Indian PM Narendra Modi recently inaugurated the Highway Landing Strip (HLS) for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) aircraft operations in the East on Moran Highway in Assam.
Close to the China border, India has turned one more highway into a runway for all types of aircraft in its inventory. The 4.2-km facility, erroneously termed an Emergency Landing Facility (ELF), has been carved out of a National Highway in Dibrugarh district, Upper Assam.
It is near IAF’s Chabua airbase, which is the north-easternmost IAF fighter base, and isn’t far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. It is strategically sensitive due to proximity to China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, and logistically challenging due to the terrain.
The event comes just after IAF operationalized the Nyoma airfield in Ladakh.
Around 16 IAF aircraft, including Rafale and Su-30 MKI fighters, and C-130J Special operation aircraft (flew the PM) took part in the event. The strip is also fit for the 265-ton (77-ton payload) C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft.
The HLS landing event in Assam was the most elaborate one to date. IAF had earlier operated from HLSs on the Greater Noida-Agra Yamuna expressway, the Agra-Lucknow Expressway, NH-925A in Rajasthan (Barmer), and the Meerut-Ballia Ganga Expressway.
These strips of highways allow fighter jets and heavy aircraft to land during emergencies or wartime contingencies. They are designed to serve as alternate runways if airbases are targeted or rendered unusable.
The IAF and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) have identified around 28 HLS for development across India. Approximately 15 facilities are reported as ready or active across various states.
The blending of highways and a runway reveals India’s “strategic resolve”. The HLS will boost national security and disaster preparedness. The airstrip will enhance dispersed and survivable air power in combat scenarios.
Large Airbase Assets
Traditionally, air forces have built large airbases with extensive infrastructure. This included runways, operational areas, storage hangars, large tarmacs with sun-shelters, maintenance facilities and labs, armament and fuel storage, administrative areas, and housing, among others.
Air Forces with global reach had to build these in their territories abroad or in friendly foreign countries. All this costs a lot of money and time to build and operate.
When operational requirements reduced after major conflicts, like happened after World War II, most of these airbases had to be abandoned and became disused. Also, after the end of the Cold War, the US Air Force (USAF) greatly reduced its use of foreign air bases.
In the case of India, the initial airbase locations and other operational infrastructure were Pakistan-centric. Later, there was a need to shift the focus to the northern border, with a China-centric approach.
Large Permanent Airbases Easy Targets
Satellite-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities today provide detailed information on a permanent airbase. Modern weapons have global-strike capability with high precision and lethality.
Airbase is a high-value target. During “Op Sindoor” between 8 and 10 May, India targeted 11 Pakistani airbases, including key air stations at Nur Khan, Jacobabad, and Sargodha. In these attacks, India employed a combination of SCALP and BrahMos missiles.
Pakistan’s Air Force has also been practising using highways and advanced landing grounds for dispersed operations, enhancing survivability if main bases are targeted, like in Op Sindoor.
The PAF has conducted landings on motorways such as the Lahore-Islamabad stretch with F-7P fighters in 2000, Mirage III/F-7P in 2010 during Exercise Highmark, and repeated drills in 2019 and 2020.
This was a classic case of a country needing Highway Landing Strips, as the Indian Air Force annihilated nearly a dozen airbases. Had the clashes continued, the PAF would likely have tried to operate from the HLS.
The best air defences may not be able to stop all the strikes. These can therefore cause considerable damage.
For example, Guam is a major USAF airbase in the Pacific, to take on China, and the Americans would have to defend it at any cost. Conversely, the Chinese are building their operational inventory to neutralise it.
Similarly, some Indian Air Bases, such as Ambala, which are relevant to both Pakistan and China contingencies, are high-value assets. Also, it is not possible to build large airfields in areas where the conflict starts after a trigger event.
In such a case, one has to depend on regional partners’ assets, as the U.S. did during operations against Iraq by using Saudi airbases like Dhahran. This, too, may not always be possible because of local political sensitivities.
Agile Air Operations Concept
The ability to project power cannot be compromised. Major air forces of the world, especially those that must plan for out-of-area contingencies, have thus begun evolving a new concept: creating self-contained, mobile air force units that will use specially designed highway stretches as operating surfaces.
