By Imran Khurshid, PhD
By courting Beijing under a new G2 framework, Trump may be handing China the leadership mantle the U.S. once proudly held. What he calls “peace and success” could mark the twilight of American dominance.
In a surprising turn of events, U.S. President Donald Trump recently hinted at reviving a possible G2 arrangement with China. Ahead of his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Trump posted on Truth Social:
“THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”
Following the meeting, he declared:
“My G2 meeting with President Xi of China was a great one for both of our countries. This meeting will lead to everlasting peace and success. God bless both China and the USA!”
Beijing swiftly welcomed Trump’s framing of the summit as a “G2 meeting,” with the Chinese Foreign Ministry declaring that both nations could “jointly work for mutual benefit and global good.” China’s response underscored its long-standing advocacy for shared global leadership with Washington—a subtle move to legitimize its co-equal status on the world stage.
The Busan meeting marks a significant departure from the rhetoric that once defined U.S. policy toward China and the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, Trump’s statements made no mention of traditional American talking points such as freedom of navigation, the rules-based international order, Indo-Pacific stability, or Taiwan—issues that previously formed the core of Washington’s diplomatic posture.
Even more striking was the absence of any reference to China’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil—a matter for which the Trump administration has imposed sanctions even on its close strategic partner, India—revealing a conspicuous inconsistency in the U.S. approach. Instead, the language now revolves around the balance of power rather than a rules-based order, indirectly signaling a potential strategic realignment.
Whether this represents a deliberate recalibration or merely a transactional ploy to secure economic gains remains unclear. Yet when a sitting U.S. president invokes “G2,” the symbolism alone carries profound geopolitical consequences.
Strategic Accommodation
This evolving orientation was evident in the official U.S. briefings and post-meeting summaries. The White House highlighted trade-related understandings, including Washington’s decision to halve the 20 percent tariff on Chinese goods related to fentanyl precursor chemicals—reducing the overall tariff rate on Chinese imports to about 47 percent—and China’s commitment to a one-year pause on export restrictions of rare-earth minerals and magnets.
It also announced the easing of certain technology export restrictions on non-military-grade semiconductor components, alongside a plan to reopen select trade and investment channels suspended since 2020. Yet there was no mention of security-related concerns such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, or human rights—issues that were once central to U.S. policy discussions.
As the Associated Press noted, “the one-hour-and-forty-minute meeting’s agenda appears not to have touched on some perennial problems such as tensions over the self-governed island of Taiwan.”
Adding weight to this shift, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, speaking at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, remarked that U.S.–China relations “have never been better.” Referring to Trump’s remarks, he noted that the President had described his Busan engagement with Xi Jinping as a “historic G2 meeting” that “set the tone for lasting peace and success for both countries.”
He further announced that both sides had agreed to establish military-to-military communication channels to “deconflict and de-escalate any problems that arise.”
Addressing ASEAN nations, however, Hegseth did caution that “China’s sweeping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea fly in the face of their commitments to resolve disputes peacefully,” warning that Beijing “must not be allowed to dominate you or anybody else.” Yet this appeared largely as a symbolic and damage-control effort—an attempt to reassure anxious regional partners rather than a genuine balancing move.
Meanwhile, U.S. social media has been abuzz with speculative maps depicting a hypothetical G2 division of global influence—with Washington and Beijing each leading distinct spheres, and Europe shown as a neutral or intermediary zone.
These visuals have been widely circulating on Reddit and X. Newsweek recently reported on these maps, while a Carnegie Endowment analysis warned that, under Trump’s evolving foreign policy vision, the world risks reverting to competing spheres of influence led by the U.S., China, and Russia, leaving Europe uncertain about its future role.
Strategic Blunder Revisited
During his first term, President Trump was known for his hardline stance on China. It was under his administration that the Quad was revived, China was officially listed as a strategic rival in the National Security Strategy (2017), and the Indo-Pacific framework was formally adopted to counter Beijing’s growing influence.
However, the Trump of today appears to view China primarily through an economic lens, downplaying the strategic competition that had defined U.S.-China relations for the past decade. This shift could prove perilous for the U.S. and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Trump’s current approach mirrors President Barack Obama’s early attempts to forge a cooperative arrangement with China—an informal G2 concept that envisioned shared responsibility for global governance.
