TPY-2 radar was previously deployed.
The large AN/FPS-132 fixed-face AESA early warning and long-range anti-ballistic radar located at the US base in Al Udeid, Qatar, also appears to have been hit.
Some satellite images circulating on the internet show inconsistencies that prevent confirmation with certainty. Iranian sources also indicate damage to another AN/TPY-2 at the Muwaffaq Salti base (Jordan), but there is currently no evidence to support this.
Most strikes against these high-value radars, as well as Aerial Refuellers and AEW&C, were carried out using ballistic missiles or inexpensive Shahed drones ($50,000).
US & Israeli Approach for Strikes
The United States and Israel are engaged in a coordinated, joint military campaign (Operation Epic Fury/Rising Lion). The division of labor in air strikes was generally organized by geography, target type, and strategic capability.
Israeli Air Force focuses on targets in western and central Iran, particularly targeting ballistic missile launchers and other military assets used to strike Israel.
Israel has also focused on hitting Iranian regime sites, oil infrastructure, and nuclear-related facilities, including sites in Tehran and Karaj.
The United States Air Force/Navy operates primarily against Iranian missile launchers and assets in southern Iran, which have been used to target US bases in the Gulf region. The US has taken responsibility for targeting the entire Iranian Navy and has used long-range bombers (B-2 and later B-52s, B-1s) for heavy strikes.
Both nations are conducting intensive, ongoing strikes against Iranian infrastructure, including industrial sites, ports, and bridges. The campaign targeting strategy is to “destroy Iran’s navy and ballistic-missile forces” and prevent the weaponization of its nuclear program.
Israel alone reported over 10,000 strikes in Iran and 1,100 in Lebanon. By early March, the joint operations achieved near-complete air superiority, with Israel claiming to have destroyed 80 percent of Iran’s air defense systems. Of late, strikes have expanded to include oil storage facilities, pharmaceutical raw material units, and a key bridge near Tehran.
Israel has had years of experience in targeting ground assets in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, among others.
The Israeli Air Force has fine-tuned tactics to keep its own assets secure. This is one of the reasons that they have lost only slow-moving UAVs.
The USA also lost more aircraft in the air due to a lack of coordination with the Gulf countries, where most of its assets are located. Also, more action has shifted south near the Gulf of Hormuz, and when Iran started hitting assets in the countries that allowed housing US assets.
Securing Ground Assets by the US & Israel
Israel has been perpetually at war. Being a small country, it has been conscious of securing its assets under hardened shelters. Also, a country with a population of Bengaluru has nearly 10 Iron Dome-class AD systems, among others, such as David’s Sling and Arrow.
The USA has come to the region with a naval flotilla. It has a large number of air bases with major ones at Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base), Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base, Ahmed al-Jaber Air Base), Saudi Arabia (Prince Sultan Air Base), and Bahrain (NSA Bahrain/Sheikh Isa Air Base).
US assets in Jordan primarily focus on critical military infrastructure, including the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base and air defense systems. The US did not anticipate that Iran would start attacking Gulf countries.
Many of their radars and large air platforms were lying in the open. These assets were thus a relatively easy target. Iranians used drones and drone swarms to hit US military assets and oil facilities.
While the US Air Force and Navy have been exercising regularly with GCC countries, including “large force engagements,” the GCC countries have had almost no combat experience. There was an obvious lack of coordination between the US armed forces and the GCC counterparts.
Iran’s “Mosaic Defense” Strategy
Iran’s Mosaic Defense (Defa-e Mozaiki) is a decentralized military strategy designed to survive decapitation strikes and ensure long-term resistance by dividing the country into 31 autonomous provincial commands.
It removes dependence on a central command in Tehran, allowing local units to function independently, maintain logistical autonomy, and launch retaliatory strikes.
Key aspects include the decentralized command, formalized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) around 2008. This strategy ensures that if one “tile” (province) is destroyed or loses communication, others continue fighting.
They maintain “Operational Autonomy” with each of Iran’s 31 provinces acting as a self-contained unit with its own weapons, intelligence, and logistical support, authorized to act without instructions from central leadership.
By distributing command away from Tehran, the system makes it impossible to end the conflict with a single strike, turning a potential war into a protracted conflict.
The strategy integrates the Basij militia for urban warfare and localized defense. The doctrine leverages Iran’s terrain, mountains, and deserts to create “natural fortresses”, making conventional occupation difficult.
This doctrine was specifically developed to counter a “Shock and Awe” type attack from the United States or Israel, prioritizing long-term attrition over a short, conventional war.
What Went Wrong in US Air Strategy
The US-led air strategy against Iran has faced significant challenges despite initial projections of a quick victory.