Such a concept has existed in the IAF mainly to take over an enemy or disused airfields during contingencies. Highways exist in most major countries, including India. A forward arming and refuelling point (FARP), or forward area refuelling point, is an existing NATO term for an area where aircraft (typically helicopters) can be refuelled and re-armed at a location closer to their area of operations than their main operating base.
This was also used for Harrier vertical Take-off jet operations. The concept, on a larger scale, is now being applied to fighter operations.
The USAF has formalised and introduced Agile Combat Employment (ACE), a proactive scheme for agile air power projection at short notice. The concept requires identification of road/highway stretches that have been prepared for possible air operations.
These stretches are duly marked for air operations. There are no access roads crossing these stretches. Small aircraft parking and servicing aprons are created at either end or at both ends. Such aprons would be suitably camouflaged and may be set in forest-like surroundings.
The Command and Control (C2) will be through minimal secure satellite mobile communications. Each launch pad will have man-portable AD systems. It will include a counter-drone capability.
A mobile servicing cum replenishing unit is especially designed for the purpose. This includes vehicles for Fuel, Oils, and Lubricants (FOL) and dedicated armament-carrying and loading vehicles.
Normally, their requirement is to service only around 4 aircraft at a time. There will be a universal power generation unit for both lighting and powering the aircraft.
The storage and replenishment point for these vehicles could be a nearby warehouse. It will require minimal manpower. In the event of a major technical problem with the aircraft, the modern fault-diagnostics system will transmit information to the main repair base, which could be a few hundred kilometres away. A crack team of specialists would be heli-lifted for further repairs.
Modern fifth-generation aircraft that require conformal carriage would have limitations on the quantum of on-board fuel. They would invariably require aerial refuelling. With very long-range aerial missiles, the Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) will be forced to maintain farther from the frontline. The ACE concept will be advantageous in that context as well.
Leveraging local commercial markets can alleviate stress on the distribution system. It can thus be seen that the infrastructure requirement is minimal.
A cluster of launch pads or contingency locations can be fed by a central logistics and maintenance support centre, like a hub-and-spoke set up. Such launch and recovery pads can be built in larger numbers, often at short notice. ACE offers great flexibility. ACE will work well, especially since in a contested environment, air superiority may not be easy to achieve.
Complicate Enemy Targeting
The ACE will certainly complicate the enemy’s targeting process and create operational dilemmas for the adversary. The system will be highly mobile. After forward objectives are achieved, the launch pad can be deactivated.
In the event of advancing forces, fresh pads can be created in advance. All launch pad relocations will be proactive manoeuvres that alter the adversary’s or enemy’s understanding of friendly intentions and capabilities.
It will be an aggressive use of mobility and dispersion of forces and assets. ACE positions the force within the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop across all domains.
It will increase survivability and support reposition forces for follow-on operations. It will also complicate the adversary’s Anti-access and area-denial capabilities.
It will create a dilemma and complicate the adversary’s operational response and tempo. This will make targeting by adversaries much more complex and put a premium on timely intelligence.
India’s Highway Landing Strips
All the new expressways being built in the country have 3-kilometre or longer straight stretches for IAF aircraft to operate. The stretches have approach paths clear from obstacles as per specifications.
The stretches have runway markings identical to those at IAF airfields. The side berms have been kept clear of obstructions. The highway pole lights have been replaced with ground lighting to cater to aircraft operations.
At the ends of these highway runway stretches is a larger area for the aircraft to turn around. Securing these strips and IAF assets is managed by the IAF in close coordination with the civil police or paramilitary agencies. IAF has been conducting landings and takeoffs from most of these stretches.
Such highway strips are created for use in emergencies and war-like situations, which may render air force bases inaccessible due to bombing or other calamities, such as earthquakes, as happened in Bhuj in January 2001.
The Indian government has recognized the operational importance of these strips and is now accelerating efforts to build many more. Various government departments could now explore the possibility of greater civil use during calamities.
As of late 2025, India has 44 operational expressways, with a rapidly expanding network exceeding 6,000 km in total length and over 11,000 km under construction, and many more under planning. Most expressways are fit for fighter jet operations.
