On June 1, the world witnessed the Kalashnikov moment of Drone Warfare. While military watchers had been warning for some time that drone warfare had arrived, if anyone had any doubts, they were cleared in the spectacular Ukrainian drone attack on Russian airbases that might have knocked out 34% of its long-range strategic bomber fleet.
By smuggling 117 low-cost FPV drones into Russia, Ukraine claims that it has destroyed 41 Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-95, Tu-160, Tu-22, and AEW&C A-50.
Kyiv claims that Russian losses amount to over USD 7 billion.
However, ever since the spectacular videos of the flimsy, low-cost drones rising vertically from trucks and destroying strategic bombers parked in open in Russian air bases appeared on social media, many people are questioning why long-range bombers, worth millions of dollars and part of the Russian nuclear triad, were parked in the open like sitting ducks with little to no protection?
Moreover, long-range bombers like the Tu-22 and Tu-95 are Soviet-era legacy aircraft that are no longer in production, which enhances their strategic value and makes replacement nearly impossible.
Despite this strategic significance, why these high-value targets were not parked in shelters is a question that is bewildering many.
In fact, rather than being parked in shelters or under well-protected concrete structures, these aircraft were parked in plain sight of satellites, on open tarmac in clearly marked bays, making them easily detectable by US/NATO spy satellites.
As strange as it may sound, Russian bombers could have been parked in the open for exactly this reason: so that they can be spotted or detected by US satellites.
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian strikes, many people, including military veterans, pointed out on social media that nuclear-capable bombers are to be parked in the open under the obligations of a bilateral treaty with the US.
New START Treaty & Implications For Heavy Bombers
Former US Army lieutenant general Michael Flynn, who also served as the 24th national security advisor under the first Trump administration, noted that the Russian bombers could have been parked in the open due to nuclear treaty obligations.
“FYI, those bombers that were hit HAVE to be out in full view due to nuclear treaty obligations. Zelenskyy took advantage of that,” General Flynn noted on X.
His post generated heated discussions on social media about whether Russian obligations under a bilateral treaty with the US might have helped Ukraine in targeting the Russian strategic bombers.
The nuclear treaty General Flynn was referring to was the New START Treaty signed between the US and Russia in 2010.
The bilateral treaty was signed to reduce and limit strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, enhancing global security and stability. Signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, it replaced the expired START I treaty and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
The treaty aimed to reduce nuclear arsenals and enhance verification and transparency.
It set verifiable limits, capping deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers at 700, and total deployed and non-deployed launchers at 800.
The treaty also established a robust inspection and verification regime, including on-site inspections, data exchanges, and telemetry sharing, to ensure compliance and build trust between the two nations, which hold over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
The treaty covers ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95 are both covered under the category of heavy bombers and are mentioned explicitly in the treaty.
Article 8, clause C of the treaty states that existing types of heavy bombers are:
- For the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-IB, and B-2A.
- For the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.
Further, Article IV of the treaty states that
Each Party shall:
(a) Deploy launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) Deploy heavy bombers only at air bases.
There are many other restrictions on Heavy bombers in the treaty. For instance:
“Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.”
“Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.”
Also, “Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.”
Under the treaty, both parties also need to release data on deployed nuclear warheads on strategic bombers, as well as on non-deployed strategic bombers.
For the sake of verification and transparency, both parties were given the right to inspect each other’s nuclear-capable assets. The inspection involves both on-site and off-site inspections.
It is clear that under this treaty, both sides have to release data on the number of nuclear-capable heavy bombers, as well as on their locations. Furthermore, there are restrictions on where these heavy bombers can or cannot be placed. Both parties have the right to inspect and verify the authenticity of the provided data.
The protocols for inspection further state that “heavy bombers shall be photographed without tarpaulins or covers.”
Another important clause in the treaty puts the obligation for “Non‑Interference with National Technical Means (NTM).”
“The treaty permits the use of national technical means of verification (e.g., satellites) in a manner consistent with international law, and contains explicit provisions that prohibit interference with NTM and the use of concealment measures that may impede monitoring by NTM.”
The verification by means of satellites meant that the heavy bombers were often parked in the open, in full glare of spy satellites.
So, while the treaty does not explicitly demand that the heavy bombers be parked outside, this became a usual practice.
“Russia, like the US, often leaves long-range bombers parked outside and easily visible, both for operational reasons and as part of nuclear-treaty obligations,” the Wall Street Journal reported.
The treaty also means that the data on the number of heavy bombers and their location is often publicly available.
However, it is worth noting that Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty in February 2023. Still, the old treaty will remain in force, at least legally, until February 5, 2026.
So, it is clear that Russia was not obligated to park its heavy bombers in the open. However, the terms of the treaty and its complex inspection protocols meant that it became the usual practice.
In fact, not just Russia, even the US often parks its strategic bombers in the open.
The spectacular Ukrainian attack and the devastating blow it has delivered to the Russian heavy bomber fleet are a wake-up call not just to Moscow but to the US as well.
“Very costly U.S. Strategic Bombers can be taken out in the same way by anyone with access to inexpensive drones, delivery trucks, explosives, and a bit of technical knowledge (not good and new tactics will now have to be developed).”
“People, and especially world leaders, need to realize the global implications to such an operation as Ukraine just pulled off,” former US General Flynn warned in his post.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR.
- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
