Diplomatic ties are rarely just symbolic. In South Asia, they increasingly act as entry points for deeper shifts in strategy, economics, and security.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once presented as a purely developmental project, has become one of the strongest forces remapping the region’s balance of power.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Bangladesh, a country whose geography, politics, and economic vulnerabilities are making it central to Beijing’s long-term game plan.
For India, this evolving landscape raises questions that go far beyond infrastructure projects. It is about whether South Asia itself is drifting into a China-shaped order.
From Strategic Partnership To Strategic Dependence
China and Bangladesh formally established diplomatic ties in 1975, but the relationship remained limited for several decades.
It was Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to Dhaka that marked a turning point. The visit elevated relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership” and firmly integrated Bangladesh into the BRI framework.
Since then, Chinese financing has poured into various infrastructure projects, including the Padma Rail link, the Payra deep-sea port, the Dhaka–Chittagong railway, and major power plants.
A 2023 ‘AidData’ report estimated that Bangladesh owed China around $6.1 billion, making Beijing its fourth largest source of foreign loans. That figure has grown since. In March 2025 alone, China lent another $2.1 billion, while also easing repayment terms by extending loan maturities from 20 to 30 years.
On paper, these loans have brought bridges, ports, and power plants. But they have also deepened Dhaka’s financial dependence.
Critics warn of a potential “debt trap,” citing Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, which fell into Chinese control when Colombo was unable to meet its obligations.
Proponents argue that Chinese financing delivers speed and scale unmatched by other lenders. What is clear is that China’s influence is no longer confined to economics; it is seeping into Bangladesh’s politics and foreign policy choices.
The Political Shift After Hasina
The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 marked another significant turning point. Hasina, despite her authoritarian streak and her tense moments with New Delhi, had always balanced China’s courtship with a working relationship with India.
Her decision to seek refuge in India after being displaced demonstrated that, at the very least, she valued the historic bond between the two countries.
Her successor, interim chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, has steered Dhaka in a different direction. Yunus has openly courted China, calling Bangladesh “the guardian of the ocean in this region” during a March 2025 visit to Beijing, and inviting further Chinese investment.
Public opinion has also shifted. A June 2025 ‘Chatham House’ survey found that 75% of Bangladeshis viewed China favourably, while only 11% felt the same about India.
Years of anti-Hasina propaganda, often portraying her as propped up by New Delhi, appear to have spilled over into broader anti-India sentiment.
For India, this combination of political realignment, economic fragility, and public opinion tilting toward Beijing creates an environment where its influence in Dhaka is shrinking.
China, Pakistan & Bangladesh: An Emerging Triangle
Bangladesh’s drift toward China is concerning enough, but when paired with its renewed closeness to Pakistan, the picture becomes more troubling for India.
After decades of estrangement following the 1971 Liberation War, Dhaka and Islamabad are reconnecting. In early 2025, the Bangladesh Navy participated in Aman 2025, a multinational naval exercise held in Karachi, marking its return after a 12-year hiatus.
Just a month earlier, a high-level Bangladeshi military delegation met Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. Trade, too, has restarted. In February 2025, the two countries resumed direct commerce for the first time since independence, with Bangladesh agreeing to purchase 50,000 tonnes of Pakistani rice.
These developments are happening against the backdrop of China’s firm grip on Pakistan through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
If Bangladesh continues down this path, India could face a China–Pakistan–Bangladesh axis emerging on its doorstep. General Anil Chauhan, India’s Chief of Defence Staff, has already flagged this convergence as a pressing national security concern.
Attempt To Replace SAARC
The geopolitical reshaping is not just about bilateral ties. China and Pakistan are now pushing for a new regional bloc to replace the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which has been dormant since 2016 after India and others boycotted a planned summit in Islamabad following the Uri terror attack.
On June 19, 2025, Bangladesh participated in a meeting in Kunming, China, where this new grouping was discussed. Reports suggest that Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Afghanistan may also be invited to join.
