A quiet but important deviation in French policy toward East Africa is unfolding. It could potentially rank among the most consequential strategic recalibrations France has undertaken in Africa in the past two decades.
This shift has been shaped less by ambition than by necessity.
Over the last several years, France has suffered serious setbacks in the post-colonial spaces where it once exercised unquestioned influence in West Africa.
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Chad have led to the closure or expulsion of French military bases and training missions.
What were once presented as stabilising counterterrorism interventions are now widely seen by local populations as symbols of neo-colonial overreach.
Paris has been forced to reconsider not only where it engages in Africa, but how.
In 2025, France’s standing in much of Francophone West Africa is at its lowest point since independence. Popular resentment, military coups, and the growing appeal of alternative security partners, such as Russia, have called into question the value of the old French model of intervention.
Yet while one chapter of French engagement in Africa appears to be closing, another is tentatively opening in the east.
Nowhere is this more obvious than in Kenya, which is fast becoming Paris’s preferred ally in East Africa.
The ratification process of the first-ever France–Kenya Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) marks a clear departure from the Sahelian model that defined French security policy for nearly two decades.
Rather than a unilateral counterterrorism intervention, the DCA envisages a framework for partnership, focused on training, maritime security, intelligence sharing, and peace support operations.
Some analysts see this as the symbolic end of one African era for France and the cautious beginning of another.
From the Sahel to the Swahili Coast
France’s repositioning was shaped by its withdrawal from the Sahel.
Operations Serval and Barkhane, once seen as responses to jihadist threats, gradually became the subject of popular unhappiness.
French troops were viewed not as partners but as an agency enforcing the views of unpopular governments. Russia, by contrast, proved adept at filling the vacuum. Its security cooperation came with few conditions, less moralising, and an ability to engage regimes with weak popular mandates.
For fragile governments under pressure, that bargain was often appealing. France, constrained by its own political culture and international expectations, found itself outmanoeuvred.
East Africa presents a fundamentally different environment. Kenya is not a country recovering from a series of military coups, nor is it governed by a junta seeking external validation. It has a stable, elected government with growing regional influence.
Kenya does not have a legacy of French colonialism. Unlike Mali or Niger, there is no historical memory of French rule to complicate engagement. This gives Paris a degree of political space it no longer enjoys in much of the Sahel.
At the same time, Kenya is not approaching France as a dependent or a client. Nairobi has long been embedded in the Western security ecosystem through deep ties with the United Kingdom and the United States.
French engagement is therefore not a replacement for existing partnerships, but a diversification. In Kenyan strategic thinking, France is a complement, not an alternative to Washington and London.
The Defence Cooperation Agreement
The France–Kenya agreement, currently under debate in Kenya’s National Assembly, provides a structured framework for collaboration across several domains, including intelligence sharing, maritime security, military training, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance.
It seeks an administrative structure and rules to govern the presence of visiting French forces in Kenya, including logistical support and legal protection.
It is these protective provisions, especiallythose relating to immunity and jurisdiction, that have generated controversy. Some Kenyan legislators have called for wider public opinion before approval, reflecting the country’s democratic culture and sensitivity to national issues.
This debate itself is significant.
Unlike in parts of the Sahel, foreign military agreements in Kenya are not quietly pushed through; they are scrutinised, contested, and publicly discussed.
Operationally, the DCA places a strong focus on maritime collaboration. This includes training for the Kenyan Navy, joint exercises for operational readiness, and efforts to improve maritime domain awareness.
More frequent visits by French naval vessels to Mombasa would expose Kenya to the broader strategic dynamics of the western Indian Ocean, a space increasingly shaped by piracy, illicit trafficking, and intensifying competition with China.
Defence Cabinet Secretary, Soipan Tuya, has publicly acknowledged France’s long-standing contributions to Kenya’s military training and peace initiatives.
From the French perspective, the agreement is framed as part of a shared commitment to regional stability and sustainable peace. The language is deliberately different from that used during the height of France’s Sahel interventions—less directive, more collaborative.
Kenya’s Regional Ambitions
For Kenya, the DCA fits into a broader new understanding of its regional role. Nairobi increasingly sees itself as a creator of security policy rather than merely a recipient of security guarantees.
