May 20, 2025: An Iskander-M missile struck a field training camp of the 1st Separate Special Forces Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russian sources claim the strike resulted in the deaths of 70 Ukrainian servicemen, including 20 instructors.
May 22, 2025: Iskander-M missiles targeted a Patriot air defense missile system position near the village of Ordzhonikidze in the Dnipropetrovsk region. According to reports, the strike destroyed the AN/MPQ-65 multifunctional radar, the combat control cabin, and two Patriot missile launchers.
May 23, 2025: Iskander missiles hit a container ship reportedly carrying military equipment to the port of Odesa, as well as a container warehouse in the port. The ship was said to be transporting around 100 containers of military cargo, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ammunition.
On May 24 and 25, 2025, Russia pummeled Ukraine with its most intense aerial assaults since the war began, unleashing a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. The missile barrages included Iskander-M and potentially KN-23 ballistic missiles, targeting critical infrastructure and air defense systems, most notably a Patriot missile battery near Dnipropetrovsk.
Following the massive drone and missile attack on Kyiv on May 24, Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat claimed that Russia has upgraded its ballistic missiles with radar decoys and evasive maneuvering, making them harder to intercept, even for advanced Patriot systems.
The Kyiv Independent quoted Ihnat as saying: “It complicates (the interception), but doesn’t make it impossible. I think our partners are already working to improve the system’s capabilities.”
He elaborated: “The flight of a ballistic missile along such a quasi-ballistic trajectory—when it doesn’t just fly in a straight line like it’s falling, but actually performs maneuvers in flight—makes it more difficult for the Patriot system, which calculates the interception point using software, to predict exactly where the missile will be.”
Dissecting Ihant’s Claim
Ihnat’s statement is intriguing because the Iskander-M, operational since the early 2000s, has always incorporated advanced countermeasures designed to defeat missile defenses, including:
1. Quasi-Ballistic Trajectory
2. In-flight maneuvering
3. Stealth shaping
4. Radar Decoys
These features were integral to the Iskander-M’s design from the outset and are not recent upgrades.
As Ihnat acknowledged, the combination of high speed, quasi-ballistic flight, and terminal maneuvering makes the missile very difficult to intercept.
The Iskander’s decoys, ejected at high altitudes or during the terminal phase, create false radar signatures that confuse or saturate enemy systems, mimicking the missile’s radar cross-section (RCS) to evade interceptors like the Patriot PAC-3 or THAAD.
What prompted Ihnat to attribute Russian missile penetration success to new upgrades remains unclear.
Iskander-M Predecessor
It’s worth noting that the Iskander-M (9K720) evolved from the Oka (OTR-23 “Spider”) missile of the 1970s–80s.
The Oka had a range of ~400 km and featured excellent accuracy for its time (30–50 meters CEP), using inertial navigation (INS) coupled with terminal radar or optical correlation guidance and digital terrain matching (akin to TERCOM).
However, it lacked the sophisticated countermeasures of the Iskander-M, such as decoys and advanced maneuvering.
The Oka system was eliminated under the INF Treaty, and all missiles were destroyed under international supervision. Thus, it is highly unlikely that any Iskander-M predecessor has been used in the current conflict.
Iskander-E (Export Version)
The Iskander-M’s export version, Iskander-E, is limited to a 280 km range under MTCR guidelines.
Its full capabilities remain classified, but it’s plausible that countermeasures like maneuvering and decoy deployment are reduced. However, it is highly unlikely that Russian forces have been using the downgraded Iskander-E in Ukraine.
North Korea’s KN-23
Ihnat claimed that six out of nine ballistic missiles launched at Kyiv on May 24—comprising Iskander-M and KN-23—were successfully intercepted.
“Two-thirds is a high figure,” he noted. “But we know (Russia) is improving its ballistic weapons.”
Taking Ihnat’s shootdown claim at face value, it’s plausible that his comments about missile upgrades were aimed at the KN-23, not the Iskander-M. This suggests he was alluding to Russian modifications of the North Korean missile.
The KN-23, sometimes dubbed the “North Korean Iskander” due to its external resemblance, is a different beast.
North Korea developed it independently, without direct Russian assistance. The KN-23 is larger, heavier, and less accurate (~30–50 meters CEP vs. 5–7 meters for Iskander-M). It features limited terminal maneuvering to evade regional air defenses but lacks decoy deployment.
Could Russia Be Enhancing The KN-23?
It’s possible Russia has modified the KN-23, similar to how it upgraded the Geran-2 drones acquired from Iran.
Russia has steadily enhanced the Gerans, improving performance, warhead size, navigation accuracy, and electronic warfare (EW) resistance. They now feature more powerful engines, fly at 3 km AGL to avoid mobile air defenses, and carry the Kometa SATNAV module with 12–16 antenna elements for better EW resilience. Warheads have grown from 50 kg to 90 kg..
There are reports that some Geran variants feature E/O sensors instead of warheads. They identify and geolocate targets and relay their coordinates to other Gerans that are equipped with 90 kg explosive warheads for precision attacks.
Similar tweaks to the KN-23—improving maneuverability, decoy capability, or navigation—are plausible and could eventually be shared with North Korea as part of a quid pro quo.
Conclusion
Due to the fire damage to these targets, a secondary detonation of the ammunition and containers unloaded onto the pier occurred, as well as a strong fire.
Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat’s claims likely refer to Russian modifications to the KN-23, not the Iskander-M, which has always had sophisticated countermeasures.
Of course, there’s also the possibility that these statements serve as a narrative cover for Ukraine’s air defense systems’ failures in preventing recent missile strikes.
Given that the Iskander-M is among the most lethal weapons in Russia’s arsenal, upgrading the KN-23 to match its capabilities would significantly boost Russia’s offensive power.
The independent production infrastructure of the KN-23 in North Korea would allow Russian forces to use difficult-to-intercept missiles like the Iskander-M and KN-23 more freely.
