China has more adversaries than allies in the Asia-Pacific region, driven by territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, with India at the Line of Actual Control, and with multiple claimants in the South China Sea. And on top of that, it remains embroiled in a geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
Relations with India have started to improve, but China’s strong support for Pakistan during the short May 2025 India-Pakistan war has created new distrust in New Delhi. Things are made worse by China’s rapid building of roads, airfields, and other projects near the border in Tibet, and by the frequent visits of Chinese “research ships” to the Indian Ocean—ships that India believes are gathering military intelligence.
China is currently engaged in a tense diplomatic standoff with Japan over the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about going to war with Beijing if it attacked Taiwan.
China also remains at loggerheads with the US, its primary rival and adversary. The two countries have been working together to cool things down on the trade front, but the military tensions in the Indo-Pacific persist.
Interestingly, revelations from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on December 1, 2025, underscore that internal rot and corruption within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could pose the greatest threat.
SIPRI research states that revenues for China’s major military corporations plummeted last year as corruption purges slowed arms contracts and procurement.
The study has come as a surprise because revenues from sales of arms and military services by the 100 largest arms-producing companies rose by 5.9% in 2024, reaching a record $679 billion.
Although the bulk of the global rise was attributed to enterprises based in Europe and the United States, there were year-on-year increases across all geographical regions featured in the Top 100, with Asia and Oceania the only exceptions, where issues within the Chinese arms industry drove down the regional total.
The revenues of China’s top military firms fell 10% last year, an intriguing finding given that China’s defense budget has continued to rise over the past three years.
The SIPRI report links the drop in revenues to China’s anti-graft campaign.
“A host of corruption allegations in Chinese arms procurement led to major arms contracts being postponed or cancelled in 2024,” said Nan Tian, director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Program. “This deepens uncertainty around the status of China’s military modernisation efforts and when new capabilities will materialise.”
It is no secret that President Xi Jinping has openly modeled his anti-corruption drive on Mao Zedong’s ruthless purges. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has used the campaign to clean out corruption—and disloyalty—from both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What began as a broad crackdown has grown much fiercer since late 2023, reaching a new peak in 2024–2025 with the sudden disappearance of several top generals and ministers.
In 2023, this sustained anti-corruption campaign targeted high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives, especially within the strategically vital PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).
The purge was driven by concerns over graft undermining military readiness, procurement integrity, and Xi’s control over the armed forces. A US Pentagon 2024 annual report on China’s military stated that at least 15 senior PLA officers and executives were removed between July and December 2023 alone.
More recently, in October 2025, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the expulsion of nine senior officers, including General He Weidong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the PLA’s second-highest-ranking uniformed officer.
These individuals were accused of “serious violations of Party discipline” and “duty-related crimes” involving “extremely large amounts of money,” with consequences described as “extremely serious and detrimental.”
Revenue drops were reported at China’s largest arms manufacturer, AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China), land-systems producer Norinco, and aerospace and missile manufacturer CASC. Of these state-owned firms, Norinco saw the steepest decline in revenue—falling 31% to $14 billion.
The SIPRI research states that corruption-related high-level personnel changes at Norinco and CASC triggered government reviews and project delays. Meanwhile, AVIC’s military aircraft deliveries slowed down.
In contrast to the abysmal performance reported in China, the revenue of Japanese firms surged by 40% and that of German firms by 36%, while the revenue of U.S. military firms rose only 4%. Even Russian firms recorded a 23% rise in revenue despite international sanctions.
Does Anti-Graft Campaign Affect PLA Modernisation?
Analysts believe that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has significantly affected the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military modernization efforts, primarily through short-term disruptions to leadership stability, procurement processes, and operational readiness.
While the campaign aims to enhance long-term effectiveness by rooting out graft and ensuring political loyalty, it has introduced delays and resource inefficiencies.
SIPRI researcher Xiao Liang stated that aerospace and cyber programs, as well as the schedule for the deployment of sophisticated technologies for the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force (PLARF), which manages its expanding stockpile of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, may be exposed.
This raises doubts about the PLA’s goal of having essential capabilities and combat readiness in place for its 100th anniversary, Liang added.
“However, in the medium and longer term, sustained investment in defense budgets and political commitment behind modernisation will continue, albeit with some program delays, higher costs and tighter control of procurement.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping has set a military modernization goal for the PLA to achieve the capabilities of a “world-class military” by 2027, the year marking the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding in 1927. And, by 2049, China aims to realize the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, transforming into a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country” that leads the world in composite national strength and international influence.
Yet the ongoing anti-corruption purges sweeping through the PLA and China’s defense industry could still cause delays, shortages of experienced officers, and disruptions in weapons programs.
Even so, they are unlikely to halt Beijing’s overall rise as a military power. The sheer scale of China’s military buildup remains unmistakable: the PLA Navy is expanding faster than any fleet in the world. It now operates three aircraft carriers, with more under construction.
Moreover, it is developing a range of cutting-edge hypersonic weapons. Not just that, it has two different fifth-generation stealth fighter jets now operational—the J-20 and the J-35A.
The J-20 fleet has surpassed the 300-mark, and a two-seater variant of the aircraft has been unveiled. Additionally, China’s nuclear arsenal is swelling, with about 1,000 nuke warheads expected by 2035, as per the prediction of the US.
China is expanding work on sixth-generation fighter jets, with two different prototypes flying and technology maturing. Meanwhile, the next-generation stealth bomber—the H-20—is believed to be nearing its debut.
The September 2025 military parade gave the world a glimpse into the PLA’s capability and made its adversaries gasp, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.
China seems to be advancing plans to seize Taiwan, a self-ruled island state that it considers its own sovereign territory, by force. And it continues to militarise the hotly contested South China Sea, despite opposition from regional and extra-regional players.
Furthermore, the country is determined to challenge the United States, and now wields a gargantuan inventory of missiles that can reach the US frontline territories, like Guam, but also target the continental United States.
In the end, Xi’s sweeping purges may delay his ambitious 2027 goal of forging a “world-class” military by a few years, forcing timelines to slip and some programs to stumble. Yet they are unlikely to derail the larger trajectory.
China’s rise as a dominant military power is too deeply funded, too systematically planned, and too fiercely driven to be stopped by even the harshest internal reckoning. The deadline may shift, but the destination remains inevitable.
- Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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