This is particularly evident in Somalia, where Kenya has long been involved militarily and diplomatically. As US attention to Africa—and to Somalia specifically—has become more episodic, Kenya views itself as a stabilising bulwark in the Horn of Africa.
Kenya is prepared to shoulder greater responsibility in Somalia and has signalled willingness to offer expanded facilities for US deployments in the region. At the same time, it is seeking to reshape the regional security architecture through more assertive diplomacy.
Its role within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is notable. Nairobi is no longer content to be a participant; it wants to be an agenda-setter.
Historically, Kenya and Ethiopia were the twin pillars of IGAD’s engagement in Somalia, particularly in countering Al-Shabaab. Today, that partnership is frayed.
Ethiopian challenges, the Tigray conflict, fraught relations with Eritrea, tensions with Sudan, and its ambition to secure access to the Red Sea,have altered its regional focus. Kenya does not share Ethiopia’s urgency on Red Sea access, but the two countries find some convergence on issues such as Somaliland’s search for greater autonomy.
In this complex landscape, France offers Kenya a partner with credible maritime capabilities and global reach, but without the baggage of a hegemonic agenda. Paris, in turn, sees Kenya’s geography, at the edge of the Horn and astride the Indian Ocean, as strategically invaluable.
France’s Broader East African Footprint
France’s turn to East Africa is not an isolated experiment. It already maintains a significant military presence in Djibouti—its former colony—alongside US and Chinese bases.
It retains sovereignty over Mayotte in the Comoros archipelago, a point of persistent regional contention. French companies also have substantial stakes in Mozambique’s gas sector, particularly in Cabo Delgado, where an insurgency threatened major investments.
When the Southern African Development Community wavered in responding to that insurgency, France played a key role behind the scenes in enabling the rapid deployment of Rwandan forces, which proved decisive.
These episodes underline that France has never truly left the region. What is changing is the form of its engagement.
Unlike in Mozambique, where security cooperation has remained indirect, France sees Kenya as a candidate for a more structured and enduring partnership. This reflects confidence not only in Kenya’s stability, but in its political legitimacy.
The Indo-Pacific Dimension
France’s East African outreach is also linked to its broader Indo-Pacific strategy, which \stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to the Pacific Islands.
In this vision, East and Southern Africa are not peripheral, but integral to maritime security and trade flows. Here, France’s interests increasingly align with India’s.
Paris recognises India’s deep imprint in East Africa, from development cooperation and long-standing commercial ties to regular naval engagement in the western Indian Ocean.
Analysts suggest that France is likely to work more closely with India and possibly Germany to invigorate its East African partnerships through a “middle powers” framework that avoids the zero-sum rivalries of great-power competition.
India’s approach, emphasising institution-building over direct intervention, resonates with Kenya’s preferences.
The convergence of French, Indian, and Kenyan interests around maritime security, capacity-building, and regional stability creates the possibility of a genuinely multilateral model—very different from France’s 20th-century Africa policy.
A Test of Learning and Adaptation
The France-Kenya pact signals a potential change in mindset. While French involvement in West Africa often relied on military action, the Kenyan approach is slower, more consultative, and constrained by accountability.
This makes the partnership challenging, but possibly more sustainable.
France must convince Kenya’s National Assembly that the legal protections for visiting troops are intended to avoid interference in local politics and to allow regional deployments only when needed.
Kenyan public opinion is much more assertive than that of many Sahelian states. Ultimately, France’s success in re-engaging with Africa won’t hinge solely on signing the DCA; it will depend on whether Paris can genuinely build a sincere partnership focused on training, shared goals, and long-term capacity-building rather than quick security fixes.
In some ways, the Kenya-France model goes beyond a mere shift eastward.
It supports African agency. Kenya is choosing its partners, and France is adjusting to this reality. Other African countries are watching closely and cautiously.
The old West African approach reflected a 20th-century mindset focused on French economic and security needs. East Africa, on the other hand, requires patience, humility, and mutual respect.
Whether Paris has truly learned from the past decade remains uncertain. However, the pivot to Nairobi, along with engagement with India and Germany, suggests that France is at least making a sincere effort.
- Gurjit Singh is a former Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union Chair, CII Task Force on Trilateral Cooperation in Africa, Professor, IIT Indore.
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