While the campaign initially succeeded in degrading Iranian air defenses and leadership, it encountered serious operational and strategic failures as the conflict continued.
The US underestimated Iranian defenses and tactics. While official reports initially claimed all of Iran’s air defenses were destroyed, this assertion was not really true. In fact, a CNN report claims that Tehran could have 50% of its missile launchers and drones intact.
Additionally, Iranian forces successfully hid mobile air defense systems in tunnels and bunkers, allowing them to ambush US planes, proving it was not a one-sided conflict.
Clearly, the “Quick War” assumption had failed. The strategy had relied on the belief that a swift, massive aerial campaign could force a regime collapse or quick victory. This failed because Iranian conventional capabilities, while degraded, managed to endure and retaliate, turning the campaign into a long war of attrition.
Iranian strategy revolves around an asymmetric, “forward defense” approach designed to project power across the Middle East while avoiding direct, conventional war. By leveraging regional proxy forces, investing in low-cost drones, and threatening the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran seeks to challenge US/Israel influence while creating a sustainable, hard-to-hit deterrent.
Yet it managed direct retaliation against US bases. Iran successfully targeted US military installations across the region, including in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, causing significant casualties. This demonstrated that US air dominance did not equate to security on the ground.
Tehran relies heavily on inexpensive, locally produced drones like the Shahed, costing $20,000–$50,000, to overwhelm sophisticated, expensive air defenses as part of asymmetric warfare. Iran is fostering closer military ties with Russia, supplying drones in exchange for advanced technologies like the S-400 system.
Iran projects power through a network of proxies in failed or fragile states, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, PMUs in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, to move conflicts away from its own borders. Iran uses its IRGC to threaten global oil supply chains. This manifested as a “smart” selective blockade, allowing some vessels to pass while targeting those linked to the US, Israel, and their allies.
Iran has warned it will attack American and Israeli assets, including infrastructure in host nations, if its own civilian infrastructure (power plants, energy facilities) is targeted.
The US repeated mistakes from previous conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq) by relying solely on aerial destruction without a viable, clear “day-after” political strategy to replace the targeted regime.
Despite neutralizing senior leadership, the “Rally-Around-the-Flag” effect became visible. The extensive bombing campaign, including strikes that destroyed civilian infrastructure, has backfired by uniting the Iranian population behind their regime, destroying the prospects for a domestic opposition movement, and reinforcing hardliner positions.
Sustainability and resource constraints are visible. The conflict has heavily exhausted US military resources, including high-value assets like Tomahawk missiles and Patriot interceptors, creating shortages in other critical theatres like Europe and Asia. Most NATO members refused to join or help in replenishments.
Miscalculation of diplomatic/escalation risks is evident. The strategy failed to prevent regional escalation and, in fact, spurred Iran to target vital global economic assets, such as energy infrastructure in the Gulf, increasing anti-US sentiment globally.
Conclusion
In summary, the strategy failed because it assumed technological superiority would translate into a swift political victory, while failing to anticipate the resilience of Iranian defense systems and the geopolitical consequences of the destruction.
This disparity of losses between the US and Israel is not due to any inferiority in US technology or pilot skill. It stems from differences in basing, operational exposure, and strategic approach to the conflict.
The US operates from a network of large, forward-deployed bases across the Gulf — many high-value assets, including AWACS, tankers, radars (AN/TPY-2 linked to THAAD), and parked aircraft, were initially exposed or only partially hardened. Iran exploited this with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-cost Shahed drone swarms targeting these bases in the opening phases.
In contrast, Israel operates primarily from its heavily defended territory, where aircraft and critical systems benefit from hardened shelters, dispersed basing, and one of the world’s densest layered air-defense networks.
Secondly, the US has shouldered a heavier burden in the Iran war than Israel, which could explain more exposure to Iranian fire and counterattack.
Early coordination challenges with Gulf host nations, some of which lacked recent combat experience, contributed to incidents like the initial friendly-fire loss of three F-15Es over Kuwait.
Israel has concentrated on precision strikes while minimizing manned aircraft exposure over the most defended zones. The IAF has relied heavily on standoff weapons, electronic warfare, and UAVs for risky missions — accepting predictable losses of cheap drones rather than risking pilots.
Israel has been in a near-constant state of conflict for decades. Its military possesses extensive expertise in operating against integrated air defenses in contested environments. For Israel, this translates into more conservative mission planning, better integration of deception and suppression tactics, while minimizing personnel risk.
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran, fighter test pilot, and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals during his 40-year tenure in the IAF.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- He tweets @Chopsyturvey
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