In 2009, President Obama emphasized that “the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century,” highlighting the need for both countries to work together on global challenges. However, as China began asserting its influence more aggressively in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, Washington was forced to recalibrate.
The Obama administration responded by launching the “Rebalance to Asia” strategy in 2011, aimed at reinforcing America’s diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the Indo-Pacific to counter Beijing’s growing assertiveness.
By re-engaging China on G2 terms, Trump risks committing the same strategic blunder — underestimating China’s long-term ambitions while alienating U.S. allies and partners in Asia and beyond.
Trump’s second-term foreign policy demonstrates a lack of geostrategic vision. His focus remains narrowly on extracting trade concessions from both allies and adversaries. Through his actions, he is dismantling the very network of alliances and institutions that have sustained U.S. global dominance since World War II.
From withdrawing the U.S. from multilateral institutions and global initiatives to adopting an overtly transactional approach to diplomacy, Trump’s policies are accelerating America’s decline. The global governance structures that the U.S. once designed — the United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, and various alliance frameworks — are now being undermined by Washington itself, paving the way for China to expand its influence.
Implications
If the proposed G2 arrangement materializes, it could mark the end of U.S. hegemony and herald a new era of Chinese predominance in the Indo-Pacific. The consequences would be profound — particularly for countries in the Indo-Pacific.
A U.S.–China condominium would marginalize smaller and middle powers, weaken regional security arrangements, and effectively place China in a position of dominance over its periphery.
The implications would extend to every major flashpoint: the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and even India’s northern borders. They would also encompass economic frameworks, technological ecosystems, and governance norms in digital and maritime domains — collectively shifting the balance of power decisively in China’s favour, with far-reaching repercussions.
For Washington’s traditional allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, such a development would raise existential questions. The very foundation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which sought to preserve a free, open, and balanced regional order, would crumble under the weight of this bilateral understanding.
A Crisis Of Trust & The Coming Decline
Trump’s transactionalism — from Europe to Asia — is steadily eroding that trust. Allies who once stood shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. now view Washington with uncertainty. A Pew Research Center report published in June 2025 revealed that more than half of adults across 19 of 24 surveyed nations expressed little or no confidence in U.S. global leadership, reflecting a growing credibility gap among America’s traditional partners.
By demanding immediate concessions and pursuing purely transactional deals, Trump places allies in difficult and embarrassing positions, often compelling them to make politically costly compromises. His relentless pressure even contributed to Japan’s political turmoil, with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigning in September 2025 amid rising public unease over perceived U.S. coercion.
Such developments underscore how Trump’s approach is weakening, rather than reinforcing, the very alliances that have long underpinned America’s global power.
Ironically, in trying to “Make America Great Again,” Trump may be engineering its decline. Much like Mikhail Gorbachev, whose well-intentioned reforms hastened the Soviet Union’s collapse, Trump risks becoming the Gorbachev of the United States—a leader whose policies, meant to restore power, instead accelerate strategic unravelling.
By alienating allies, undermining partnerships, and retreating from multilateral institutions, Trump is dismantling the architecture that sustained U.S. global leadership for decades. As Carnegie analysts warn, Washington’s withdrawal from global governance has created “a vacuum that others—especially China—are eager to fill.” Beijing, in turn, is capitalizing on every opening, expanding its influence through trade, infrastructure, and institutional networks.
At home, Trump’s politics of exclusion, division, and hate are deepening societal fractures and corroding the moral foundations of American democracy—further weakening the very strength he claims to defend. Once an exclusionary ideology penetrates society through sustained social engineering, it becomes self-sustaining and difficult to reverse, threatening the cohesion of the American polity itself.
If the G2 concept truly takes shape, it will not represent stability but a tectonic shift in the international order. For the Indo-Pacific, it could mark the end of American strategic primacy and the rise of a China-centric order. Trump’s short-term economic pragmatism, devoid of strategic foresight, may ultimately transform what he calls “peace and success” into a turning point of American decline and China’s ascendancy.
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
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