China may now be perceived as the “big brother” in its growing ties with Russia, but it still acknowledges the latter’s rich war-fighting experience and is accordingly learning the Russian lessons.
The lesson that China is said to be learning most keenly is the way Russia seized Crimea in 2014 so that it could replicate that in taking over Taiwan by 2027, the deadline that Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly set.
And in this, Russia is playing the role of an inspirational teacher, apart from providing necessary weapon systems worth $584 million for the purpose, if one goes by the just leaked 800 pages of contracts and collateral materials by “the Black Moon hacktivist group” that have been vetted by the Center for Defence Reforms in Kyiv and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.
Although RUSI cautions that there is a possibility that parts of the documents have been altered or omitted, overall, the material hacked seemed genuine in its opinion.
“Based on documents obtained by hackers from the Black Moon group, experts from the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI) have provided a factual analysis and forecast of the danger posed by the Russian-Chinese project aimed at preparing an airborne assault by the Chinese army on Taiwan in 2027,” the hacking group said in a post to X.
Apparently, a document dated September 2024 details timelines for payments to Russia and Russian delivery. Stages one and two — analysis of technical specifications, software modifications, and equipment manufacturing — have been completed, according to that document.
The hacked agreements provide for the sale by Russia to China of:
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37 BMD-4M, light amphibious assault vehicles with a 100 mm gun and 30 mm automatic cannon.
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11 Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious anti-tank self-propelled guns with a 125 mm cannon.
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11 BTR-MDM ‘Rakushka’ airborne armoured personnel carriers.
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Several Rubin command and observation vehicles and KSHM-E command vehicles.
The agreements, as inferred by RUSI experts Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Dr. Jack Watling, stipulate that all armoured vehicles must be equipped with Chinese communication and command and control suites, and must undergo verification of their electromagnetic compatibility with Russian electronic equipment.
This is reportedly due to the need to maintain interoperability with other Chinese units. The Russians are supposed to prepare the equipment and software for the use of Chinese ammunition.
The agreements also require Russia to train a battalion of Chinese paratroopers in employing the equipment. Armored vehicle drivers will be trained at the Kurganmashzavod base, and the crews of KMN command and observation vehicles, as well as Sprut anti-tank guns, will be trained in Penza at JSC NPP Rubin.
After completing courses on training equipment and simulators, the collective training of the Chinese airborne battalion will be carried out at training grounds in China. Here, Russian instructors are tasked with preparing the battalion for landing, fire control, and maneuvering as part of an airborne unit.
The Russians are also transferring the Rheostat airborne artillery command and observation vehicle and the Orlan-10 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicles. A Centre for Technical Maintenance and Repair of Russian Equipment will be established in China, to which all necessary technical documentation will be transferred. This will allow China to undertake the production and modernisation of these capabilities in the future.
In addition, the agreements provide for the transfer of special-purpose parachute systems ‘Dalnolyot’, which are designed for inserting loads of up to 190 kg from an altitude of up to 32,000 feet, achieving a range of between 30-80 km depending on load.
It has also been said that Russia is equipping and training Chinese special forces groups to penetrate the territory of other countries without being noticed, offering offensive options against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other island states in the region.
Experts find it to be obvious that Russia is helping to train and equip Chinese airborne forces in assault tactics and hybrid warfare that will play the most crucial role in any campaign against Taiwan.
China is said to be realizing the operational challenge for its forces in successfully landing with a sufficient mass of troops, establishing a lodgement, and building up a force that can defeat the Taiwanese military by seizing vital ground before Taiwan mobilizes its forces. And that is because the beaches suitable for amphibious landing in Taiwan are limited.
Therefore, the inference is that air assault will play an important role if China were to attack the island nation. And this was something that Russia did in Crimea in 2014 in its covert operation. Unmarked Russian paratroopers secured key airfields such as Belbek in Sevastopol before reinforcements arrived by air.
And now, Russian instructors are reportedly training Chinese PLA units in airborne operations designed to camouflage invasion forces, particularly in areas such as clandestine high-altitude drops and covert parachute insertions of special forces.
