China’s naval expansion is no longer a matter of abstract projections or distant ambition. It is visible, measurable, and increasingly operational.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has moved in two decades from a coastal force to the world’s largest navy by hull numbers outpacking the US.
Recently, China conducted coordinated operations involving about 100 naval and coast guard vessels across the East and South China Seas. This was not the first time, and this is how Beijing terrorizes smaller powers: persistent presence, coercive signalling, and readiness for escalation without necessarily crossing the threshold.
The Pace & Direction Of Naval Growth
China’s naval growth is impressive not only for its scale but also for its coherence.
Unlike many countries updating their navies with newer vessels, the PLAN’s modernization drive follows a clear operational logic.
Warships, submarines, combat jets, space-based surveillance, and coast guards are being developed as parts of an integrated system. This is what facilitates quick, mass deployments, intricate drills, and synchronized formations across multiple sectors, as seen in the late-2025 surge reported by intelligence sources.
China already fields over 370 warships, the largest in the world, and is expected to have or even exceed 400 by 2030.
It’s not just numbers; China is also developing a modern, cutting-edge navy, including gigantic destroyers, cruisers, amphibious assault ships, and advanced submarines, which are quickly replacing older, lightly armed platforms.
The PLAN of 2026 will be structurally different from the PLAN of 2010: more blue-water, more integrated, more confident.
Carrier Aviation as a Strategic Turning Point
The maturation of China’s aircraft carrier program is both stunning and exemplary. Liaoning and Shandong, while constrained by ski-jump decks and older design, have already proven valuable as training platforms and power-projection tools.
Their increasingly frequent deployments into the Philippine Sea and around Taiwan demonstrate that China is learning to sustain air operations at sea, a domain the US has long mastered.
The commissioning and operationalization of the third carrier, Fujian, represents a more profound shift. With electromagnetic catapults, larger displacement, and the ability to launch heavier aircraft, Fujian is designed for real combat.
Catapult systems allow for airborne early warning aircraft, heavier strike loads, and more flexible sortie generation.
This moves China closer to the kind of carrier aviation that underpins U.S. naval power. By 2026, even if Fujian is still refining its operational routines, its mere presence complicates planning for Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.
Reports of a fourth carrier under construction underscore that Beijing is not content with a token carrier force. A fleet of four to five carriers would allow rotational deployment, maintenance cycles, and simultaneous pressure in multiple directions: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and potentially the Indian Ocean.
Amphibious & Gray-Zone Power
China’s rapid expansion of amphibious capability is concerning and noteworthy. The Type-075 large-deck assault ships already in service give Beijing a credible platform for helicopter-borne operations.
Meanwhile, the emerging Type-076 design suggests experimentation with drone operations and possibly fixed-wing aviation from amphibious decks.
These ships are tailor-made for operations in the Taiwan scenario: rapid force insertion, seizure of offshore islands, and sustained presence along contested coastlines.
Yet Beijing’s most sophisticated innovation may lie in its blending of military and non-military maritime power. The Chinese Coast Guard, maritime militia, and fishing fleets operate as tools of state strategy, allowing China to apply pressure without triggering immediate military response.
Large coast guard flotillas operating alongside naval units blur the line between law enforcement and warfare. For Taiwan and Southeast Asian states, this creates a constant low-level crisis: responding too weakly invites further encroachment, responding strongly risks escalation.
Surface Combatants & Undersea Modernization
China’s current surface fleet is now built around platforms such as the Type-055 and Type-052D destroyers.
These warships are armed with state-of-the-art radars, long-range missiles, and land-attack capabilities. They are not only designed to defend China’s coast but also to escort carrier strike groups, protect sea lanes, and project power.
China continues to invest heavily in both nuclear-powered and conventional submarines, with newer classes emphasizing quieter propulsion, longer endurance, and vertical launch systems.
According to reports, China has 32 active nuclear submarines, overtaking Russia’s 25 to 28. The US leads the pack as the world’s biggest nuclear submarine force, operating 71 as of 31 December 2025.
Even without perfect parity with U.S. undersea technology, the sheer growth of China’s submarine fleet complicates anti-submarine warfare in the Western Pacific. It raises the costs of intervention for any external power.
The US Department of Defense (DOD) states that China’s navy “is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries”.
“The… overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030,” the US Congress research paper said.
Budgetary Priorities & Political Intent
China’s official defence budget has continued to grow steadily, typically at 6–8% annually in recent years. In nominal terms, this places China’s military spending well above that of any country except the USA.
More important than the number is the allocation pattern. A considerable share of investment is moving towards naval construction, aerospace systems, missile forces, cyber and space capabilities, and joint command infrastructure.
This reflects Xi Jinping’s aspirations. Beijing is not preparing only for border skirmishes; it is building a military to project power outside the South China Sea. Beijing has already declared itself a near-Arctic state and may look to exert dominance there in the near future, along with Russia.
It is also important to recognize that China’s official defence budget likely understates real military spending. Research and development, state subsidies to shipyards, dual-use infrastructure, and paramilitary maritime forces often sit outside formal defence accounts.
When these are taken into account, the scale of China’s maritime investment becomes even clearer.
Changes?
From 2026, the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific will likely be shaped by three realities.
First, China will have a more operationally mature Aircraft Carrier force, even if still behind the US Navy in experience and expertise.
Second, its ability to conduct coordinated, multi-theatre naval operations will continue to grow, as demonstrated by complex and large-scale military exercises and deployments.
Third, regional actors like Taiwan, the Philippines, and, to some extent, Japan will be operating under sustained pressure rather than episodic crises.
This does not mean war is inevitable. China’s maritime strategy appears designed to avoid open conflict while steadily shifting the balance of power.
Large naval drills, aggressive patrols, and Gray-zone operations normalize Beijing’s presence and test others’ responses. Over time, this can erode the credibility of existing security arrangements without a single shot being fired.
Threats to Indo-Pacific Order
The implications for the Indo-Pacific are profound. For Taiwan, the threat is not only invasion but also blockade, quarantine, and psychological exhaustion.
For Japan, especially in the southwest islands, China’s naval reach challenges territorial defence and complicates reinforcement routes. For the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states, China’s growing ability to project power into the South China Sea weakens their bargaining position and tests alliance commitments.
For the US, China’s naval growth does not yet offset American power, but it does raise the costs and risks of intervention.
Washington must now assume that any Taiwan contingency will involve dense missile threats, contested sea and air control, and complex multi-domain operations. That reality shapes alliance planning, force posture, and diplomatic signalling across the region.
Conclusion
China’s unprecedented naval expansion is not a momentary surge but a well-planned and structural transformation.
China’s PLA Navy has been designed to coerce without fighting when possible and to fight effectively if coercion fails.
The PLA Navy will be more capable, more confident, and more embedded in China’s broader strategy of reshaping the regional order.
The challenge for the Indo-Pacific is not simply how to respond to individual deployments or exercises, but how to preserve stability in an environment where power is increasingly exercised through persistence rather than open war.
- Gurjit Singh is a former Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union Chair, CII Task Force on Trilateral Cooperation in Africa, Professor, IIT Indore.
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