By creating an alternative to SAARC, Beijing and Islamabad aim to isolate India and establish a forum where China, rather than New Delhi, sits at the centre of South Asian integration.
For India, this strikes at the heart of its regional diplomacy. SAARC was founded in Dhaka in 1985, with India as a natural leader. It’s weakening, and the emergence of a China-backed alternative highlights how Beijing is rewriting the architecture of South Asian cooperation.
Turkey Enters The Scene
Adding another layer to India’s concerns is Turkey’s growing involvement. Ankara supported Pakistan militarily during Operation Sindoor, its brief conflict with India.
Today, Turkey is building defence ties with Bangladesh and exploring opportunities to establish arms manufacturing hubs there.
This creates the prospect of Turkey serving as a common denominator between India’s western and eastern neighbours, both of whom are already leaning toward China.
It complicates India’s diplomatic map further, introducing another actor with ambitions that could align against New Delhi’s interests.
The Geostrategic Value Of Bangladesh
Beyond politics and alliances, geography plays a crucial role in explaining why Bangladesh is so significant in this unfolding contest.
Sitting at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh offers China a gateway to the Indian Ocean that bypasses the Strait of Malacca.
This strait is a vulnerability for Beijing, as it is closely monitored by the United States and India. Access through Bangladesh would give China greater flexibility in securing its maritime trade and potentially deploying naval assets.
Ports like Payra and potential future facilities carry dual-use potential. Officially, they are commercial projects. Unofficially, they could serve as nodes for a Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal.
For India, which relies heavily on this maritime space for its own trade and security, the implications are stark.
Risks For Dhaka
For Bangladesh, the challenge is not whether to accept Chinese financing; it has already done so, and the projects are transforming the country’s infrastructure.
The question is whether Dhaka can ensure that Beijing remains a partner rather than a patron. That requires transparency in loan agreements, strict oversight of projects, and clear plans for generating revenue to service debts.
Without such safeguards, Bangladesh risks falling into the same trap as Sri Lanka, where debt dependency led to the surrender of strategic assets. Economic diversification is also key. Bangladesh already receives investment from Japan, India, and Western donors. Balancing these sources against China’s scale will be difficult but essential to preserve autonomy.
India’s Dilemma
India is watching these changes with unease. Historically, it has shared deep ties with Bangladesh, rooted in the liberation struggle of 1971.
Culturally, linguistically, and geographically, the two countries are bound in ways that no external power can replicate. Yet today, India finds itself portrayed in sections of Bangladeshi public opinion as an overbearing neighbour that backed an unpopular regime.
To counter this, New Delhi needs to re-engage not just with Dhaka’s government but also with its people. That means investing in connectivity projects that directly benefit citizens, offering credible alternatives in trade and infrastructure, and supporting Bangladesh’s own aspirations rather than appearing to dictate terms.
The challenge is to stay involved without being seen as interfering.
At the same time, India must prepare strategically for the possibility of a deeper Chinese footprint in Bangladesh. This includes strengthening its naval presence in the Bay of Bengal, bolstering ties with other regional partners such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and maintaining robust engagement with global powers committed to keeping the Indian Ocean free and open.
A Map In Flux
The Belt and Road Initiative has never been just about roads, bridges, or ports. In Bangladesh, it is redrawing the lines of influence across South Asia. The fall of Sheikh Hasina, the rise of Muhammad Yunus, the revival of Bangladesh–Pakistan ties, the push to replace SAARC, and the arrival of Turkey are all pieces of a larger puzzle in which China is the central player.
For India, the challenge is not only to adapt to this shifting map but also to ensure it is not boxed into a corner by the convergence of its neighbours under Beijing’s influence.
The coming years will test whether New Delhi can combine hard security with soft power to retain its place as South Asia’s natural leader, or whether the BRI will succeed in reorienting the region’s geopolitics in China’s favour.
- Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
- Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com