Once on the ground, these teams could sabotage air defenses and disrupt logistics, paving the way for massed airborne and naval landings, it is said. Accordingly, cyber and electronic warfare, drone swarms, and decoys would be employed to overwhelm defenders.
It is thus understandable why the systems, particularly the hardware equipment that Russia is providing to China, as revealed in the hacked documents, are suitable for the Airborne Corps.
These are compatible with systems like Russian-built Il-76/78 aircraft equipped with PBS-955M/957, MKS-350-14M, and APSDG-250 landing and parachute platform equipment, which is used for landing vehicles in a train.
The documents discuss using heavy transport aircraft equipped with special “train-drop” systems that enable armoured vehicles to be landed in sequence along a runway before the planes quickly depart, as well as training Chinese crews for these operations.
As Danylyuk and Watling explain, “ If the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, supported in a Joint Firepower Campaign, can successfully suppress Taiwanese air defences, then air manoeuvre offers the fastest means of transferring combat power onto Taiwan, and spreading operations across an expanded area. Helicopters offer the most flexible means of deploying troops, but light infantry, unsupported by armour and fires, will necessarily struggle to hold their objectives against a mechanised adversary, as Russian airborne troops found to their detriment at Hostomel. The capacity to airdrop armour vehicles, therefore, on golf courses, or other areas of open and firm ground near Taiwan’s ports and airfields, would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power and threaten seizure of these facilities to clear a path for the landing of follow-on forces”.
They also seem to make a lot of sense by pointing out that “the greatest value of the deal to the PLA, however, is most likely in the training and the procedures for command and control of airborne forces, as Russia’s airborne forces have combat experience, while the PLA does not.
The requirement for a battalion’s worth of equipment – with an expanded number of C2 platforms – likely speaks to the desire to conduct battalion-scale collective training, and since the Russians are to deliver it, this must be conducted on Russian vehicles”.
However, all said and done, there is no guarantee of success for the Russian formula in Crimea if applied in Taiwan. And that is because Taiwan is not Crimea. The Russian-speaking majority in Crimea welcomed being part of Russia again, which the late Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had transferred to Ukraine in 1954 for administrative convenience and to celebrate the 300th anniversary of “the Merger” of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. And that at a time when the Soviet Union or the USSR was live and kicking. No wonder the overwhelming majority in Crimea welcomed the Russian troops when they landed in 2014.
On the contrary, though ethnic Han Chinese constitute 98% of Taiwan’s population, the overwhelming majority of them do not like to be part of Communist China. Therefore, the invading Chinese or PLA forces will not receive local support when they land on the island.
Secondly, unlike the situation in Crimea, the Taiwanese not only have international backing but also have kept themselves prepared on how to defend against any Chinese military attack.
They regularly tailor their military exercises, including those in July when Taiwanese troops rehearsed repelling the PLA attack. In July, its annual drills rehearsed shooting down a simulated Chinese airborne attack on Taoyuan International Airport, a site Chinese military commentators have spotlighted as pivotal for breaching defenses.
The Army’s 269th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was mobilized for the drill to protect Taiwan’s primary international gateway in Taoyuan’s Dayuan District, which was part of the Han Kuang military exercises.
Besides, U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictability and transactional foreign policy notwithstanding, the fact remains that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s interim National Defense Strategic Guidance has reportedly directed the military to prioritize Taiwan, signaling Washington’s intent to center its defense planning on the threat perceived from the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) and there are other leading Indo-Pacific powers like Japan and Australia whose support Taiwan will continue to enjoy.
Thirdly, any Chinese attack on Taiwan will have serious economic fallout. It would likely disrupt China’s global shipping in the South China Sea. A conflict would threaten China’s trillion-dollar trade, especially through chokepoints like the Taiwan Strait and the Strait of Malacca. Further, an invasion would risk provoking international economic sanctions against Beijing.
However, despite the aforementioned limiting factors regarding a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the hacked documents reveal ever-increasing defense collaborations between Beijing and Moscow, something that was previously unthinkable, given their historical rivalry.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
