Just days after China’s September 3 military parade in Beijing, Pakistan announced the creation of a dedicated missile branch. Coming so soon after Beijing displayed strategic and conventional deep-strike systems, the move looked less like a coincidence and more like a reflection of shifting military realities across Asia. These realities must be understood in Europe as well.
On 3 September 2025, Beijing staged what was arguably its most ambitious military parade in years. Ostensibly commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan, the display served more than ceremonial purposes: it was a signal, intended for internal and external audiences alike, about China’s strategic direction.
Notably, it conveyed a message of deterrence to potential adversaries, above all, the United States. But there are lessons for Europe as well, not least in defensive deterrence.
Alongside members of the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese Navy (and new units like the cyberspace unit), an array of modern tech was on full display in the Beijing sunlight, with the world watching on.
From missiles to lasers, drones to nuclear triad components, the Chinese leadership presented a spectrum of systems, many of them new or newly prominent. The parade reaffirmed a central message: deterrence no longer means merely possessing nuclear weapons, but being able to strike with precision, at range, below the nuclear threshold.
For Europe, the implications are pressing not only as observers, but as actors with choices to make about defence posture, sovereignty, and investment.
The principal lesson to take away is that deterrence cannot rely solely on a nuclear umbrella, whether American or otherwise, but must also be based on the autonomous capacity to inflict calibrated damage on an adversary at any time and in any place, thereby reducing its offensive ambitions.
What Was On Display
Observers have noted that this mighty display of force and deterrence underscores China’s excellence in military hardware on land, at sea, and in the air.
According to Reuters, the parade featured “a sweeping display of strategic weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched systems and, crucially, new families of cruise missiles.”
These included the Yingji-17, Yingji-20, and Changjian-1000 hypersonic missiles, PLARF’s CJ-1000 scramjet-powered land attack cruise missile carried on a 10×10 truck, the land-based CJ-1000, and the air-launched, long-range CJ-20A.
Traditional ICBMs were on display, including the newly unveiled DF-61, as well as older systems such as Dongfeng-31 and DF-5C. China showed components of what could be called its nuclear triad: air-launched, land-launched, and submarine-launched strategic weapons.
The parade also showcased new drone systems (both aerial and underwater), the laser weapon LY-1, “robotic wolves”, and the colossal, 65-foot underwater drone, the AJX002.
China “not only wants to augment, but replace traditional structures”, noted Michael Raska, assistant professor in the military transformations programme at the Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, to the BBC.
Raska added that the Chinese push for ultra-modern tech integrated into its military systems has put it at the forefront of AI. “They are going all the way to integrate it into their systems,” he added.
But beyond the spectacle lies the strategic meaning: this is a demonstration of credibility, an unapologetic display of a ready-to-go strike capability.
As the U.S. and its allies take note, the parade’s message is that deterrence cannot rest solely on nuclear umbrellas. According to open‐source analysis, China’s recent investments reflect a shift toward conventional strike systems capable of imposing costs below the nuclear threshold.
In his 2024 study, Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observes that China’s evolving nuclear posture is increasingly intertwined with conventional strike and escalation management capabilities.
He notes that “the PLA’s growing interest in acquiring escalation management capabilities … carries significant implications for U.S.-China nuclear stability.” Rather than relying purely on ballistic missiles and counters, Beijing appears to favour a more layered deterrence model that blends nuclear and non-nuclear tools. China is reminding the world that its military ambitions now extend to conventional deep strike, anti-access, and denial operations.
A Lesson For Europe
For Europe, the lesson has been sobering. While the continent has invested in cutting-edge defensive systems such as the Patriot, SAMP/T, and IRIS-T systems, these remain limited in number and are designed to intercept, not to inflict damage.
And as the recent Russian drone intrusions into Polish territory showed, even the intrusion of virtually harmless devices can reveal vulnerabilities. Without credible long-range strike options, Europe risks being unable to impose costs below the nuclear threshold.
The continent relies on the United Kingdom and France for its nuclear deterrent, but beyond those arsenals, its conventional offensive strike capabilities are shallow.
Modern deterrence depends less on divisions of tanks or numbers of infantry than on the ability to degrade an adversary’s high-value assets like command posts, depots, ports, quickly and at a distance. The most effective deep precision strike (DPS) tools for that are cruise missiles.
Today, Europe faces a well-diagnosed capability gap in the 500–1,000 km range. Air and naval platforms exist (Rafale, Typhoon, F-35 fleets, and frigates with vertical launch systems), but the vectors themselves remain few. Land-based options are even more limited, which explains the push for a Land Cruise Missile (LCM) program led by MBDA. Without scale, Europe’s deterrent lacks credibility.
Cruise missiles matter because of their ability to penetrate defences: by flying low, varying trajectories, and using stealth profiles, they complicate detection and interception.
They can be subsonic or supersonic. “They are a very tough threat to deal with,” said Philip Coyle, senior science fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “They fly low, they don’t travel in a straight line, they can avoid radar detection.”
Unlike ballistic missiles, they maximize effect with fewer shots, reducing costs per effect. China’s show of force, which displayed a full range of cruise missiles for non-nuclear strikes, clearly takes this reality into account.
European Political Will
In July 2024, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland initiated ELSA, the European Long-Strike Approach, to develop a new generation of deep strike effectors with ranges beyond 500 km.
According to Reuters, the agreement aimed to “jointly develop long-range cruise missiles,” part of Europe’s effort to close the gap exposed by the war in Ukraine, and, according to then French defence minister Sebastien Lecornu, act as a deterrent.
Industry is positioning itself accordingly. MBDA has unveiled STRATUS, a family of future cruise and anti-ship missiles offering both low-observable and rapid-strike variants.
Eric Béranger, CEO of MBDA, said: “These new advances on STRATUS are the result of France, UK, and Italy’s strong commitment to develop Europe’s present and future critical capabilities…MBDA will continue to deliver on the next phase, bringing together France, the UK, and Italy to meet the armed forces’ needs and protect European citizens for the years to come.” Similarly, the aforementioned Land Cruise Missile (LCM) concept (evolved from the combat-proven MdCN) promises, in the next few years, metric precision, high survivability against integrated air defences, and flexibility across launch platforms.
But pooling projects is as much a political matter as a technical one. Europe’s challenge is threefold: to reduce dependence on the United States in a critical area of sovereignty, to rationalise fragmented defence budgets, and to pool industrial capacity for economies of scale.
Without alignment, fragmentation will undermine the very credibility Europe seeks. The stakes are high.
As Theodore Roosevelt once remarked in 1901, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” China has taken this maxim to heart. The question is whether Europe will summon the political will to do the same.
- OPED By Guest Author Diana Jonhson
- Views Personal of the Author
- The author can be reached at diana2johnson (at) proton.me