The expressways connecting Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, U.P., Bihar, West Bengal, the North Eastern States, Rajasthan, and Gujarat have immediate operational significance due to their proximity to borders.
Expressways in southern states are important as India shifts its focus to the Indian Ocean. The concept is interesting for the IAF to implement, and it will greatly increase the Air Force’s freedom of action.
IAF Preparation for Operationally Limiting Environment
Each major airbase should initially be assigned a few expressway stretches to manage and build ACE-related support infrastructure and logistics.
Tailor-able force packages would have to be evolved. It will require rapidly establishing short-duration air traffic services (ATS) under austere conditions for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets, on an expeditionary basis, for missions of short duration and limited scope. Quick reaction teams (QRT) would have to be created.
The aircrew would have to regularly train to land and operate from such locations. The mission may not land back at the same launch pad and be retrieved from a far-off location, providing operational flexibility.
Air warriors would need to be trained in skills to operate in a contested, degraded, and operationally limited environment, and to execute distributed operations that increase survivability while generating combat power. They will have to operate with minimal equipment and personnel footprints.
The operating area Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) will have to be evolved. These would list equipment and supply pre-positioning, scalable logistics packages, and resupply sources.
IAF already operates in a networked environment. Secure satellite data-links will be used to feed relevant operational mission information, including situational awareness and operational priorities.
It will make IAF operations lighter, leaner, and more agile. IAF will be able to redistribute posture through operational unpredictability afforded by an increased number of dispersed locations.
Location shifts could mean a shift in command and control, and the SOPs for flexibility would need to be worked out. ACE will require multi-tasking air warriors to accomplish tasks outside of their core air force specialty. This concept is well established in most modern air forces. This would have to strengthen in the IAF too.
Leveraging advances in artificial intelligence, automation, augmentation, and human-machine teaming would make operations smoother and more effective, and increase commanders’ ability to rapidly develop, execute, and transition between missions.
Dispersal plans from specific permanent airbases would have to be put in the operational contingency plans. Only a few launch pads, among the many, will be occupied at any given time, and these will be in the active war theatres.
Lastly, the QRTs will also be used for outside-area contingencies, especially when landing on semi-prepared surfaces, as IAF landed a C-130 in Wadi Sayyidna, Sudan, during operation ‘Kaveri’.
Options and Way Ahead India
The concept is a revolutionary change in how the air forces think about and conduct operations. It is a forward-looking concept with greater flexibility and “punch for the buck”.
It is applicable to both offensive and defensive operational approaches, especially in a contested environment. This will enable quicker and more effective offensive operations following the adversary’s initiation of conflict.
It enables dispersed forces to adapt and prevail despite uncertainty. Closer to the Tactical Battlefield Area (TBA), such operations can be supported or secured by the Indian Army. If a similar concept had been applied by Ukraine, a significant part of its air force would still have been operational.
A large adversary like China wields a disruptive, dangerous operational reach through mass, precision, and speed. They can challenge India’s ability to project power from large airfields by targeting them.
The concept will mitigate the adversary’s technological advancements in ISR, and its advantage in long-range strike, and reduce risk to own airbases and assets. It will adjust to a changing operational environment and the evolving character and phase of war.
The ACE concept shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructure to a network of smaller, operationally viable locations. ACE concept potential will maximize in a highly lethal, hyperactive battlefield.
The operating stretch of the expressway may be changed on an as-required basis. IAF may run a few pilot projects to begin with. Thereafter, training will be needed to make the air force more flexible and agile.
The scheme should also work very well in some advanced landing grounds in Ladakh and India’s North East. This could also work well in island territories.
Out-of-the-box thinking often yields operationally sound, viable solutions. Let us stop using defensive names such as “Emergency Landing Strips” and call them “Advanced Operating Airstrips” (AOS).
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired) is an Indian Air Force veteran, fighter test pilot, and ex-director-general of the Center for Air Power Studies. He has been decorated with gallantry and distinguished service medals during his 40-year tenure in the IAF.
- THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- He tweets @Chopsyturvey
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