On May 19, the FighterBomber Telegram channel—typically a reliable source for insights into Russian military aviation—suggested in a post that Russia’s A-100 AEW&CS development program had been canceled.
The last official statement on the A-100 program was issued in December 2023, when Rostec reported that its subsidiary, Vega Concern, was delivering modernized A-50 AEW&CS aircraft to the Russian armed forces while concurrently developing the more advanced A-100 AEW&CS.
The report noted that the A-100 is intended to replace the A-50 system and will significantly surpass it in capability.
The A-100 features a fully digital navigation system, a digital flight control system with a “glass” cockpit, and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This “flying radar” system is mounted on an Il-76MD-90A airframe, which is powered by new, low-noise, high-thrust PS-90A-76 engines.
Reasons For Cancellation
There is considerable speculation on social media regarding the reasons behind the reported cancellation of Russia’s A-100 AEW&CS program. The prevailing narrative attributes the cancellation to Western sanctions, which allegedly hindered Russia’s ability to procure components for the advanced system.
However, this explanation warrants skepticism. The A-100’s first flight occurred in 2017, with flight testing beginning in 2019.
Its first flight with an operational radar reportedly took place in February 2022. Given that Russia has been under sanctions since 2014, it is unlikely that the country would have continued developing such a critical system while remaining heavily reliant on Western components.
More plausible reasons for the program’s cancellation or pause could include:
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Combat losses highlighting the vulnerability of airborne radar systems to long-range missiles.
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A review of system requirements, shaped by operational experience and the evolving dynamics of drone warfare.
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The feasibility of cheaper, more flexible alternatives to traditional AEW&CS platforms
The FighterBomber Telegram channel, in a follow-up post, hinted at at least two of these factors.
Vulnerability To Long-Range Missiles
When AEW&CS platforms were originally conceived, there were no air- or ground-launched missiles capable of seriously threatening them at their typical standoff distances. These aircraft could operate deep within friendly airspace while surveilling enemy territory. That paradigm has changed.
Modern long-range missiles—with ranges exceeding 300 km—now pose a credible threat to AEW&CS aircraft, even when they operate at maximum standoff range.
Russia is believed to have lost two A-50s in such incidents:
- January 14, 2024: An A-50 was reportedly downed over the Sea of Azov by a U.S.-supplied Patriot missile operated by Ukraine.
- February 23, 2024: A second A-50 was allegedly shot down over Russia’s Krasnodar Krai by a Soviet-era S-200 missile.
Both incidents likely stemmed from the aircraft straying into the lethal envelope of air defense systems due to inadequate situational awareness. Compounding the threat, many modern AD systems are highly mobile, making them difficult to track and predict.
An airborne radar with a 300 km surveillance range is highly advantageous if enemy missile systems have a 60–70 km reach. However, that advantage erodes—and the risk to the platform increases significantly—when missile ranges exceed 150 km, especially if their launchers are mobile and untrackable.
While AEW&CS platforms are equipped with defensive countermeasures, the recent losses indicate that these systems do not guarantee survivability. The threat will only grow as AD missile ranges continue to increase.
Rapid Evolution Of Drone Warfare
Following the A-100’s maiden flight, Russia’s Ministry of Defense–run Red Star newspaper reported that the platform would serve as a command center for drones, leveraging the extended line-of-sight offered by its airborne position.
However, drone warfare is evolving rapidly. Since drone capabilities are increasingly defined by onboard data processing, their advancement may loosely follow Moore’s Law.
This technological momentum may have caused scope creep in the original qualitative requirements for the A-100, potentially making its envisioned role as a drone control hub obsolete or impractical.
The very concept of an airborne drone control platform may now be outdated, given the rise of low-latency satellite communication constellations like Starlink. Ukraine has demonstrated this effectively by operating drones deep inside Russian territory using Elon Musk’s Starlink network.
In this context, Russia’s most viable course may be to double down on the modernization of its A-50 fleet—at least until the dust settles and the long-term role of airborne command platforms becomes clearer.
AEW&CS Alternatives
Perhaps the most compelling reason to abandon the A-100 program is Russia’s potential shift toward an alternative aerial warning and control architecture—one in which high-endurance fighter aircraft equipped with long-range radars and missiles function as distributed nodes of an AEW&CS network.
While such a shift might seem risky amidst an ongoing conflict and a perceived existential threat from NATO, Russia possesses the necessary hardware, software, and tactical experience to implement this new concept.
Three operational fighters—MiG-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-57—are already equipped with long-range radar systems and networking capabilities that allow them to act as airborne surveillance and control platforms. Additionally, the Su-34 fighter-bomber can carry specialized reconnaissance pods on external pylons, expanding its role beyond strike missions.
Russia has effectively modularized the capabilities of its Tu-214-based reconnaissance aircraft into three externally mounted pods for the Su-34:
UKR-RT: An ELINT pod that detects, locates, and analyzes enemy radio communications, radar emissions, and data links, enabling the targeting of command centers and UAV control stations.
UKR-OE: An optical-electronic pod for round-the-clock visual surveillance to locate and identify ground targets.
UKR-RL: A radar reconnaissance pod with side-looking radar sensors capable of detecting concealed or camouflaged targets in all weather conditions.
Together, these pods greatly enhance the Su-34’s reconnaissance capabilities. When networked with other advanced fighters, they can provide theater-wide situational awareness through real-time sensor fusion, creating a distributed and resilient alternative to traditional airborne early warning systems.
Increased Versatility, Reduced Vulnerability
Russia has already tested networked operations involving its fighters. Not only can Su-57 fighters operate in a networked environment with each other, but they can also be integrated with Su-35S fighters and S-400 air defense systems.
All four of Russia’s frontline fighters—the Su-57, Su-35S, Su-34, and MiG-31BM—are capable of carrying long-range air-to-air missiles like the RVV-BD (R-37).
The operational costs of maintaining a network of fighters would likely be no higher than operating a traditional AEW&CS platform, which typically requires its own escort fighters for protection.
Conclusion
Notably, in November 2023, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation published a patent for a multifunctional two-seat stealth aircraft, believed to be a twin-seat variant of the Su-57.
According to TASS, which obtained a copy of the patent, the aircraft is designed to detect and engage air, ground, and surface targets. It also serves as an airborne command post for network-centric operations involving mixed aircraft groups.
The increasing cost, complexity, and vulnerability of traditional AEW&CS systems raise serious questions about their long-term viability. Russia may well be the first nation to recognize—and act upon—the writing on the wall.
